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Abstract 
Financial discussion boards (FDBs) have been widely used for a variety of financial 
knowledge exchange activities through the posting of comments. Popular public 
FDBs are prone to be used as a medium for spreading misleading financial 
information due to having larger audience groups. Moderation of posted content 
heavily relies on manual tasks. Unfortunately, the daily comments volume received 
on popular FDBs realistically prevents human moderators or relevant authorities 
from proactively monitoring and moderating possibly fraudulent FDB content as it is 
extremely time-consuming and expensive to manually read all the content. 
This thesis presents a financial crime analysis methodology (which is comprised of 
novel forward analysis and novel backward analysis methodologies) implemented in 
a template-based Information Extraction (IE) prototype system, namely FDBs Miner 
(FDBM). The methodologies aim to detect potentially illegal Pump and Dump (P&D) 
activities on FDBs with the integration of per minute share prices in the detection 
process. This integration can reduce false positives during the detection as it 
categorises the potentially illegal comments into different risk levels for investigation 
purposes. 
P&D is a well-known financial crime that happens through different methods 
including FDBs. P&D happens when fraudsters deceive investors into buying stocks 
by spreading misleading information. FDBM extracts a company’s ticker symbol (i.e. 
a unique symbol that represents and identifies each listed company on the stock 
market), comments and share prices from FDBs based in the UK for experimental 
purposes. Results from both forward and backward analysis experiments show that 
the two novel methodologies can aid relevant authorities in the detection of 
potentially illegal activities on FDBs. Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) experiments 
have also shown that the approach could be adopted in the process of detecting 
potentially illegal activities on FDBs. 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgement 
I am indebted and thankful to my parents who supported me financially to pursue 
my PhD research in the UK. I am also wholeheartedly grateful to my supervisors, Dr 
Majdi Owda and Dr Keeley Crockett, who did not give up on me when I did not 
progress well due to personal matters. I appreciate their efforts in always pulling me 
back on track, following up my work and guiding me throughout the entire process 
of my PhD research journey, right up to the last minute. Also, thank you to the 
anonymous expert in the field who validates the financial crime keyword template 
and was part of one of the conducted experiments. I would also like to give special 
thanks to my best friend for giving me a lot of positive vibes, listening to my problems 
and being patient with me for years. Thank you to my best housemate for two years, 
who took care of my meals when I was stressed out due to my PhD research. Lastly, 
I also thank my other Malaysian friends who were there for me in the first two years 
of my PhD journey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Declaration .................................................................................................................... i 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ ii 
Acknowledgement ...................................................................................................... iii 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................... ix 
Glossary ....................................................................................................................... xi 
List of Publications ..................................................................................................... xii 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................ xiii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... xv 
Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background and Motivation .......................................................................... 2 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives ........................................................................ 5 
1.3 List of Contributions ...................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Thesis Outline ................................................................................................ 8 
Chapter 2. Financial Discussion Boards and Financial Crimes ............................... 11 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 11 
2.2 London Stock Exchange ............................................................................... 12 
2.3 Share Price Based Financial Discussion Boards (FDBs)................................ 13 
2.3.1 ADVFN .................................................................................................. 14 
2.3.2 London South East ............................................................................... 15 
2.3.3 Interactive Investor .............................................................................. 16 
2.3.4 Identified Semantically Understandable Artefacts .............................. 18 
2.4 Stock Market Regulatory Agencies .............................................................. 20 
2.4.1 United States of America ..................................................................... 21 
2.4.2 United Kingdom ................................................................................... 21 
2.5 Financial Crimes on Share Price Based FDBs ............................................... 23 
v 
 
2.6 Existing Pump and Dump Related Research ............................................... 25 
2.6.1 Emails ................................................................................................... 25 
2.6.2 Social Media ......................................................................................... 26 
2.6.3 Financial Discussion Boards ................................................................. 26 
2.7 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................ 28 
Chapter 3. Information Extraction and Semantic Textual Similarity ..................... 30 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 30 
3.2 Unstructured, Semi-Structured and Structured Data ................................. 31 
3.2.1 RSS Feeds ............................................................................................. 32 
3.3 Information Extraction (IE) .......................................................................... 33 
3.4 An Overview of Semantic Similarity Measures ........................................... 35 
3.4.1 Applications of Semantic Similarity Measures ..................................... 35 
3.5 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................ 37 
Chapter 4. A Methodology for Financial Crime Detection on Share Price Based 
Financial Discussion Boards ....................................................................................... 38 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 38 
4.2 Identification of Share Price Based FDBs and Semantically Understandable 
Artefacts ................................................................................................................. 38 
4.3 An Overall Methodology for the Detection of Potentially Illegal Activities on 
FDBs 40 
4.3.1 Phase 1: Implement a Data Crawler .................................................... 41 
4.3.2 Phase 2: Implement a Data Transformer ............................................. 41 
4.3.3 Phase 3: Devise a Dataset for Storing Data.......................................... 42 
4.3.4 Phase 4: Construct a Pump and Dump Keyword Template ................. 42 
4.3.5 Phase 5: Devise a Forward Analyser .................................................... 43 
4.3.6 Phase 6: Devise a Backward Analyser .................................................. 44 
vi 
 
4.3.7 Phase 7: Implement Semantic Textual Similarity................................. 44 
4.4 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................ 45 
Chapter 5. An Architecture for Financial Crime Detection on Share Price Based 
Financial Discussion Boards ....................................................................................... 46 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 46 
5.2 Prototype Architecture Overview ............................................................... 46 
5.3 Data Crawler ................................................................................................ 50 
5.3.1 Collecting Ticker Symbols ..................................................................... 50 
5.3.2 Collecting Share Prices ......................................................................... 50 
5.3.3 Collecting Comments ........................................................................... 51 
5.3.4 Collecting Other Artefacts Data ........................................................... 51 
5.3.5 An Overview of the Data Collection ..................................................... 51 
5.4 Data Transformer ........................................................................................ 52 
5.4.1 Pre-processing Collected Ticker Symbols............................................. 52 
5.4.2 Pre-processing Collected Comments ................................................... 53 
5.4.3 Pre-processing Collected Share Prices ................................................. 54 
5.5 Financial Discussion Boards Dataset (FDB-DS) ............................................ 54 
5.6 Pump and Dump (P&D) Keyword Template ................................................ 57 
5.7 Forward Analyser......................................................................................... 59 
5.7.1 Comment Flagging ............................................................................... 59 
5.7.2 Price Matching ..................................................................................... 59 
5.7.3 Threshold Labelling .............................................................................. 60 
5.8 Backward Analyser ...................................................................................... 61 
5.8.1 Moving Average Calculation ................................................................ 61 
5.8.2 Alert Labelling ...................................................................................... 65 
5.8.3 Alert Matching ..................................................................................... 66 
vii 
 
5.9 Graphical User Interface (GUI) .................................................................... 66 
5.9.1 Data Crawler GUI .................................................................................. 66 
5.9.2 Forward Analyser GUI .......................................................................... 72 
5.9.3 Backward Analyser GUI ........................................................................ 75 
5.10 Chapter Summary .................................................................................... 77 
Chapter 6. Forward and Backward Analysis of Potentially Illegal Comments ....... 79 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 79 
6.2 Experiment 1: Forward Analysis of FDB Comments .................................... 80 
6.2.1 Methodology ........................................................................................ 80 
6.2.2 Results and Discussions ........................................................................ 81 
6.3 Experiment 2: Forward Analysis of FDB Comments and Prices .................. 84 
6.3.1 Methodology ........................................................................................ 85 
6.3.2 Results and Discussions ........................................................................ 86 
6.4 Statistical Test and Summary of Forward Analysis Experiments ................ 88 
6.5 Experiment 3: Backward Analysis of Prices ................................................. 90 
6.5.1 Methodology ........................................................................................ 91 
6.5.2 Results and Discussions ........................................................................ 93 
6.6 Experiment 4: Backward Analysis of Prices and FDB Comments ................ 97 
6.6.1 Methodology ........................................................................................ 97 
6.6.2 Results and Discussions ........................................................................ 98 
6.7 Statistical Test and Summary of Backward Analysis Experiments ............ 104 
6.8 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................... 109 
Chapter 7. Semantic Similarity Measures for Analysis of Financial Discussion 
Board Comments ..................................................................................................... 111 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 111 
7.2 Application of STS to FDB Comments Overview ....................................... 112 
viii 
 
7.2.1 Methodology for Data Generation .................................................... 112 
7.3 Experiment 1: Human Expert Comments Labelling .................................. 117 
7.3.1 Hypothesis .......................................................................................... 118 
7.3.2 Methodology ...................................................................................... 118 
7.3.3 Results and Discussions ...................................................................... 118 
7.4 Experiment 2: STS Approach for Comments Flagging ............................... 120 
7.4.1 Hypothesis .......................................................................................... 123 
7.4.2 Methodology ...................................................................................... 123 
7.4.3 Results and Discussions ...................................................................... 124 
7.5 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................... 128 
Chapter 8. Conclusion and Further Work ............................................................ 129 
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 129 
8.2 Thesis Summary ......................................................................................... 129 
8.3 Contributions Summary ............................................................................ 131 
8.4 Future Directions ....................................................................................... 132 
8.5 Overall Conclusion ..................................................................................... 133 
References ................................................................................................................ 135 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................... 144 
Appendix B ............................................................................................................... 147 
Appendix C ............................................................................................................... 153 
Appendix D ............................................................................................................... 159 
Appendix E ............................................................................................................... 170 
Appendix F ................................................................................................................ 171 
Appendix G ............................................................................................................... 179 
 
 
ix 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AIM  Alternative Investment Market 
CSV  Comma-Separated Values 
EMA  Exponential Moving Average 
FCA  Financial Conduct Authority 
FDB  Financial Discussion Boards 
FDB-DS Financial Discussion Boards Dataset 
FDBM  Financial Discussion Boards Miner 
FSA  Financial Services Authority 
FTSE  Financial Times Stock Exchange 
HTML  HyperText Markup Language 
HTTP  Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
HTTPS  Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 
IE  Information Extraction 
II  Insider Information 
III  Interactive Investors FDB 
IR  Information Retrieval 
KE  Knowledge Engineer 
LSA  Latent Semantic Analysis 
LSE  London Stock Exchange 
LSE-FDB London South East Financial Discussion Board 
MA  Moving Average 
MAD  Market Abuse Directive 
x 
 
MAR  Market Abuse Regulation 
NLTK  Natural Language Toolkit 
P&D  Pump and Dump 
PRA  Prudential Regulatory Authority 
RNS  Regulatory News 
RSS  Really Simple Syndication 
SEC  Security Exchange and Commission 
SMA  Simple Moving Average 
STS  Semantic Textual Similarity 
SVD  Singular Value Decomposition 
URI  Uniform Resource Identifier 
URL  Universal Resource Locator 
WMA  Weighted Moving Average 
XML  Extensible Markup Language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
Glossary 
Broker Ratings – Suggestions or recommendations by stock brokers whether a stock 
is worth buying or selling. 
Director Deals – Stocks bought and sold by the directors of a listed company. 
Financial Diary – Financial details such as company’s turnover, profit, market capital 
and so on. 
Penny Stock – Stocks that are usually valued at less than a dollar. 
Semantically Understandable Artefacts – FDBs’ artefacts that can be processed by 
computers 
Ticker Symbol – A unique symbol that represents and identifies each listed company 
on the stock market. 
 
 
  
xii 
 
List of Publications 
The following papers have reported some of work related to this thesis: 
1. Lee, P. S., Owda, M. and Crockett, K. (2014) ‘A Financial Crime Analysis 
Methodology for Financial Discussion Boards using Information Extraction 
Techniques.’ 7th Manchester Metropolitan University Postgraduate Research 
Conference, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester. 
2. Owda, M., Lee, P. S. and Crockett, K. (2017) ‘Financial Discussion Boards 
Irregularities Detection System (FDBs-IDS) using Information Extraction.’ 
Intelligent Systems Conference 2017. London, 7th-8th September 2017. 
3. Lee, P. S., Owda, M., & Crockett, K. (2018) ‘The detection of fraud activities 
on the stock market through forward analysis methodology of financial 
discussion boards.’ Future of Information and Communications Conference. 
Singapore, 5th-6th April 2018. 
4. Lee, P. S., Owda, M. and Crockett, K. (2018) ‘Methodologies for resolving false 
positives during the detection of fraudulent activities on the stock market 
through forward and backward analysis of financial discussion boards.’ 
International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, 9(1). 
 
 
  
xiii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 Research Chapter Flowchart ................................................................ 8 
Figure 2.1 Lloyds (LLOY) on ADVFN ..................................................................... 14 
Figure 2.2 Lloyds (LLOY) on LSE-FDB ................................................................... 15 
Figure 2.3 Lloyds (LLOY) on III .............................................................................. 17 
Figure 2.4 Suspicious Market Manipulation Reports Submitted by Trading Firms 
(FCA, 2017) ......................................................................................... 22 
Figure 3.1 RSS Feed Icon on URL Bar (Problogger.net, 2017) ............................. 32 
Figure 3.2 RSS Feed Structure (Software Garden Inc., 2004) .............................. 33 
Figure 5.1 Prototype Architecture Overview ...................................................... 47 
Figure 5.2 Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) ..................................................... 55 
Figure 5.3 Data Crawler GUI – Part 1 .................................................................. 69 
Figure 5.4 Data Crawler GUI – Part 2 .................................................................. 71 
Figure 5.5 Forward Analyser GUI ......................................................................... 72 
Figure 5.6 Backward Analyser GUI ...................................................................... 75 
Figure 6.1 Percentage of Flagged and Non-Flagged Comments ......................... 81 
Figure 6.2 Percentage of Flagged Comment by Index ........................................ 82 
Figure 6.3 Total Number and Percentage for Each Threshold ............................ 86 
Figure 6.4 Total Number of Flagged Prices (SMA) .............................................. 94 
Figure 6.5 Total Number of Flagged Prices (WMA) ............................................. 95 
Figure 6.6 Total Number of Flagged Prices (EMA) .............................................. 96 
Figure 6.7 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Price Hike 
Thresholds and Simple Moving Average (SMA) Thresholds .............. 99 
Figure 6.8 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Price Hike 
Thresholds and Weighted Moving Average (WMA) Thresholds ...... 101 
Figure 6.9 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Price Hike 
Thresholds and Exponential Moving Average (EMA) Thresholds .... 103 
Figure 7.1 GUI for Semantic Textual Similarity Experiments ............................ 117 
Figure 7.2 Total Count of the Short Texts whose Similarity Scores are Higher than 
the Semantic Similarity Thresholds (Line Chart) .............................. 124 
xiv 
 
Figure 7.3 Total Count of the Short Texts whose Similarity Scores are Higher than 
the Semantic Similarity Thresholds (Stacked Bar Chart) .................. 125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Available Financial Information of Each Listed Company 
…………………….…………………………………………………………………………………18 
Table 2.2 Identified Semantically Understandable Artefacts ……………………..…..20 
Table 3.1 An Example of Extracted Information from SEC News ………….…….….34 
Table 4.1 Collected FDB Artefacts ……………………………………………………….…………40 
Table 5.1 Time Intervals for Capturing Data …………………………………………….…….51 
Table 5.2 Total Database Entries of Data Collected ………………………………………..52 
Table 5.3 P&D IE Keyword Template ……………………………………………………………..57 
Table 5.4 SMA Calculation Example …………………………………………………….………..62 
Table 5.5 WMA Calculation Example …………………………………………………..…………64 
Table 5.6 EMA Calculation Example ……………………………………………………………….65 
Table 5.7 Moving Average Threshold Calculation Example …………………….………65 
Table 6.1 Examples of Flagged Comments ……………………………………………..……..82 
Table 6.2 Total Number and Percentage of Each Threshold …………………….…….87 
Table 6.3 Number and Percentage of Flagged Comments Based on Indices …..87 
Table 6.4 Chi-Square Test …………………………………………………………………….……….88 
Table 6.5 Correlations  …………………………………………………………………………………..89 
Table 6.6 Moving Average Threshold Price Calculation Example ……………………92 
Table 6.7 Total Number of Flagged Prices that Exceeded Thresholds (SMA) ……93 
Table 6.8 Total Number of Flagged Prices that Exceeded Thresholds (WMA) ..94 
Table 6.9 Total Number of Flagged Prices that Exceeded Thresholds (EMA) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………... 95 
Table 6.10 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Both Price Hike 
Thresholds and Simple Moving Average (SMA) Thresholds  …………..98 
Table 6.11 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Both Price Hike 
Thresholds and Weighted Moving Average (WMA) Thresholds  …..101 
Table 6.12 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Both Price Hike 
Thresholds and Exponential Moving Average (EMA) Thresholds 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….... 102 
xvi 
 
Table 6.13 Threshold_Yes_No * SMA1_Threshold_YesNo Crosstabulation – First 
Method ……………………………………………..…………………………………..…...105 
Table 6.14 Chi-Square Test – First Method …………………………………………….………106 
Table 6.15 Symmetric Measures – First Method …………………………….………………106 
Table 6.16 Summary of Correlations – First Method ………………………………………107 
Table 6.17 Threshold_Recoded * SMA1_Threshold Crosstabulation – Second 
Method …………………………………………………………………………………..……108 
Table 6.18 Chi-Square Test – Second Method ………………………….………………….…108 
Table 6.19 Symmetric Measures – Second Method ……………………………….………108 
Table 6.20 Summary of Correlations – Second Method ………………………….………108 
Table 7.1 32-row Comments Dataset ………………………..…………………………………113 
Table 7.2 32-row Comments Dataset – With Human Expert’s Answers …………118 
Table 7.3 Total Count of the Short Texts whose Similarity Scores are Higher than 
the Semantic Similarity Thresholds …………….………………………..………125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
This thesis describes the development of a Stock Market Surveillance Prototype 
System, namely Financial Discussion Boards Miner (FDBM), which implements a set 
of novel methodologies in an attempt to detect potential financial crimes on share 
price based Financial Discussion Boards (FDBs) in the UK. FDBs contain numerous 
semantically understandable artefacts (i.e. FDBs’ artefacts that can be processed by 
computers) which will be used for this research. 
Given the freedom of speech on the Internet, it has become the number one source 
of information for unlimited things. Unsurprisingly, this includes financial discussions 
by investors and traders. There are many online forums where likeminded people 
can hold conversations in the form of posted comments (vBulletin Solutions Inc., 
2017). FDBs allow investors to exchange knowledge, information, experience and 
opinions about investment opportunities.  
Such FDBs are not moderated by relevant authorities nor strictly moderated by forum 
owners and moderators. Due to the lack of manpower or systems to moderate 
posted content automatically, share price based FDBs are open to abuse by 
fraudsters. Financial crime like Pump and Dump (P&D) is the predominant crime that 
can happen on FDBs. Typically, fraudsters post false news, usually in an encouraging 
or positive manner about particular stock on the FDBs after buying in a huge amount 
of stock at a very low price. This attracts genuine investors into buying the stock. 
Once the stock price is pumped up due to high demand, the fraudsters sell off a huge 
portion of stock. The stock price is immediately dumped, leaving the deceived 
investors with losses. Penny stocks (i.e. stocks valued at less than one dollar) are 
often used in P&D crimes as it is a lot easier for fraudsters to pump the price and gain 
a significant amount of profit almost effortlessly. 
The stock exchange used for this research is the London Stock Exchange (LSE, 2017) 
and the share price based FDBs in the UK are ADVFN (ADVFN, 2017), London South 
East (LSE-FDB, 2017) and Interactive Investors (III, 2017). Based on thorough research 
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and observations by the thesis author, these three FDBs appear to be the most 
popular and active FDBs based in the UK. The authors of previous work (Delort et al., 
2011; Knott and Owda, 2012; Leung and Ton, 2015) have also picked the most 
popular FDBs based in the countries in which their research is conducted as popular 
and active FDBs attract more members, thus there is a higher chance of financial 
crimes. It appears that very little Information Extraction (IE) research has been 
conducted in relation to the analysis of potentially illegal activities on share price 
based FDBs. As a result, this research explores the potential usage of IE techniques, 
Moving Average (MA) techniques and Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) in the FDBM 
prototype system. The solution presented in this research could significantly 
influence the way share price based FDBs are regulated in the future. 
This chapter describes the motivation for this study, a list of the aim and objectives, 
a summary of contributions and the thesis outline. 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The development of the Financial Discussion Boards Miner (FDBM) prototype system 
presented in this research adopted techniques in three research areas, namely 
Information Extraction (IE), Moving Average (MA) and Semantic Textual Similarity 
(STS). 
The increased freedom of speech on the internet means an increased chance of 
delivering misleading information regardless of whether it is with the intention or 
not. Discussion boards are popular since they represent a place for topical 
discussions by likeminded people. Being part of the discussion boards, share price 
based FDBs allow investors to discuss investment opportunities, exchange and share 
knowledge. They have also become a place for fraudsters to commit financial crime 
like P&D by deceiving others into buying stock through the spreading of misleading 
information. 
One of the problems with such FDBs is that the investors do not know the exact 
intention of another poster (Ackert et al., 2016). Fraudsters can easily pretend they 
are experienced investors and deceive others into buying stock. P&D fraudsters on 
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FDBs usually buy a huge amount of stock before spreading misleading information 
on FDBs, usually accompanied by positive sentiment such as “buy now”. When the 
price of the stock has successfully been pumped up, the fraudsters “dump” their 
stock and get away with huge profits. This leaves the victims with losses. Another 
problem with most of the FDBs is that, since FDBs are used for financial discussions, 
forum moderators do not moderate the financial related sentiments or opinions of 
investors (Ackert et al., 2016). Even if the FDB comments are meant to be moderated, 
it is unrealistic for the forum moderators to read through all the comments on a daily 
basis, especially on popular share price based FDBs. 
Financial crime related research in the past has tended to focus on prediction 
through trading volume and quantified content from the Internet (Jin et al., 2016). 
Wysocki (1999) was one of the first authors to find a positive relationship between 
the trading volume and the number of posted messages on Yahoo! message boards. 
Other established research in the field such as Antweiler and Frank (2004), Cook and 
Lu (2009) and Bettman et al. (2011) also focuses on finding a relationship between 
trading volume and posted content volume from FDBs. 
Delort et al. (2011) attempted to automate the moderation of Online Discussion Sites 
(ODSs) using their novel classification technique with the incorporation of a partially 
labelled corpus, i.e. comments that were moderated and labelled by forum 
moderators on an Australian FDB, namely HotCopper (HotCopper, 2017). Their 
classification was able to moderate the comments into various categories, not limited 
to ramping (i.e. P&D), such as flaming, profanity, spamming and so on. However, 
according to the authors, the misclassification remains too significant. Furthermore, 
the share prices were not taken into account during the moderation of ODS content. 
Other than the initial work proposed by Knott and Owda (2012), there has been no 
other research attempt using IE techniques in relation to the monitoring and 
detection of potential P&D activities on share price based FDBs in the UK. The initial 
work proposed a template-based IE prototype system that can flag potentially illegal 
FDB comments. However, the initial work was a fairly basic system as it did not take 
share prices into account. 
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To the knowledge of the thesis author, no other detection or moderation tool has 
been built for detecting potentially illegal P&D activities on share price based FDBs in 
the UK by taking share prices into account during the detection process. 
The motivation for this research came from the need for a stock market surveillance 
prototype system that can detect the potentially illegal P&D activities on share price 
based FDBs. P&D is nothing new; it is still happening today, through many methods 
which include the use of share price based FDBs as they allow investors to 
communicate. As long as the stock exchanges are alive, so is P&D. P&D happens 
especially around the penny stocks (Barnes, 2017) because these stocks are usually 
listed under the index, such as FTSE (pronounced as “Foot-sie”) AIM All-Share in the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE, 2017) that has more flexible regulation than the main 
indices such as the FTSE-100 and FTSE-250. The reason for having more flexible 
regulation for such an index is because it allows new and smaller companies to be 
part of the stock market. Unfortunately, this opens the door to fraudsters. 
This project attempts to address the following research question: 
Can IE techniques, MA techniques and STS be used to develop novel 
methodologies to automatically detect potential financial crimes on share 
price based FDBs? 
 
The testable hypothesis is listed as follow: 
H0: Potential Pump and Dump financial crime activities on financial discussion 
boards (FDBs) cannot be detected through the use of IE techniques, MA 
techniques and STS. 
H1: Potential Pump and Dump financial crime activities on financial discussion 
boards (FDBs) can be detected through the use of IE techniques, MA 
techniques and STS. 
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1.2 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to investigate the suitability of Information Extraction (IE) 
techniques, Moving Average (MA) techniques and Semantic Textual Similarity (STS); 
and, the combined use of these techniques in developing a template-based 
Information Extraction (IE) stock market surveillance prototype system that is 
capable of automatically detecting potential financial crimes such as Pump and Dump 
(P&D) on share prices based Financial Discussion Boards (FDBs).  
In order to address the research question, this research can be divided into a number 
of objectives. The objectives of this research are listed as follow: 
1. To investigate the suitability of IE techniques, MA techniques and STS usage 
in FDB related research and to establish the background work in the field. This 
is to determine the state of the art in the fields. 
2. To identify the semantically understandable artefacts on FDBs such as stock 
ticker names, date, time, usernames, comments and more. These artefacts 
will be employed for the experiments conducted in this research using the 
prototype system. 
3. To research and evaluate financial crime related keywords used in FDBs and 
elect appropriate keywords for the use of novel IE keyword template creation 
in conjunction with the semantically understandable artefacts. 
4. To capture 12 weeks of message board comments traffic and share prices 
from FDBs in order to construct an FDB dataset (FDB-DS) for experiment 
analysis and evaluation. 
5. To develop a novel methodology for a template-based IE prototype system 
by using IE techniques. 
6. To develop an automated prototype system based on the designed 
methodology in an attempt to perform real-time financial surveillance and 
reduce time consumption when moderating FDB comments. 
7. To apply statistical techniques such as Simple Moving Average (SMA), 
Weighted Moving Average (WMA) and Exponential Moving Average (EMA) on 
the prices in order to highlight rises and falls in price regardless of the 
availability of flagged comments. 
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8. To integrate the use of STS in the prototype system so that the textual 
comments can be compared to the novel IE keyword template. 
9. To evaluate the prototype system by conducting experiments using the 
constructed FDB-DS. 
 
1.3 List of Contributions 
The principal research contributions are listed as follow: 
1. A semi-automated stock market surveillance prototype system, namely FDBs 
Miner (FDBM), developed based on the novel methodologies devised in 
Contribution 5, that is capable of analysing FDB comments and share prices 
simultaneously in order to flag potentially illegal activities on the share price 
based FDBs. 
2. A crawler component in the FDBM prototype system that is capable of 
crawling semi-structured data from share price based FDBs automatically. 
3. A data transformer component in FDBM that can pre-process and transform 
the FDB related semi-structured data, collected in Contribution 2, into 
structured data. 
4. A novel FDB dataset (FDB-DS) that contains FDB artefacts data such as ticker 
symbols, FDB comments, share prices, broker ratings and director deals, 
which belong to all of the 941 companies (picked from FTSE-100 and FTSE AIM 
All-Share indices) on the London Stock Exchange (LSE, 2017). These data can 
be used for further research work and extension of the prototype system. 
5. Two novel methodologies (i.e. forward analysis and backward analysis) that 
are formulated based on the IE and MA techniques for the detection of 
potentially illegal activities on FDBs. 
• Forward analysis can perform the flagging comments against the list 
of keywords, phrases and sentences in the P&D IE keyword template. 
It is also capable of calculating the ±2 days of share prices against the 
“base price” of a flagged comment and appending price hike 
thresholds to these flagged comments. 
7 
 
• The backward analysis can calculate the moving averages of all the per 
minute share prices and highlight the abnormalities in price 
movements. It is also capable of labelling these price abnormalities 
backward to the flagged comments to further classify the flagged 
comments for investigation prioritisation and resolving false positives. 
6. A predefined IE keyword template that was constructed based on P&D 
financial crime. The template contains keywords, phrases and sentences, that 
are commonly used by fraudsters on FDBs. The keyword template can be 
employed and expanded in a real-world scenario by the relevant authorities. 
7. A prototype system component that can accept input of new financial crime 
IE keyword templates defined by relevant authorities; thus, FDBM is not only 
for detecting P&D financial crimes but also for detection of other potential 
financial crimes on FDBs. 
8. The STS approach that is incorporated into the forward analysis can reduce 
false positives during the comment flagging process. Relevant authorities can 
investigate potentially illegal FDB comments based on different semantic 
similarity thresholds while performing both forward and backward analysis as 
proposed in the two novel methodologies described in Contribution 5. 
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
This chapter presents an overview of the research background and motivation, 
research aim, research objectives and research contributions. Figure 1.1 illustrates a 
flowchart of the interrelation between the thesis chapters.  
 
Figure 1.1 Research Chapter Flowchart 
 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides an idea of the stock 
exchange in the UK, namely the London Stock Exchange (LSE, 2017). The same 
chapter also reviews all three share price based FDBs in the UK on which the stock 
market price data are collated from the LSE. While reviewing the share price based 
FDBs, the chapter also identifies the semantically understandable artefacts on FDBs. 
The stock market regulatory agencies in both the UK and the US are also introduced. 
The chapter continues with a discussion of existing popular financial crime cases that 
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have happened on FDBs which were mainly dealt with by the regulatory agency in 
the US. This is followed by a description of the existing research related to P&D 
financial crime which has happened through methods such as emails, social media 
and FDBs. 
Next, Chapter 3 introduces and describes the three types of data structures that can 
be collected from the Internet. Following this, there is an introduction of the two 
fundamental classes of IE, namely the knowledge engineering approach and 
automatic learning approach. The knowledge engineering approach is also known as 
the rule-based approach as it relies on rules to be predefined by the experts in the 
domains in order for the systems to work out the outcomes. This approach is 
discussed as it is the approach being utilised by the template-based IE prototype 
system introduced in this thesis. An overview of Semantic Similarity Measures is also 
presented in the same chapter. 
Chapter 4 introduces methodologies for the detection of potential financial crime 
activities on share price based FDBs. The methodology for identifying the FDBs and 
the semantically understandable artefacts is described. This is followed by a 
description of the overall methodology (Section 4.3) for the development and 
implementation of the prototype system, which is divided into seven phases (i.e. the 
implementation of a data crawler, data transformer, dataset for storing FDB data, 
construction of P&D IE keyword template, novel forward analyser, novel backward 
analyser and Semantic Textual Similarity).  
A prototype system architecture overview is presented in Chapter 5. Section 5.3 to 
Section 5.8 in the chapter describe each of the components in the architecture that 
implements the 7-phase methodology. Lastly, the Graphical User Interface (GUI) for 
the data crawler, novel forward analyser and novel backward analyser is presented. 
Chapter 6 describes a series of experiments for the novel forward analysis and 
backward analysis introduced in this research – two experiments for the forward 
analysis and another two for the backward analysis. The outcomes of the 
experiments are discussed. Chapter 7 also conducts experiments using the STS 
approach to test whether the STS approach can be adopted in the detection of 
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potentially illegal FDB activities. The outcomes of the experiments are also discussed. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, highlights the contributions and discusses the 
potential future directions of this research. 
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Chapter 2.  Financial Discussion Boards and Financial Crimes 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the years, the Internet has become a place for people to seek and share 
information and almost everything else that could possibly be presented in a digital 
format. The Internet does seem like a major source of information in many ways. 
However, not all information being shared online is accurate. Furthermore, not 
everyone undertakes the necessary due diligence prior to acting upon the 
information found on the Internet. With the freedom of speech on the Internet, 
many things can go wrong. One of these things is the spreading of fake financial 
information through Financial Discussion Boards (FDBs) on the Internet. 
Unlike the traditional methods, false information does not just spread through word 
of mouth and spam emails anymore; it also spreads through FDBs since these are the 
places that gather the most investors. Share price based FDBs represent a place for 
investors to exchange stock related financial knowledge and discuss stock investment 
or trading related topics in the form of posted comments. These comments often 
involve investors’ financial sentiments. However, some fraudsters may disguise 
themselves as investors and spread fake financial information or actively promote 
specific stocks, usually penny stocks (i.e. stocks that are valued at less than one 
dollar). 
Each country has its own stock exchange that allows investors to trade and invest. 
Share price based FDBs are created based on these stock exchanges. There have been 
a fair number of studies conducted on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (NYSE, 
2017), NASDAQ (NASDAQ, 2017) and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) (ASX, 2017). 
However, there is little to no FDB related research which has been conducted on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) (LSE, 2017) for the infamous Pump and Dump (P&D) 
financial crime. This research examines the share price based FDBs that collate stock 
market data from the LSE. P&D happens when fraudsters intentionally and actively 
post comments like “This is the right time let’s start pumping this share” after buying 
specific stocks at a low price. Novice investors often fall into such schemes. Once the 
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price hikes to a certain level, the fraudsters “dump” their stocks, earning them huge 
illegal profits while leaving others at a financial loss. 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of FDBs and how they have been used 
for financial crimes. The key problems and challenges of detecting such crimes on 
FDBs are also discussed. 
 
2.2 London Stock Exchange 
The LSE (LSE, 2017) is located in the city of London, UK. As of 11th April 2017, 
according to an infographic (Visual Capitalist, 2017), the LSE is one of the oldest stock 
exchanges (215 years old) and it is the third largest stock exchange in the world after 
the NYSE and NASDAQ. The LSE has a total market capital size of 6.187 trillion US 
dollars (Visual Capitalist, 2017) and has 3,041 listed public companies. Each listed 
company has a unique ticker symbol, i.e. a unique abbreviated name that represents 
and identifies each listed company on the stock market. 
The LSE has seven main indices and each index is described below: 
• FTSE-100 
This index consists of the first hundred companies with the highest market 
capitalisation listed on the LSE. 
• FTSE-250 
This index consists of the 101st to the 350th largest companies listed on the 
LSE. 
• FTSE-350 
This index consists of a combination of both the FTSE-100 and FTSE-250 listed 
on the LSE. 
• FTSE All-Share 
This index consists of the combined indices of the FTSE-100, FTSE-250 and 
FTSE SmallCap (i.e. an index that consists of the 351st to 619th listed 
companies on the LSE). 
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• FTSE AIM UK 50 
This index consists of the 50 largest UK companies listed by the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM). Note: AIM allows smaller companies to offer shares 
to the public with a more flexible regulatory system as compared to the main 
market like FTSE-100. 
• FTSE AIM 100 
This index consists of the first hundred companies listed on the AIM. Other 
than non-UK companies, this index may also consist of UK companies listed 
on the FTSE AIM UK 50. 
• FTSE AIM All-Share 
This index consists of all the UK and non-UK companies listed on the AIM. 
 
In this research, the FDB comments on the FTSE-100 and FTSE AIM All-Share listed 
companies, from 23rd September 2014 to 22nd December 2014, have been chosen 
for the experiments. This allows for a comparison of whether potentially illegal P&D 
activities tend to happen on both indices, the FTSE-100 or FTSE AIM All-Share. As 
mentioned, companies that are listed on the FTSE AIM indices are smaller companies 
and have a more flexible regulatory system as compared to the main indices like the 
FTSE-100. Smaller (penny stock) companies tend to be abused by fraudsters for P&D 
crimes (Barnes, 2017). 
 
2.3 Share Price Based Financial Discussion Boards (FDBs) 
According to Lu et al. (2010), financial related content falls into three categories. The 
first category consists of forums, blogs or wikis. The second category contains news 
or research reports. The third category describes those firms which have a means by 
which investors can communicate. As Feldman et al. (2008) claimed, a discussion 
board is a place which can provide essential information such as consumers’ 
sentiments towards a particular product. 
This research extracts information from three share price based FDBs based in the 
UK. These FDBs are ADVFN (ADVFN, 2017), London South East (LSE-FDB, 2017) and 
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Interactive Investor (III, 2017) respectively. Each of these FDBs will contribute to the 
identification of semantically understandable artefacts and help shape the FDB 
dataset (FDB-DS) for the use of experiments in subsequent chapters. 
 
2.3.1 ADVFN 
ADVFN (ADVFN, 2017) is one of the largest share price based FDBs globally and it was 
founded in 1999. ADVFN does not just provide a discussion board for interactions 
between investors; it also provides several types of financial information relevant to 
the stock market. ADVFN is divided into many sections based on stock market regions 
across the globe such as the United States of America (USA), Canada, Brazil, India, 
Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom (UK), Italy and so on. The UK version 
of ADVFN is used since the LSE stock market is being studied in this research. Figure 
2.1 demonstrates an example of how various information on a specific share, for 
example, Lloyds (ticker symbol: LLOY), would appear on the ADVFN website. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Lloyds (LLOY) on ADVFN 
 
In order to participate in the discussions and access other functions of the website 
like a personal portfolio, investors can sign up for free accounts on ADVFN. To access 
the historical per minute share prices, the user needs to pay for a monthly 
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subscription. ADVFN appears to be the only FDB that provides per minute share price 
history. 
 
2.3.2 London South East 
London South East (LSE-FDB, 2017) was established in 1997. It focuses only on the 
London Stock Exchange. Like ADVFN, LSE-FDB provides not only discussion boards for 
interaction but also other types of information related to the stock market. Figure 
2.2 illustrates the webpage for how a ticker symbol such as LLOY would appear on 
the LSE-FDB website. In addition to most of the artefacts on ADVFN, LSE-FDB also 
provides broker ratings and director deal artefacts which ADVFN does not. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Lloyds (LLOY) on LSE-FDB 
 
Similar to ADVFN, in order to access the live prices and certain premium features, 
LSE-FDB requires a member to subscribe to its monthly paid subscription. The only 
difference between ADVFN and LSE-FDB in terms of access to share prices is that 
ADVFN provides both live prices and downloadable historical prices whereas LSE-FDB 
provides only the live prices. It is more time consuming to capture the live prices in 
this research because there is a need to design a separate crawler component just to 
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collect the per minute share price. This is also risky because the process of data 
crawling might get interrupted due to unforeseen circumstances. Furthermore, 
although the owner of the LSE-FDB has expressed his interest in this research in an 
email reply (see Appendix E), he does not feel comfortable with this research crawling 
the live prices on LSE-FDB. Hence, it was decided that it was less risky and fairer to 
crawl the historical price data every week from ADVFN which is provided through a 
paid subscription. In addition to live prices, LSE-FDB’s paid subscription also provides 
members with access to the premium discussion section. Only the publicly available 
comments on LSE-FDB are taken into account, considering it is the most influential 
piece of information for non-paid members as well as investors who perform an 
internet search. Unlike the premium discussion section (private comments), these 
publicly available comments will appear as results on the public online search engines 
such as Google (Google, 2017) and Bing (Bing, 2017) when keywords are searched 
for. Similar to ADVFN, financial diary (i.e. financial details such as company’s turnover, 
profit, market capital and so on) are also available on LSE-FDB. These financial data 
are the same across both FDBs. 
 
2.3.3 Interactive Investor 
Interactive Investor (III, 2017) was established in 1995. It is also one of the leading 
investment and trading FDBs in the UK. III has stated that there are over 600,000 
messages posted each year and over 1.5 million unique visitors which help to shape 
its online community. Like ADVFN and LSE-FDB, III not only provides an FDB for 
investors to exchange financial knowledge but also other information such as prices, 
news and fundamentals. However, publicly available artefacts on III are fewer than 
on ADVFN and LSE-FDB. Figure 2.3 demonstrates a sample of how a ticker symbol 
such as LLOY would appear on the III website and can be navigated around to access 
other artefacts such as news and discussions. 
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Figure 2.3 Lloyds (LLOY) on III 
 
III also allows investors to subscribe to its monthly paid subscription to stream live 
prices and gain access to other features such as “Level 2” data which appears to be 
the stock information at a more in-depth level. “Level 2” data can only be explored 
by subscription. 
All three well established share price based FDBs allow investors to hold discussions 
while trading on their platforms. On all three FDBs, the terms and conditions (T&C) 
for using the FDBs were stated. Snippets of the warnings are presented as follow: 
 
“…ADVFN does not monitor, approve, endorse or exert editorial control over 
information posted by users and does not therefore accept responsibility for 
or make any warranties in connection with or recommend that you or any 
third party rely on such information.” – ADVFN, 2017. 
“…The contents of all 'Chat' messages should not be construed as advice and 
represent the opinions of the authors, not those of London South East Limited, 
or its affiliates.” – LSE-FDB, 2017. 
“…The content of the messages posted represents the opinions of the author, 
and does not represent the opinions of Interactive Investor Trading Limited or 
its affiliates and has not been approved or issued by Interactive Investor 
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Trading Limited. You should be aware that the other participants of the above 
discussion group are strangers to you and may make statements which may 
be misleading, deceptive or wrong.” – III, 2017. 
 
Although T&Cs have been made available to the public readers, not everyone follows 
the rules. Some do it intentionally and some unintentionally. Unlike ordinary online 
discussion boards, ADVFN, LSE-FDB and III appeared to have not explicitly announced 
any forum moderator usernames. It is unsurprising that there is no one proactively 
moderating the FDBs until someone reports a post, considering how time consuming 
it is to monitor the massive amount of posted comments made in a day. Generally, 
instead of moderating members’ sentiments and opinions, a forum moderator’s task 
is to monitor any spam content, advertisements, forum etiquettes and other generic 
rules. This has led fraudsters to take FDBs for granted over time to conduct P&D 
scheme. 
 
2.3.4 Identified Semantically Understandable Artefacts 
Table 2.1 represents the financial information available on the three FDBs introduced 
above for each company listed on LSE. 
 
Table 2.1 Available Financial Information of Each Listed Company 
 Description ADVFN LSE III 
Share name The name of the listed company √ √ √ 
Share 
symbol 
The unique abbreviated name of the 
listed company 
√ √ √ 
Market The stock exchange the share listed on √ √  
Type Type of the share √   
Share ISIN International Security Identification 
Number of the share 
√ √ √ 
Share 
description 
Describe the type of share √   
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Price change How much has the price change on the 
last day 
√ √ √ 
% change How many percentages have the price 
change on the last day 
√ √ √ 
Share price Current and latest share price √ √ √ 
Bid price Nearest price that the traders want to 
buy the share at 
√ √ √ 
Ask price Nearest price that the traders want to 
sell the share at 
√ √ √ 
High price Highest price of the day a share 
reached 
√ √ √ 
Low price Lowest price of the day a share reached √ √ √ 
Open price The opening price of the day √ √ √ 
Close price The closing price of the day  √ √ 
Shares 
traded 
The volume of share being traded on 
the day 
√ √ √ 
Last trade The latest time of an LLOY share being 
traded 
√ √ √ 
Industry 
Sector 
Which sector the listed company falls 
into 
√ √ √ 
Turnover 
(m) 
The liquidity of a company √   
Profit (m) The profit made by a company √ √  
EPS - Basic The value of one unit of the company’s 
share 
√ √  
PE ratio Market price divided by earnings per 
share (EPS) 
√ √ √ 
Market Cap 
(m) 
Total market capital (in million) √ √ √ 
Related 
Shares 
Shares that are in the similar sector √ √  
News Fundamental news related to a listed 
company 
√ √ √ 
Regulatory 
News 
Official regulatory news of a company 
announced by RNS (a service provided 
by LSE) as a form of communication 
with the professional investors 
 √  
Share Chat The discussions of the specific share √ √ √ 
Dividends The dividends distribution historical 
data 
√ √ √ 
20 
 
Director 
Deals 
Information of the buy and sell deals by 
company directors 
 √  
Broker 
Ratings 
The ratings given by brokers for a 
company 
 √  
 
The extended financial information presented in Table 2.1 is summarised and 
categorised into Table 2.2. Table 2.2 presents the semantically understandable 
artefacts identified on the three FDBs. Artefacts such as ticker symbols, prices and 
financial diary remain the same across all FDBs as these artefacts are extracted 
directly from the stock exchange market. Artefacts like comments are not identical 
across the FDBs in terms of the content by different authors, unless there are authors 
who intentionally write the identical comments on all FDBs, which did not happen in 
the collected data. 
 
Table 2.2 Identified Semantically Understandable Artefacts 
Artefact ADVFN LSE III 
Ticker Symbols √ √ √ 
Prices √ √ √ 
Comments √ √ √ 
Director Deals  √  
Broker Ratings  √  
Financial Diary √ √  
Fundamentals √ √  
Recent Share Trades √ √  
Regulatory News  √  
 
 
2.4 Stock Market Regulatory Agencies 
If a stock market is left uncontrolled and unchecked, it will become a hotbed for 
fraudsters to manipulate the market and deceive other investors. This is where the 
stock market regulatory agencies are formed, to prevent financial disasters. With 
such regulatory agencies, investors are supposed to feel more confident investing 
and trading in the stock market. However, the scope of the regulators’ governance 
may be too broad, especially on the free internet with currently over 1.3 billion active 
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websites. Share price based FDBs are part of these websites where they lack 
surveillances. If share price based FDBs are not properly moderated with maximum 
efforts for potentially illegal activities like P&D crime, it will become the hub for 
fraudsters to commit financial crimes, thus, the development of FDBM. Section 2.4.1 
describes one of the most preeminent stock market regulators, namely the Security 
Exchange and Commission (SEC) in the United States. Section 2.4.2 describes the SEC 
equivalent in the UK, namely Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
 
2.4.1 United States of America 
The Security Exchange and Commission (SEC, 2017) was formed in 1934. SEC is a 
securities regulatory agency that is independent of United States (US) federal 
government. Its mission is to protect investors and regulate the securities market. 
SEC believes as more and more first timers enter the stock market there is a need for 
a market regulation. SEC believes the only way for investors to really protect 
themselves while investing is to do their own research and ask questions. Investors 
can easily lookup on the internet for regulatory press releases, forum discussions, 
scam alerts and news before making any investment decisions. Besides, ask 
questions and seek advice from a financial professional can also reduce the risk of 
becoming P&D crime victims. 
 
2.4.2 United Kingdom 
In the UK, the Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2013) was the equivalent of SEC in 
the US prior to April 2013. It was then separated into two regulatory authorities, 
namely Financial Conduct Authority (FCA, 2017) and Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(PRA, 2017) (i.e. PRA ensures financial firms such as banks to hold enough funds and 
practice appropriate financial risk controls). FCA then took over the responsibilities 
of FSA and exercised the powers. Hence, FSA was replaced by FCA in April 2013. FCA’s 
missions are to protect investors, stabilise the UK financial system and reduce 
financial crimes. FCA can take actions in relation to market abuse by imposing 
penalties against relevant firms or personnel. On 3rd of July 2016, the Market Abuse 
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Regulation (MAR) took effect across the European Union (EU). MAR replaces the 
existing Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and is said to have strengthened the previous 
rules in MAD. 
The key difference of the existing MAD and the new MAR in terms of market 
manipulation is that the trading firms will now need to develop a more robust, 
systematic and automated surveillance process to perform surveillances towards all 
the trades and orders, instead of just a sample of the trades which followed the 
existing MAD. A stricter rule has also applied in MAR where the firms are also obliged 
to report the suspicious transactions and orders (STORs) to FCA after implementing 
new surveillance process. Figure 2.4 shows the increment of suspicious market 
manipulation reports through STORs from the year 2007 to 2016. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Suspicious Market Manipulation Reports Submitted by Trading Firms (FCA, 2017) 
 
FDBs are a popular mode of communication among investors (Halifax UK, 2017). 
According to MAR’s Section 1.8 - Market Abuse, a market manipulation example in 
relation to FDBs was provided: 
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“…a person posts information on an Internet bulletin board or chat room 
which contains false or misleading statements about the takeover of a 
company whose shares are qualifying investments and the person knows that 
the information is false or misleading.” 
 
With the development of FDBM, it can possibly contribute to the regulatory agencies 
in the detection and prosecution of potential criminal activities in relation to FDBs 
without expensive efforts in terms of time and manual human efforts. 
 
2.5 Financial Crimes on Share Price Based FDBs 
Traditionally, word of mouth and “boiler rooms” used to be the major ways to 
commit a financial crime like P&D. According to the SEC (SEC, 2017), “boiler rooms” 
involve salespersons cold calling victims and promoting penny stocks in a very 
positive and convincing tone. Cold calling is a method where the salespersons make 
unsolicited calls to potential buyers in an attempt to promote and sell products. 
These salespersons are under high pressure all the time, to achieve successful sales; 
hence, the name “boiler rooms” (Investopedia, 2017). This usually forces the victims 
to proceed with payment because of the high return promises claimed by the 
fraudsters. But in fact, these so-called high return investments are actually worthless, 
non-tradable or non-existent (Financial Times, 2010). Hence, the victims are deceived 
and lose their money entirely. 
As time goes by, with emerging internet trends such as the incremental use of emails, 
P&D fraudsters have adopted an email method for committing a P&D crime by 
sending spam emails to promote “good stocks”. When free and paid service 
providers like Google and Symantec improved their spam email filter and detection 
algorithms (Wired.com, 2015; Symantec, 2017), fraudsters followed the latest 
internet trends once again to commit financial crimes. This time around the 
fraudsters began to use FDBs, social media and chatrooms (SEC, 2015) in addition to 
the old methods that were still not fully eliminated. 
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With the existence of stock exchanges, market manipulation crimes like P&D are an 
ongoing issue. However, the number of such crimes supposedly can be reduced with 
best efforts and useful tools. There are P&D financial crimes being committed from 
time to time and through different channels. Generally, the SEC and FCA have been 
enforcing laws and regulating the stock market in the US and UK respectively. But, 
there is no clear evidence to show that these authorities are actively monitoring 
share price based FDBs, likely due to insufficient manpower or tools that are 
specifically developed for monitoring posted comments on FDBs. 
Unfortunately, since FDBs are not proactively monitored by human moderators and 
relevant authorities like the FCA, fraudsters are very likely to be benefited by it. Even 
if the FDBs are monitored by human moderators or relevant authorities, with such a 
huge volume of comments posted on different FDBs and for more than 2,000 ticker 
symbols, it is unrealistic for human moderators to read through all the comments on 
a daily basis, not to mention the fact that, like any other websites on the Internet, 
FDBs are meant to be online 24 hours a day. In such situation, there is a need to 
develop a system to support the monitoring and detection of potentially illegal P&D 
activities on FDBs. 
There have been several popular and significant FDB related P&D financial crimes in 
the past, which are highlighted as follow: 
• 15-year-old Jonathan Lebed was the first minor to be involved in a stock 
market fraud in 2000 (Lewis, 2001). Lebed earned a total revenue of 
US$800,000 by pumping the share price through the Yahoo! Finance Message 
Board over half a year and was charged by the SEC (Lewis, 2001; Reim, 2001; 
Cybenko et al., 2002). 
• In 2000, two people were charged for pumping the price of a share by 10,000% 
by posting on the Raging Bull message board and then dumping millions of 
shares with a profit of at least US$5 million (Reim, 2001). 
• In 2009, eight participants were charged by the SEC for being involved in 
penny stock manipulation (SEC, 2009). These wrongdoers met each other 
through InvestorsHub (now owned by ADVFN), a popular penny stock 
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message board. This was followed by them carrying out a P&D scheme 
throughout the year of 2006 and 2007. 
 
2.6 Existing Pump and Dump Related Research 
 
2.6.1 Emails 
Siering (2013) conducted an event study alongside a sentiment analysis on a total of 
1,299 suspicious stock recommendation newsletter emails that were manually 
obtained by the author from the “Newsletter Hub” section of the website 
HotStocked.com (HotStocked, 2017). When selecting these newsletter emails, the 
author followed the guidelines proposed by the SEC. The guidelines suggested that 
stocks that are normally involved in P&D are usually from poorly-regulated markets 
like the FTSE AIM All Share. Also, such emails often lure recipients into buying certain 
stocks by urging readers to buy the stocks, spreading misleading and exaggerated 
statements about how well the stocks will perform. In the 1,299 suspicious 
newsletter emails, a total of 221 stocks were recommended in 252 newsletter emails. 
According to the author’s findings, on average, 252 newsletter emails were sent in 
five different emails by two P&D campaign promoters during a period of about two 
days. Based on the dictionary-based sentiment analysis, the author also found that 
the positive words used in the emails are positively related to the abnormal stock 
returns. The author concluded that the web and social media still play a significant 
role in enhancing this type of financial crime despite the efforts by relevant 
authorities to fight it. 
Apart from the newsletter emails which have now been strictly filtered by services 
such as Google (Google, 2017) and Symantec (Symantec, 2017), newer tactics such 
as social media and discussion boards were adopted for performing P&D schemes by 
luring inexperienced investors into buying the so-called recommended stock mainly 
because these channels allow more freedom of speech. 
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2.6.2 Social Media 
Social media is one of the latest popular methods used by fraudsters to manipulate 
the market. Twitter is especially popular as it allows the use of “hashtag” (e.g. #LLOY) 
and “cashtag” (e.g. $LLOY) in each tweet alongside text, links, photos, animated 
photos or videos (Twitter, 2017). 
Renault (2014) and Renault (2017) analysed millions of messages (tweets) on Twitter 
using network theory and the results showed that there was a spike in the number 
of posted messages related to securities traded in over-the-counter (OTC) markets 
on the same day when the prices spiked. It was then followed by a sharp price 
reversal in the following days. This is consistent with the behaviours of P&D crime. 
Wolfram (2010) conducted research using Natural Language Processing (NLP) 
techniques with a predictive machine learning approach, to examine if the fast-
growing social network Twitter can be used to predict share prices. The author 
selected several stocks from the NASDAQ stock exchange and the intraday price 
figures were collected for a period of two weeks. Intraday price figures also mean per 
minute price figures, which are also used in this research. According to Wolfram, 
most of the prediction models utilise End of the Day price figures rather than intraday 
price figures. The results were varied across different stock selections, but the author 
was able to achieve “profits” in some instances. 
 
2.6.3 Financial Discussion Boards 
Phillippsohn (2001), a leading authority on fraud in the UK whose his firm has an 
extensive international network of experienced lawyers and financial crime 
investigators, has reviewed several types of financial crimes on the Internet including 
P&D financial crime cases. One of the P&D crimes that the publication’s author 
discussed was related to a coffee trading company named Coburg PLC based in the 
UK. The share price of Coburg PLC doubled after a fraudster went on an FDB to spread 
false news. The share price was also “dumped” on the same day. In another P&D case 
reviewed by Phillippsohn (2001), eConnect was charged by the SEC in the US for 
issuing misleading and untrue press releases on an FDB. The false press release 
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claimed that the company had a unique license arrangement with Palm Inc to permit 
cash transactions over the Internet. eConnect’s share price went from US$1.39 to 
US$21.88 in just one week. 
Delort et al. (2011) introduced a novel classification technique for a classifier training 
to automate moderation tasks on Online Discussion Sites (ODSs). A partially labelled 
corpus, i.e. FDB comments taken from HotCopper (HotCopper, 2017, a popular 
Australian FDB) is used for training purposes and then attempts to moderate the 
inappropriate content on ODSs using the technique. The authors collected a total of 
1.14 million comments involving 1,825 companies listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) from January 2008 through to December 2008. Of these 1.14 million 
comments, 14,139 comments were labelled. These comments that were labelled by 
a human moderator included labels such as ramping, insider trading, profanity, 
copyright, sexist, racist, flaming, spamming and other generic forum breaches. The 
authors chose a partially labelled corpus instead of a fully labelled corpus because a 
partially labelled corpus is much easier to produce as it is divided into the unlabelled 
comments and the labelled (“bad”, as a single class) comments for classification 
purposes. The authors implemented and tested their technique and the results 
indicated that the classification technique is helpful and can be used to decrease the 
number of comments that need to be moderated by human moderators. However, 
this system is not yet a fully automated moderation system due to the use of a 
partially labelled corpus. According to the authors, the misclassification errors 
remain too significant. Besides, the research only takes comments into account and 
no prices are involved during the classification of comments. 
A system named the Financial Discussions Detection System (FDDS) was proposed by 
Knott and Owda (2012) to flag potentially illegal comments made on FDBs. The 
system allows users to create and modify predefined templates (i.e. lists of 
potentially illegal keywords that commenters may or frequently use on FDBs), 
download comments from FDBs and match the downloaded comments against the 
potentially illegal keywords created in earlier steps. However, looking only at the 
comments during the detection process appears to be insufficient as it does not take 
share prices into account. Thus, this research introduces the novel methodologies 
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(forward analysis and backward analysis) in an attempt to reduce false positives by 
integrating share prices in the detection process. 
Leung and Ton (2015) examined whether 2.5 million messages posted on the largest 
FDB in Australia, namely HotCopper (HotCopper, 2017), from January 2003 through 
to December 2008, had an impact on the ASX market. These 2.5 million messages 
belonged to all the companies listed on the ASX. There were more than 2,000 listed 
companies. The results show that the FDB messages had impacts on the small 
capitalisation stocks but did not affect the large stocks. The authors concluded that 
the FDB comment posting activities are positively correlated with the trading volume 
for these small stocks in a highly regulated ASX market. 
Alić (2015) introduced a software prototype (FMS-DSS) to support decision making 
in financial market surveillance. FMS-DSS consists of three components, i.e. data, 
models and user interface. The prototype system is capable of collecting both 
unstructured and structured data of selected companies when used by users. The 
models take into account attributes such as market segment, market capitalisation, 
trading volume, the age of the company and so on. Subsequently, attribute scales 
ranging from very low to very high are used for aggregation to determine whether 
there are suspicious market manipulation activities such as P&D. 
Other researchers (Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Cook and Lu, 2009; Bettman et al., 
2011) have also found relationships between FDB comments and market 
performance. Through conducting statistical analysis, the authors reported that the 
FDB comments could be manipulative and affect share prices. 
 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has introduced the stock exchange in the UK, namely the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE, 2017) and its regulatory Financial Conduct Authority (FSA, 2017) as 
well as the equivalent preeminent authority in the US, namely the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC, 2017). These authorities are responsible for protecting 
investors from becoming victims of financial crimes. 
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Three share price based FDBs (i.e. ADVFN, London South East and Interactive 
Investors) that were created based on LSE market data have been comprehensively 
described. These FDBs are the most popular share price based FDBs in the UK; they 
provide the same factual LSE market data except in terms of their discussion sections. 
These FDBs allow investors to participate in discussions while trading. However, not 
all investors use FDBs lawfully. Financial crimes like P&D are likely to happen on 
unmonitored and unregulated FDBs. 
There were attempts to moderate the FDB comments by Delort et al. (2011) and 
Knott and Owda (2012). However, misclassification remains high in Delort et al.’s 
(2011) attempt to moderate. Both research attempts did not take share price into 
account while moderating FDB comments to reduce false positives. Besides, the 
existing research (Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Cook and Lu, 2009; Bettman et al., 2011; 
Leung and Ton, 2015) has also found that FDB activities can impact on the stock 
markets’ performance. 
Therefore, to address the challenges of FDBs having to be proactively monitored and 
resolve gaps identified in the existing research, share prices are taken into account 
when flagging and detecting potentially illegal FDB comments, in this study. This 
leads to the introduction of two novel built-in methodologies (namely, forward 
analysis and backward analysis) and the integration of Semantic Textual Similarity 
(STS) (Chapter 7) for flagging potentially illegal comments and resolving false 
positives during the comments flagging process. 
To devise and implement these methodologies, Chapter 3 conducts an investigation 
into the types of data, the field of Information Extraction (IE) and STS. These fields 
are used for the development of novel methodologies used within the template-
based Financial Discussion Boards Miner (FDBM) prototype system proposed in the 
forthcoming chapters. 
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Chapter 3.  Information Extraction and Semantic Textual 
Similarity 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Previously in Chapter 2, three share price based Financial Discussion Boards (FDBs) 
in the UK, namely ADVFN (ADVFN, 2017), London South East (LSE-FDB, 2017) and 
Interactive Investors (III, 2017), have been identified and discussed. In order to 
develop a template-based Information Extraction (IE) prototype system, namely the 
Financial Discussion Boards Miner (FDBM), to extract the artefacts from these FDBs 
the area of IE will be studied and reviewed in this chapter. 
This chapter first defines and introduces the three types of data structures on the 
Internet. It goes on to introduce the two fundamental classes of IE, namely a 
knowledge engineering approach and an automatic learning approach. The 
template-based IE prototype system, namely FDBM, introduced in this thesis, is 
based on the knowledge engineering approach. 
FDBM automatically extracts information from an unstructured or semi-structured 
data source (such as FDB comments, FDB Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds and 
share prices) into a structured data format (i.e. FDB dataset). The IE prototype system 
in this research will be used to display a summary of information from several 
interlinked sources (i.e. FDB comments and share prices) allowing filtering of 
potentially illegal comments to take place. 
Section 3.4 includes an overview of Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) algorithms, 
including a description of STASIS – an original and well cited algorithm for defining 
similarity between short texts. Applications of STS measures are also discussed to 
justify its suitability for the application of FDB textual comments. Lastly, Section 3.5 
summarises the chapter. 
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3.2 Unstructured, Semi-Structured and Structured Data 
Sir Tim Berners-Lee, a British computer scientist, invented the World Wide Web 
(WWW) in 1989 (World Wide Web Foundation, 2017). In 1990, Tim successfully 
wrote three ultimate technologies which remain the foundation of the web today. 
These technologies are the HTML (HyperText Markup Language), URI (Uniform 
Resource Identifier) and HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol). HTML is the primary 
formatting language for websites. URI is commonly called the URL (Universal 
Resource Locator) nowadays. URI is a unique address to identify the resource on the 
web. 
A complete URL looks like this: http://www.webfoundation.org, whereby these days 
HTTPS (HTTP Secure) is more favourably used than the basic HTTP due to a rule 
imposed by Google (Google, 2017). A website that does not use HTTPS will not be 
ranked higher in the search results. HTTPS is not only great for a website’s reputation 
nowadays; the primary purpose was initially to encrypt the transmission of sensitive 
data between the backend server and the frontend website input by website users. 
The data encryption process (i.e. the process of transforming information into an 
unreadable format) prevents hackers from prying into the plaintext data while it is 
being transferred. 
With the rapid growth of publicly available data on the Internet in the past two 
decades, data have developed different structures: structured data, semi-structured 
data and unstructured data. Structured data are the data that can fit into relational 
databases in rows and columns, are easy to manage and use for performing search 
queries. HTML, XML (Extensible Markup Language) and CSV are the usual forms of 
semi-structured data. Semi-structured data are human-readable and machine-
readable. The useful data reside in specific properties in HTML and XML files, which 
can be processed by a computer and stored in the relational databases. The same 
goes for CSV; the data in CSV can be processed and stored in the databases. 
Unstructured data covers most data formats such as discussion board posts, social 
media data, email content, customer service live chat transcripts, multimedia 
content and more. Unstructured data represent the most complex data structure to 
be processed as they cannot be neatly fitted into the databases. 
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3.2.1 RSS Feeds 
The comment artefact data in this research are collected through RSS feeds on the 
FDBs. RSS stands for Really Simple Syndication (Software Garden Inc., 2004). RSS, also 
known as news feed, is a technology that allows readers to keep track of their 
favourite websites with the latest posts or news. Bookmarking websites is deemed 
complicated (Problogger.net, 2017) if the posts that a user wants to keep track of 
keep increasing in number. Also, the user has to do the work by bookmarking the 
posts manually which is time consuming. Often, when a site is RSS Feed activated, 
there will be a logo beside the URL in the URL bar. Figure 3.1 below describes the 
look of a URL bar if RSS feed is available. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 RSS Feed Icon on URL Bar (Problogger.net, 2017) 
 
RSS feed is often read by users in a web browser itself, integrated into email 
programs or read by standalone software on a computer. Figure 3.2 below shows 
how the RSS Feed XML files, website and computer are connected. A user uses the 
web browser on his personal computer to visit website 1 and also website 2. Then, 
the RSS Feed Aggregator will monitor the RSS feed for both websites the user wants 
simultaneously. 
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Figure 3.2 RSS Feed Structure (Software Garden Inc., 2004) 
 
RSS is not only useful to keep track of forum topics, but it can also be helpful for other 
purposes (Software Garden Inc., 2004) such as for shoppers who are keeping track of 
new products on shopping websites or for monitoring weather alerts. 
LSE-FDB used to provide RSS feed, but not anymore. III still provides it. ADVFN does 
not have it. 
 
3.3 Information Extraction (IE) 
Masterson and Kushmerick (2003) defined IE as the process of extracting information 
automatically into a structured data format from unstructured or semi-structured 
data sources. It was suggested by Soderland (1999) that there is a need for systems 
that extract information automatically from text data. IE is not Information Retrieval 
(IR) (Cunningham, 2004). IE is said to be a subfield of the broader field of IR. Although 
IE has not received as much attention as IR, IE techniques have been explored and 
employed in many models and systems over the past two decades. There is a 
significant difference between IE and IR. IE systems are knowledge-intensive as these 
systems extract only snippets of information that will predefine templates (fixed 
format) or databases, which represent useful and relevant information about the 
domain, and present to the users for actions such as decision making. IR, on the other 
hand, finds data in the form of ranked document lists which do not display any 
detailed information from the document and present the located documents to the 
users based on the given query (Piskorski and Yangarber, 2013). Table 3.1 displays an 
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example of the extracted information, from a snippet of news, that is fitted into a 
predefined template.  
 
“The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a New Jersey man 
(Samuel DelPresto) and his company with illicitly pocketing $13 million from 
an elaborate pump-and-dump scheme.” (SEC, 2015) 
 
Table 3.1 An Example of Extracted Information from SEC News 
Regulator Security Exchange Commission 
Financial Crime Pump-and-dump 
Amount $13 million 
Offender Samuel DelPresto 
State New Jersey 
 
IE is divided into two fundamental classes i.e. a knowledge engineering (KE) approach 
and an automatic training approach (Appelt and Israel, 1999). The KE approach is also 
called the rule-based approach since it requires rules to be developed by human 
expertise. Rules are in the form of “IF some condition THEN some action” (Ireson-
Paine, 1996). Rule-based IE systems require manual effort for rule writing. However, 
they are easy to maintain and comprehend. Errors can also be traced and fixed easily. 
On the other hand, the automatic training approach, also known as the machine 
learning approach, is quite the opposite of the rule-based approach. It does not 
require human expertise to write rules. Instead, it requires only someone who is 
familiar enough with the domain and able to train the corpus using machine learning 
algorithms. Although the machine learning approach requires less manual effort, the 
approach requires pre-labelled data and retraining for adaptation (Chiticariu et al., 
2013). 
According to Chiticariu et al. (2013), the rule-based approach is typically ignored by 
the research community due to the rule-writing labour cost, which directly motivates 
the researchers to write tools using the automatic training approach that are deemed 
better. Given that the research community has shifted its focus towards the 
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automatic training approach for the past decade, it would be reasonable to assume 
that the automatic training approach would be adopted in the commercial world. 
However, the opposite turns out to be true. In fact, the rule-based approach is mostly 
favoured in the commercial market even by larger vendors such as IBM for text 
analysis systems (IBM, 2017) and Microsoft for its enterprise search platform 
(Microsoft, 2017). 
In this research, the rule-based approach was adopted due to the nature of the 
system needing to detect potentially illegal comments on FDBs. 
 
3.4 An Overview of Semantic Similarity Measures 
 
3.4.1 Applications of Semantic Similarity Measures 
STS plays a significant role in text related research and the research in this area 
continues to emerge. STS measures the similarity between two sentences generally 
ranging between 10 and 25 words (Chandran et al., 2015) which then returns a 
similarity score of between 0 and 1, where 1 means extremely high similarity. STS has 
been applied in different areas such as information retrieval from biomedical 
ontologies (Couto and Pinto, 2013), joke detection in the Japanese language (Rzepka 
et al., 2015), a short answer grading system (Sultan et al., 2016), conversational 
agents (Sandbank et al., 2017), a tutoring system (Aljameel et al., 2017) and events 
detection through social media (Crockett et al., 2017). 
There have been a number of STS measures introduced previously, which can be 
categorised text into string-based, corpus-based and knowledge-based measures 
(Gomaa and Fahmy, 2013). String-based similarity measures the similarity between 
the strings of two words. For example, “kitten” and “mitten” can be considered 
similar. Two of the most popular STS measures are Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) 
(Landauer and Dumais, 1997; Landauer et al., 1998) and Semantic Similarity based 
on Semantic Nets and Corpus Statistics (STASIS) (Li et al., 2006). LSA is a corpus-based 
similarity measure whereas STASIS is a knowledge-based similarity measure. 
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Corpus-based similarity, like LSA, is a similarity measure that measures the similarity 
between words according to the statistical relationship of vocabulary gained from 
the large corpus (Lee et al., 2014). When using LSA, a matrix of the word by paragraph 
(row represents word and column represents paragraph) is formed from a large piece 
of text. Take, for example, an article. LSA uses a mathematical technique called 
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to find the semantic similarity of texts. SVD 
removes the smaller singular values so that the dimension of the word by paragraph 
matrix is reduced. The vectors of the words are transformed into a reduced 
dimensional space while the similarity between two texts is obtained by calculating 
the vectors in the reduced dimension (Foltz et al., 1998). LSA does not take into 
account function words (such as “at”, “the” and “that”) and word order (i.e. syntactic 
information) while calculating for semantic similarities. A grammatically correct 
sentence is not required during the computation of similarities when using LSA. 
Knowledge-based similarity, like STASIS, measures the similarity between words 
using the information derived from a large lexical database in English such as 
Wordnet (Miller, 1995). Wordnet can be obtained through the Natural Language 
Toolkit (NLTK) (Bird, 2006). NLTK is an open source tool that includes more than 50 
lexical and corpora sources including Wordnet. Wordnet is like a thesaurus, where 
the relationships between words mainly relate to synonymity (Fellbaum, 2006). 
Adjectives, adverbs, nouns and verbs are all categorised into groups of cognitive 
synonyms, i.e. synsets. STASIS compares two texts by using short vectors. STASIS 
takes function words and word order into account when calculating for similarities. 
The dimension vector in STASIS varies according with the sentence pair; hence, 
according to the author (Li et al., 2006), their algorithm is a lot more computationally 
efficient than an algorithm like LSA. Like LSA, STASIS does not require grammatically 
correct sentences when computing similarities. 
Since STASIS takes both function words and word order into account and does not 
need grammatically correct sentences, it is more suited for use in Experiment 2 of 
Chapter 7. Word order is important when it comes to texts like FDB comments 
because it is a form of communication among investors on FDBs. They do not just 
post words without conveying information or meaning. 
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the three types of data structures that can be collected 
from the Internet. It then introduced the two fundamental classes of Information 
Extraction (IE), namely the knowledge engineering approach and the automatic 
learning approach. The knowledge engineering approach, which also known as the 
rule-based approach is the approach used by the template-based IE prototype 
system, namely FDBs Miner (FDBM) in this thesis. 
The next chapter introduces new methodologies and then presents an architecture 
for financial crime detection from share price based FDBs. 
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Chapter 4.  A Methodology for Financial Crime Detection on 
Share Price Based Financial Discussion Boards 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the development of a set of novel methodologies for the 
detection of potentially illegal activities on FDBs. Section 4.2 describes the 
identification of share price based FDBs in the UK and the semantically 
understandable artefacts on these FDBs. Lastly, Section 4.3 presents each 
methodology in each phase of the detection of potentially illegal activities on FDBs. 
 
4.2 Identification of Share Price Based FDBs and Semantically Understandable 
Artefacts 
Before the detection of potentially illegal activities can be performed, share price 
based FDBs based in the UK and semantically understandable artefacts were 
identified using the following steps: 
i. Manual search on the internet for share price based FDBs based in the UK. 
ii. A decision on which London Stock Exchange (LSE, 2017) indices to use for 
this research.  
iii. A randomly picked number of stock tickers from the selected UK indices. 
iv. A study of the stock tickers’ webpages and identification of the 
semantically understandable artefacts on all the identified FDBs in step (i). 
 
The identified share price based FDBs in the UK are ADVFN (ADVFN, 2017), London 
South East (LSE-FDB, 2017) and Interactive Investors (III, 2017) which have been 
comprehensively discussed in Chapter 2. As for the LSE indices, the FTSE-100 and 
FTSE AIM All-Share indices have been chosen because this allows the observations of 
whether Pump and Dump (P&D) does happen more in the FTSE-100, or FTSE AIM All-
Share or both equally. As mentioned in earlier chapters, P&D usually happens around 
penny stocks (Leung and Ton, 2015) and most of these penny stocks are listed under 
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the FTSE AIM All-Share index, hence, this choice. The exact number of total listed 
companies, unfortunately, was not identified at the beginning of this research in 
2014. However, according to a recent list of listed companies on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE, 2017) website, there was a total of 2,037 companies trading shares 
on the market as of May 2017. The FTSE-100 and FTSE AIM All-Share indices both 
have a total of 941 listed companies at the time of data collection in September 2014, 
which accounted for nearly half of the total companies. 
All possible semantically understandable artefacts were also identified for all the 
identified share price based FDBs. This factor was also discussed and presented in 
Chapter 2. However, due to the scope of this research, the complexity of the 
webpages’ format and the number of artefacts on the FDBs, not all artefacts were 
extracted. 
During the examinations of FDBs in Chapter 2, it was found that only ADVFN provides 
downloadable per minute historical prices (in the form of downloadable CSV files) 
with the condition that a monthly paid subscription needs to be bought. These 
downloadable per minute historical prices contain a maximum of two weeks’ worth 
of data. Thus, it was crawled once per week, so that no price data were accidentally 
left out. Though the LSE-FDB also provides per minute prices through a paid 
subscription, it is only available in the form of live prices. This means that there would 
be a need to develop another custom crawler function to extract the per minute live 
prices from the LSE-FDB. Assuming that this would even be achievable without too 
much effort, the owner of the LSE-FDB did express his disapproval (via email 
communication) of scraping the live prices from the LSE-FDB webpages. The owner’s 
disapproval was understandable as crawling per minute of live share prices from raw 
webpages for a span of 12 weeks would cost the owner in terms of having to pay for 
premium bandwidth charges because each crawl counts as a visit to the website. 
Hence, for the share prices artefact, ADVFN is being utilised. 
Publicly posted comments by investors are available on all ADVFN, III and LSE-FDB 
websites. Private comments are available on the LSE-FDB only for paid members, but 
it was not considered. Public comments are thought to have more influence on the 
potentially illegal activities on FDBs as they are publicly viewable by non-paid 
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members and any website visitor. Only the public comments of III and LSE-FDB were 
collected through RSS feed. ADVFN does not provide RSS feed and due to the 
complexity of the webpage’s format, ADVFN’s comments were not considered. 
Table 4.1 below summarises the FDB artefacts that were collected from each FDB 
and SharePrices1 – a sister website of LSE-FDB (LSE-FDB, 2017) which is no longer 
active. Director deals and broker ratings were collected for potential future work. 
 
Table 4.1 Collected FDB Artefacts 
 SharePrices ADVFN III LSE-FDB 
Ticker Symbols √    
Prices  √   
Comments   √ √ 
Director Deals    √ 
Broker Ratings    √ 
 
These FDB artefacts were collected for a period of 12 weeks based on the same 
method adopted by authors such as Delort et al. (2011) and Leung and Ton (2015) 
(i.e. the data is collected based on a period of time rather than data volume).  
 
4.3 An Overall Methodology for the Detection of Potentially Illegal Activities on 
FDBs 
This section describes the methodology developed for each phase for the detection 
of potentially illegal activities on FDBs. There is a total of seven phases described in 
the following sections, which are then implemented in the seven architecture 
components in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                     
1 This website was originally used for obtaining the ticker symbols belonging to both indices FTSE100 
and FTSE AIM All-Share in 2014; however, it is no longer active. 
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4.3.1 Phase 1: Implement a Data Crawler 
Development of a data crawler architecture component to extract artefacts 
identified in Section 4.2. 
i. Scrape two webpages (in HTML file format) from SharePrices1 that contain 
ticker symbols belonging to the chosen indices – FTSE-100 and FTSE AIM 
All-Share. 
ii. Study the webpage structures and extract only the ticker symbols and 
company names. 
iii. Automatically capture the comments (in XML file format) for these ticker 
symbols from FDBs for every 10 minutes and store in local folders with 
timestamps for later use. 
iv. Automatically capture the per minute historical share prices (in CSV file 
format) for these ticker symbols every week from ADVFN via paid 
subscription. Downloaded share prices are also stored in local folders with 
timestamps for later use. 
v. Collect director deals and broker ratings (both in HTML file format) artefact 
data for potential future work. 
A total of 941 ticker symbols were successfully extracted from the SharePrices 
website. Comments, share prices, director deals and broker ratings were also 
captured. This phase is further elaborated and implemented in Section 5.3. 
 
4.3.2 Phase 2: Implement a Data Transformer 
Implementation of a data transformer architecture component that is capable of pre-
processing and transforming unstructured and semi-structured artefacts data 
collected in Phase 1 into structured data. 
i. Programmatically locate the semantically understandable artefacts data in 
the indices’ HTML files, comments’ XML files, share prices’ CSV files data 
crawled in Phase 1. 
ii. Extract and transform the revealed data from a semi-structured format 
such as HTML, XML and CSV into a structured format. 
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iii. Import the structured data into a database designed in the next phase 
(Phase 3). 
Phase 2 is further described and implemented in Section 5.4. 
 
4.3.3 Phase 3: Devise a Dataset for Storing Data 
Phase 3 devises and implements an FDB dataset (FDB-DS) to store the pre-processed 
structured data extracted in Phase 2. 
i. Design the database tables in FDB-DS to accommodate the pre-processed 
data of ticker symbols, share prices, comments, director deals and broker 
ratings. 
ii. Link all the database tables to the unique ID of the ticker symbols’ table. 
This allows all other artefacts database tables to be linked and related to 
the ticker symbol. 
iii. Decide on the data types for each data column in the database tables. For 
example, the data type for ticker symbols and company names is “varchar” 
(i.e. variable character, meaning the column can hold letters and numbers). 
iv. Create all database tables in FDB-DS based on the decided table 
relationships and column data types. 
Phase 3 is further elaborated in Section 5.5. 
 
4.3.4 Phase 4: Construct a Pump and Dump Keyword Template 
Design of a methodology for the construction of P&D IE keyword template is as 
follows. This template is used in the process of detecting potentially illegal activities 
on the identified share price based FDBs. 
i. Evaluate sample comments of P&D financial crime presented in existing 
research (Campbell, 2001; Felton and Kim, 2002; Campbell and Cecez-
Kecmanovic, 2011; Sabherwal et al., 2011) (see Section 2.6.3). 
ii. Manually select keywords, phrases and short sentences of P&D financial 
crime from the sample comments. 
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iii. Look up for similar keywords and phrases on WordWeb (WordWeb 
Software, 2017), Chamber Dictionary (Chamber Dictionary, 2017) and 
Thesaurus (Dictionary.com, LLC, 2017). 
iv. Form a P&D IE keyword template by adding the keywords, phrases and 
short sentences into a text file for later use. 
v. Validate the list of keywords, phrases and short sentences through a 
human expert in the relevant field (through email communication). 
The formulation of the P&D IE keyword template and the full list of the keywords are 
presented in Section 5.6. 
 
4.3.5 Phase 5: Devise a Forward Analyser 
A novel methodology is devised in Phase 5 for the forward analyser architecture 
component to perform flagging of potentially illegal activities on FDBs. The flagging 
process uses a combination of comments and prices from FDB-DS designed in Phase 
3 as well as the P&D IE keyword template constructed in Phase 4. 
i. Search the keywords, phrases and short sentences in P&D IE keyword 
template against all the comments in FDB-DS. 
ii. Import the result generated in Step (i) (i.e. flagged comments deemed 
potentially illegal) into a new database table in FDB-DS. 
iii. Match each flagged comment with the price of the same ticker symbol and 
same datetime. If no exact datetime is available, the next available price 
will be used to match the comments. 
iv. Set the matched price of each flagged comment as a base price, calculate 
whether at any point, the ±2 days’ prices exceed the specified thresholds 
(i.e. 5%, 10% and 15%). Record the outcomes in FDB-DS. Such thresholds 
can be adjusted by the relevant authorities as needed. 
This phase is further elaborated in Section 5.7. 
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4.3.6 Phase 6: Devise a Backward Analyser 
A novel methodology is devised for the backward analyser architecture component 
to perform moving average calculation, price spike detection on the share price data 
alone and backward price alert matching to the flagged potentially illegal comments 
produced in Phase 5. 
i. Study various moving average techniques and the use of these techniques. 
ii. Decide which moving average technique to use as part of the backward 
analysis. 
iii. Perform moving average calculation on the prices of all ticker symbols. 
iv. Depending on the calculation outcomes, label each price with price alerts 
if its moving average figure exceeds the thresholds of 5%, 10% and 15% of 
increments. 
v. Match and append the price alerts, if any, backward to the flagged 
comments that share the same or nearest datetime as the prices. 
This phase will produce a complete dataset of flagged comments with all the 
thresholds applied through forward and backward analysis, which can be used for 
determining which flagged comments should be prioritised for investigation of 
potentially illegal activities on FDBs. Phase 6 is expanded in Section 5.8. 
 
4.3.7 Phase 7: Implement Semantic Textual Similarity 
STS is implemented in Phase 7 to incorporate with forward analyser in Phase 5 with 
the purpose of reducing false positives during the comment flagging process. 
i. Generate a 32-row comment dataset for STS experiments by randomly 
choosing and sorting 16 flagged comments and 16 non-flagged comments 
programmatically. 
ii. A human expert is asked to determine the flagged and non-flagged 
comments. 
iii. Human expert’s answers are compared to the original outcomes (i.e. 16 
flagged and 16 non-flagged comments that are detected during forward 
analysis process by FDBM prototype system). 
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iv. Next, using the similarity thresholds of 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65 and 0.7, 
compute the similarity score between each comment in the 32-row 
comment dataset and each keyword, phrase and short sentence from the 
keyword template constructed in Phase 4. 
v. Record all similarity results for discussion purposes. 
Phase 7 is further elaborated in Chapter 7. 
 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced a set of novel methodologies for the creation of the FDBM 
architecture, which has been designed to assist the relevant authorities in detecting 
potentially illegal FDB comments. It also allows the relevant authorities to focus on 
investigating the flagged comments that have higher risks or higher potentials of 
association with illegal activity on the FDBs. Section 4.2 covered the area of the 
identification of share price based FDBs in the UK and the identification of the 
semantically understandable artefacts on the FDBs. Section 4.3 provided an overview 
of a set of novel methodologies for the creation of FDBM architecture and a 
prototype system which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5.  An Architecture for Financial Crime Detection on 
Share Price Based Financial Discussion Boards 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Section 5.2 illustrates an architecture overview of the Financial Discussion Boards 
Miner (FDBM) prototype system based on the methodologies introduced in the 
previous chapter. Within this chapter, the seven architecture components of the 
FDBM are described. Sections 5.3 to 5.8 expand the descriptions of the architecture 
components presented in Section 5.2 which were implemented with the potentially 
illegal activities methodologies. The architecture of FDBM is comprised of the data 
crawler, data transformer, FDB dataset (FDB-DS), Pump and Dump Information 
Extraction (IE) keyword template, forward analyser, backward analyser and Semantic 
Textual Similarity (STS). The graphical user interface (GUI) for the prototype system 
is also presented in Section 5.9. Finally, Section 5.10 summarises the chapter. 
 
5.2 Prototype Architecture Overview 
Figure 5.1 illustrates an architecture overview of the prototype system FDBM. The 
FDBM consists of seven key components. As shown in the overview, there are the 
data crawler, data transformer, FDB dataset (FDB-DS), IE keyword template, forward 
analyser, backward analyser and STS. 
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Figure 5.1 Prototype Architecture Overview 
 
Each key component is described as follows: 
 
1. Data Crawler 
The data crawler component is implemented to crawl unstructured data 
such as company names and ticker symbols from SharePrices2 – a sister 
website of London South East (LSE, 2017). The ticker symbols were 
obtained based on the FTSE-100 index and FTSE AIM All-Share index for 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE, 2017). The ticker symbols’ rankings 
change from time to time depending on the companies’ performances. A 
total of 941 ticker symbols were found in both indices at the time of 
crawling. The data crawler also crawls the three selected UK share price 
based FDBs, i.e. ADVFN (ADVFN, 2017), LSE-FDB (LSE-FDB, 2017) and III (III, 
2017) for share prices, comments, director deals and broker ratings which 
belong to all the chosen ticker symbols. These data are crawled 
                                                     
2 This website was originally used for obtaining the ticker symbols belonging to both indices FTSE100 
and FTSE AIM All-Share in 2014; however, it is no longer active. 
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automatically at different time intervals for 12 weeks from the date of 
23rd September 2014 to 22nd December 2014 (see Section 5.3). 
 
2. Data Transformer 
Once the data collection process is completed by the data crawler, the 
data transformer extracts and converts the collected unstructured and 
semi-structured data in various formats such as HTML, CSV and XML into 
a structured data format. The data transformer will import all the 
structured data into FDB-DS once it’s designed and prepared for the use 
of data storage (see Section 5.4). 
 
3. FDB Dataset (FDB-DS) 
From the data transformer, the structured data are stored into the FDB-
DS in each table as `ticker`, `price`, `comment`, `directordeal` and 
`brokerrating` respectively. More database tables follow once the 
forward analysis and backward analysis experiments are performed. FDB-
DS becomes the most vital component since the forward analyser and 
backward analyser will depend on it for conducting experiments (see 
Section 5.5). 
 
4. IE Template 
The P&D IE keyword template is created based on the research 
methodology proposed in Section 4.3.4. It consists of a series of keywords, 
phrases and short sentences that were thoroughly researched and 
validated by a human expert in the relevant field. It is saved locally in the 
FDBM prototype system in a text file (TXT file format) which can be easily 
retrieved and modified from time to time. This IE keyword template will 
be used by the forward and backward analysers to flag potentially illegal 
comments (see Section 5.6). 
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5. Forward Analyser 
Once the data are properly stored in the FDB-DS and the P&D IE keyword 
template is validated, the forward analyser incorporates the IE keyword 
template into the process of flagging potentially illegal FDB comments. 
The flagged potentially illegal comments are stored in a new database 
table. Following this, the price figures and price datetime are searched for 
and matched to the list of flagged comments. Then, ±2 days of prices are 
calculated against the price of each flagged comment to see if, at any 
point, the ±2 days of prices exceeds the predefined thresholds (i.e. 5%, 
10% and 15%). For any triggered thresholds, the forward analyser will 
append threshold alerts to the flagged comments (see Section 5.7). 
 
6. Backward Analyser 
The backward analyser is responsible for performing the calculation and 
labelling of any price hikes using a price moving average technique, 
namely Simple Moving Average (SMA). There are also three thresholds 
(i.e. 5%, 10% and 15%) for the price hikes. Once all the price hikes for all 
the tickers are determined through the SMA calculations, the backward 
analyser then matches the price hike alerts backwards to the flagged 
comments (see Section 5.8). 
 
7. Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) 
The STS component in the FDBM prototype system measures the 
similarity scores between each FDB comment and each keyword, phrase 
and short sentence. The similarity scores are used to determine the 
likelihood of an FDB comment being suspicious. There is a full explanation 
of this component in Chapter 7. 
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5.3 Data Crawler 
This section describes the role of the data crawler component starting from the 
collection of ticker symbols (Section 5.3.1), share prices (Section 5.3.2), comments 
(Section 5.3.3) and other artefact data (Section 5.3.4). Section 5.3.5 presents an 
overview of the data collection. 
 
5.3.1 Collecting Ticker Symbols 
Before collecting artefacts like share prices and comments, the crawler first 
determines all the participating shares in the FTSE-100 and FTSE AIM All-Share 
indices by scraping HTML webpages, i.e. http://shareprices.com/ftseaimallshare 
(LSE-FDB, 2017) and http://shareprices.com/ftse100 (LSE-FDB, 2017) from 
SharePrices (LSE-FDB, 2017). These HTML webpages are temporarily saved in the 
local machine for extraction of the ticker symbols and company names later. The 
listed companies in both indices change over time. However, the process of obtaining 
these company names and ticker symbols runs only once as the research will only 
take into account the data for 12 weeks. A total of 941 ticker symbols were extracted 
and written into a CSV file and imported into the `tickers` table in the FDB-DS. 
 
5.3.2 Collecting Share Prices 
Now that all ticker symbols in both indices are identified, the data crawler starts 
collecting share prices. Per minute share prices are not available publicly and can only 
be obtained through paid subscription. In this case, ADVDN is chosen for such a 
purpose and the subscription fee is £15.79 per month. Although this research takes 
only 12 weeks of data, the paid subscription lasted for about a year due to the testing 
phase in the development of the FDBM prototype system and data loss in the middle 
of the data collection process due to hard disk failure. Also, note that ADVFN does 
not guarantee the availability of all per minute price figures. This means there will be 
missing figures which will be handled in Section 5.4.3. 
To obtain the per minute share prices of all chosen ticker symbols, the data crawler 
first triggers and opens a new browser window. It then visits http://uk.advfn.com 
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(ADVFN, 2017) and automatically logs in to a preregistered ADVFN account with an 
active monthly subscription. Once logged in, the crawler extracts and downloads the 
prices of each ticker symbol in comma-separated values (CSV) files. These files are 
saved into dated folders on the local machine for later use. This collection of share 
prices automatically runs once a week. 
 
5.3.3 Collecting Comments 
While the semi-structured price data are being collected, the crawler downloads the 
comments for all chosen ticker symbols from both the LSE-FDB (LSE-FDB, 2017) and 
III (III, 2017) in XML file format. These comments are automatically collected every 
ten minutes to ensure no comments are missed. The crawled comments data are 
placed in separated and dated folders subsequently. As these data are crawled so 
frequently, the folder size grows rapidly. 
 
5.3.4 Collecting Other Artefacts Data 
Apart from ticker symbols, share prices and comments, the data crawler also 
captures the director deals and broker ratings which are potentially useful in 
expanding the research in the near future. Both director deals and broker ratings are 
captured once a week. 
 
5.3.5 An Overview of the Data Collection 
Table 5.1 summarises the frequency with which each capturing process takes place: 
 
Table 5.1 Time Intervals for Capturing Data 
Data Interval 
Ticker Symbols Only once 
Share Prices Once a week 
Comments Every 10 minutes 
Director Deals Once a week 
Broker Ratings Once a week 
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Once the 12 weeks’ worth of artefact data have been successfully captured, the data 
crawler proceeds to the data pre-processing stage. The crawler was designed to clean 
up the noise in each semi-structured data file and extract only the meaningful data. 
This process transforms semi-structured data into structured data. Subsequently, the 
extracted artefact data will be imported and an FDB dataset (FDB-DS) will be formed 
which will be described in Section 5.5.  
All the acquired data was successfully imported into the database FDB-DS. Table 5.2 
shows the total entries of data for each artefact stored in database tables in the FDB-
DS: 
 
Table 5.2 Total Database Entries for Data Collected 
Artefact Total Rows 
Ticker Symbols 941 
Comments 507,970 
Prices 28,980,465 
Director Deals 11,456 
Broker Ratings 6,469 
 
 
5.4 Data Transformer 
This section describes the functionality of the data transformer component and the 
pre-processing steps for the collected ticker symbols (Section 5.4.1), comments 
(Section 5.4.2), share prices (Section 5.4.3) and other artefact data (Section 5.4.4). 
 
5.4.1 Pre-processing Collected Ticker Symbols 
Previously in Section 5.3.1, the data crawler scraped the HTML webpages for FTSE-
100 and FTSE AIM All-Share and stored the webpage files locally. In this section, the 
data transformer searches for tables in the webpage files and iterates through each 
row and column. It then extracts the ticker symbol and company names in each row 
and writes them in a text file. The text file will be used to import the ticker records 
into the FDB-DS in Section 5.5. 
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5.4.2 Pre-processing Collected Comments 
Previously in Section 5.3.3, the comments for 941 ticker symbols were downloaded 
from FDBs in XML file format every 10 minutes for 12 weeks and placed into separate 
folders. Folders were named in the format of "LSE_" + "dd-MM-yyyy_HH-mm-ss" e.g. 
LSE_02-10-2014_21-10-05, which then makes it easier to convert the XML to CSV in 
order to import the data into the MySQL database. 
By using the designed steps in the data crawler component, XML files were converted 
to CSV using the following steps: 
 
i. Loop through each of the XML files in each of the folders. 
ii. In each XML file, scan for each XML node (which represents each 
comment). 
iii. Further scanning into each XML node, there were XML items such as 
comment title, comment author, comment and comment date and 
time. 
iv. In order to avoid conflict with the CSV file format, certain visible and 
invisible characters in the content of XML items were removed as part 
of the pre-processing steps. These components included: “,” (comma), 
“\n” (new line), “\t” (tab), “\r” (return – like new line) and “<br />” 
(break a line). 
v. Write all the pre-processed and cleaned up comments into separate 
CSV files to prevent an overlarge single CSV file. 
 
RSS feeds contain a fixed number of the latest comments. For the RSS feeds XML file 
format for the comments being collected, there were duplicated comments which 
were written into the CSV files. At this stage, the data crawler component is also 
responsible for removing the duplicates. This process takes a long time as there were 
a lot of comments to process. The CSV files then went through special character 
removal such as “, = "" '' * + - %” and each comment row in the CSV files was parsed 
into the `comment` database table in the FDB-DS. 
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5.4.3 Pre-processing Collected Share Prices 
All the downloaded price file names have a fixed format like “L-<ticker 
symbol>_<date>_intra.csv”. Remove the “L-” and “_<date>_intra” so that the file 
names are simplified as “<ticker symbol>.csv”. 
Since the experiments throughout the research rely on the ticker ID instead of ticker 
symbols or company names, this step replaces all the “<ticker symbol>” with “<ticker 
ID>”, so the file names now read “<ticker ID>.csv”, for example, 1.csv. 
In each CSV file, other than the file name itself, there was no indication of which 
ticker symbol or ID the price figures belonged to. Hence in this step, all the 941 ticker 
IDs were appended in a new column in the CSV files. This was to simplify the process 
of importing all the price figures into FDB-DS all at once without having it messed up 
while price figures were grouped according to each ticker ID. 
 
5.5 Financial Discussion Boards Dataset (FDB-DS) 
The design and creation of the FDB-DS depended upon all the identified artefacts (in 
Section 4.2) such as the ticker symbols, prices, comments, director deals and broker 
ratings from the FDBs. Figure 5.2 illustrates the novel design of the FDB-DS in the 
form of an Entity Relationship Diagram.  
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Figure 5.2 Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) 
 
Each database table is described as follows: 
• Ticker 
Database table for storing all the 941 ticker symbols, company names and 
which index they belong to. 
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• Comment 
Database table for storing all the collected comments and the associated date, 
time, author, topic title, ticker ID and prices. 
• Flaggedcomment 
Database table for storing the flagged comments when conducting 
experiments and analysis. 
• Price 
Database table for storing all the prices and the associated date, time, moving 
average calculation and moving average threshold calculation outcomes. 
• Directordeal 
Database table for storing the director deals artefact data and the associated 
date, time, amount and so on. 
• Brokerrating 
Database table for storing all the broker and rating data and the associated 
date, time and target. 
 
Each data type within the FDB-DS will now be described: 
• INT(size) 
INT in a database means integer. In Figure 5.2, the primary key (i.e. ` ticker_id`) 
in the `ticker` table is set with INT(12). “12” is the maximum number of digits 
being displayed in the database column. 
• DATE 
DATE in a database means date only. The date data are stored in the FDB-DS 
using a “YYYY-MM-DD” format, e.g. 2014-11-30. 
• DATETIME 
DATETIME in a database is used to store date and time in a same field. The 
date and time data stored in the FDB-DS uses a “YYYY-MM-DD HH:MI:SS” 
format, e.g. 2014-11-30 20:49:31. 
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• VARCHAR(size) 
VARCHAR in a database means variable character. A database table column 
with VARCHAR data type can hold numbers and letters. A VARCHAR field in 
MySQL database can hold up to a maximum of 65,535 characters. 
• LONGTEXT 
LONGTEXT in a database is used to store long texts. Unlike VARCHAR, long 
text does not have a limit in terms of how many characters a field can store. 
However, LONGTEXT has a data size limit of 4GB. LONGTEXT is used for the 
data item such as `comment` since some FDB comments can be longer than 
the 65,535-character limit in VARCHAR. 
• DECIMAL(P,D) 
DECIMAL in a database is used to store exact numeric values such as money 
data. “P” represents the precision that represents the number of digits and 
“D” represents the number of digits after the decimal point. In FDB-DS, 
“DECIMAL(12,5)” means a field can store up to 12 digits including the 5 digits 
after the decimal point, e.g. 1,234,567.89000. 
 
 
5.6 Pump and Dump (P&D) Keyword Template 
Table 5.3 demonstrates the list of P&D keywords, phrases and short sentences 
selected based on the methodology in Phase 4, described in Section 4.3.4. There is a 
total number of 117 keywords, phrases and short sentences in the P&D IE keyword 
template before stemming is performed. This list was validated by a human expert in 
the field through email communication. 
 
Table 5.3 P&D IE Keyword Template 
Keywords Keywords 
Pnd Pump dump 
Manipulate Manipulating stock 
Manipulating Manipulating share 
Manipulation Chop stock 
Manipulative Penny stock 
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Misleading False statement 
Deceive Misleading statement 
Deceiving Misleading positive statement 
Deceptive Once-in-a-lifetime 
Hoax Once in a lifetime 
Scam Pump the price 
Falsify Pump the share 
Cheat Pump this stock 
Con Inflated price 
Spreading rumours Hot stock 
Artificially raising price Huge volume spike 
Artificially inflate price Keep ramping 
Pump On hypes 
Pumped Buy now 
Pumping Good future 
Ramp Invested so heavily 
Ramped It will fly 
Ramping Buy more 
Inflate Rock bottom price 
Inflated Buy on dips 
Inflating Buy the dips 
Tips Best tips 
Incline Good tip 
Elevate Dump the price 
Promote Dump the share 
Boost Short stock 
Get rich Fall hard 
Make a killing Sell now 
Make a fortune Sell quickly 
Make money Declining stock 
Make big bucks Begin to decline 
Make a pretty penny Begin to deteriorate 
Make a bundle Volume is dead 
Make a bomb When I post you better believe me 
Make a packet Do not doubt me on this one 
Hit it big Anyone who sells to make a small profit is very short 
sighted 
Gain profit This is the chance 
Become wealthy Price will go up 
Strike it rich Buy as quickly as possible 
Dump Take what profit you can 
Dumped About to run, get in today 
Dumping Adding a few more don’t let the shorts win here 
Short Buying opportunity this AM 
Shorted Still looks good for a run 
Shorting This is the opportunity 
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Ditch shall go up again after today 
Drop speculated return 
Opt out Now is the time 
Abandon Chance to make some real dollars 
Back out This stock might not have any trouble hitting over 
Give up the ship May be too late if we wait a bit longer 
Pull out Sell as quickly as possible 
Let go Get out while you can 
Pump and dump - 
 
 
5.7 Forward Analyser 
The aim of the forward analyser component is to filter and flag the potentially illegal 
P&D comments using the IE keyword template with the integration of share prices. 
The forward analyser contains a number of functions to operate through the entire 
forward comments flagging process. These functions include the initial flagging of 
potentially illegal comments, matching prices to flagged comments and price hike 
threshold labelling. 
 
5.7.1 Comment Flagging 
The forward analyser will initially perform a stemming process against the P&D IE 
keyword template and comments using the commonly used Porter’s stemming 
algorithm (Porter, 1980). Then all the keywords, phrases and sentences from the P&D 
IE keyword template will be matched against the 507,970 comments which were pre-
processed and transformed into structured data stored in the FDB-DS by the data 
transformer as described in Section 5.4. The results of the flagged potentially illegal 
comments will then be imported into a new table named `flaggedcomment` in the 
FDB-DS for the use of experiments and analysis in Chapter 5. 
 
5.7.2 Price Matching 
As mentioned in Section 5.3.2, though the per minute share prices for ticker symbols 
are available through an ADVFN monthly subscription, the full availability of all price 
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figures is not guaranteed. As a result of this, “0.00” is recorded when there is no price 
captured by ADVFN. These zero values must be handled prior to performing price 
matching in this section and in Section 5.8.1 for moving average calculation. When 
zero values occur in the prices of a ticker ID, pick the last known or next price figure 
to replace the zero values. This is to prevent any inaccuracy in the final outcomes of 
this research. 
Once the flagged comments table has been populated, the forward analyser will 
proceed to the process of matching a price to each flagged comment. The method 
used at this stage attempts to set a “base price” for each comment, particularly the 
flagged comments, since thresholds will be applied in the next stage. At this stage, 
the analyser will read each comment’s date and time, then search for the price figure 
of each ticker ID that shares the same date and time of the comment of a specific 
ticker symbol. If a price figure at the same date and time is not found, the next 
available price figure will be appended to the flagged comment. Due to the extremely 
large `price` table – consisting of over 28 million rows – after all the testing, this 
process takes up to two weeks to completely search and match price figures for all 
the 49,858 rows of flagged comments. 
 
5.7.3 Threshold Labelling 
After having all the “base prices” set for each flagged comment according to the 
identical or nearest comment’s and price’s date and time, the analyser will attempt 
to label each flagged comment with thresholds. This process takes days to completely 
calculate all the prices within ±2 days against the “base price” and then sets the 
triggered threshold to each flagged comment. The threshold labelling rules are as 
follows: 
• Flagged comments that have no price figure (due to incomplete price figures 
provided by ADVFN) and non-flagged comments will be labelled as “N” (Null). 
• If any of the price figures from the prices within ±2 days exceeds a 5% price 
hike when calculated against the “base price” of a flagged comment, the 
comment will be labelled as “Y” (Yellow). 
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• If any of the price figures from the prices within ±2 days exceeds a 10% price 
hike when calculated against the “base price” of a flagged comment, the 
comment will be labelled as “A” (Amber). 
• If any of the price figures from the prices within ±2 days exceeds a 15% price 
hike when calculated against the “base price” of a flagged comment, the 
comment will be labelled as “R” (Red). 
• Flagged comments with a “base price” that does not exceed a 5% price hike 
will be labelled as “C”. 
 
5.8 Backward Analyser 
The aim of the backward analyser component is to further classify the flagged 
comments (resulting from forward analysis) using the abnormality in share prices 
which is calculated using moving average methods. The novel methodology used in 
the backward analyser component also attempts to resolve false positives for flagged 
comments. 
Like the forward analyser, the backward analyser consists of a number of major 
functions. These functions run one after another in order to achieve the final 
outcome. This includes calculating the moving average price figures, determining and 
labelling whether there are alerts for the original price exceeding the moving average 
price, and finally backward alert labelling towards the existing flagged comments. 
 
5.8.1 Moving Average Calculation 
Moving average is one of the technical analysis methods that is often widely used by 
financial analysts to predict future price patterns and learn stocks’ behaviour and 
trends by studying historical price data (Dzikevičius and Šaranda, 2010). The most 
common moving averages used are the Simple Moving Average (SMA) and 
Exponential Moving Average (EMA). But, Weighted Moving Average (WMA) is also 
widely used depending on the analysis needs. Some researchers even use a moving 
average for predicting the rate of traffic congestion and road accidents (Raiyn and 
Toledo, 2014). However, it appears that there have been few to no attempts in past 
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research to use moving average as a financial crime tool to detect abnormal stock 
price movements. 
The function of the backward analyser is to attempt to apply the SMA, WMA and 
EMA to the pre-processed prices. Firstly, it was decided that the time periods used 
for this experiment are 1 day, 3 days and 5 days. These time periods can be changed 
by the relevant authorities if needed. Next, calculate the SMA, WMA and EMA using 
their formulas. Section 5.8.1.1 explains the calculation of SMA; Section 5.8.1.2 
explains the calculation of WMA and Section 5.8.1.3 explains the calculation of EMA. 
 
5.8.1.1 Simple Moving Average (SMA) Calculation 
Equation 1 shows the formula for SMA calculation. 
 
Eq. 1.    𝑆𝑀𝐴 =  
𝑝1+𝑝2+⋯+𝑝𝑛
𝑛
  
where, p = price; n = time period. 
 
To understand how SMA works, Table 5.4 illustrates a simple example. To achieve 
the calculation of a 5-minute SMA, the analyser will pick the prices for the first 5 
minutes and sum up, then divide by 5. 
For example, (16+17+17+10+17)/5 = 15.4 
 
Table 5.4 SMA Calculation Example 
 
 
Time 8:00 8:01 8:02 8:03 8:04 8:05 8:06 8:07 8:08 
Price ($) 16 17 17 10 17 18 17 17 17 
5-min SMA         15.4 15.8 15.8 15.8 17.2 
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Thus, in this example, the first SMA of the prices is 15.4. When the calculation moves 
on to the next row (i.e. next price) in the database `price` table, the original first price 
figure (i.e. $16 at the time of 8:00) is excluded and the new price (i.e. $18 at the time 
of 8:05) is taken into account in order to calculate the next SMA value (i.e. $15.8 next 
to the first SMA value of $15.4). 
Since the chosen periods for this purpose are 1 day, 3 days and 5 days and for each 
day, the stock market movement is active for 8 hours (480 minutes), the SMA 
calculation for a period of 1 day starts with summing up all the prices for the first 480 
minutes and dividing the sum by 480 to get the SMA. This calculation continues for 
all the prices for each ticker symbol. 
The same steps are repeated for the periods of 3 days and 5 days. The results of these 
SMA calculations are recorded into new price tables in the FDB-DS. 
 
5.8.1.2 Weighted Moving Average (WMA) Calculation 
In a WMA calculation, a greater weight is given to the most recent price data because 
the more recent price is deemed to be more important. Equation 2 shows the 
formula for WMA calculation. 
 
Eq. 2.   𝑊𝑀𝐴 =
(𝑃∗𝑛 + 𝑃(1)∗𝑛−1+⋯𝑃(𝑛−1)∗1)
( 𝑛∗
(𝑛+1)
2
 )
 
where, p = price; n = time period. 
 
To achieve the calculation for a, take, for example, a 5-minute WMA, then carry out 
the following steps:  
i. Sum up all the weights i.e. 1+2+3+4+5 = 15 
ii. Then formulate the weighting by using the weight of each price 
divided by the sum of weights. For example, 1/15, 2/15, 3/15 and so 
on. 
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iii. After this, multiply the price with the weighting to produce the 
weighted value. For example, 
((17*(5/15))+(10*(4/15))+(17*(3/15))+(17*(2/15))+(16*(1/15))) 
iv. Finally, the calculated WMA figure is the sum of all the weighted 
values. For example, 1.07+2.27+3.40+2.67+5.67=15.07 
Table 5.5 shows an example of the WMA calculation in a clearer manner. 
 
Table 5.5 WMA Calculation Example 
Time 8:01 8:02 8:03 8:04 8:05 
Price ($) 16 17 17 10 17 
Weight 1 2 3 4 5 
Weighting 1/15 2/15 3/15 4/15 5/15 
Weighted value 1.07 2.27 3.40 2.67 5.67 
5-min WMA         15.07 
 
 
5.8.1.3 Exponential Moving Average (EMA) Calculation 
Like WMA, Exponential Moving Average (EMA) also add weights to the formula, so 
that the latest price data have more influence in the moving average charting. EMA 
is a moving average technique that is similar to SMA. The only difference is that EMA 
has weighting added and SMA does not. The weights in EMA are slightly different 
from the weights added in the WMA formula. The weights in WMA are consistently 
being decreased, but the weights in EMA are exponential, meaning they decrease at 
a greater rate instead of consistently like for WMA. In this case, EMA reacts to the 
latest prices more quickly (Ross, 2017). 
To achieve the calculation of a 5-minute EMA, there is a need to first convert time 
period (n) to “K” (i.e. smoothing constant), then carry out the EMA calculations. 
The formula to calculate EMA is as below: 
 
65 
 
Eq. 3.  𝐸𝑀𝐴[𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦]  =  (𝑃[𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦] 𝑥 𝐾)  +  (𝐸𝑀𝐴[𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦] 𝑥 (1 – 𝐾)) 
where, p = price; K = 2 / (n + 1); n = time period. 
 
An example of the calculation is shown below, also in Table 5.6: 
 (17 * 2 / (5 + 1)) + [16.3 * (1 – 2 / (5 + 1))] 
 = (17 * 0.3333) + [16.3 * (1 – 0.3333)] 
= 5.6661 + 10.86721 = 16.5 
 
Table 5.6 EMA Calculation Example 
Time 8:01 8:02 8:03 8:04 8:05 8:06 8:07 8:08 8:09 
Price ($) 16 17 17 10 17 18 17 17 17 
33.3% EMA    16.5 14.4 15.2 16.2 16.4 16.6 16.8 
 
 
5.8.2 Alert Labelling 
After obtaining all the SMA, WMA and EMA values in the previous step, three 
thresholds are applied to all the moving average values (which act as the moving 
average base value). The thresholds are 5%, 10% and 15% above the moving average 
values. 
For example, as shown in Table 5.7, if an SMA value is $15.4, all the three threshold 
values are as below: 
 
Table 5.7 Moving Average Threshold Calculation Example 
Threshold SMA Threshold Price 
5% $15.4 * 1.05 = $16.17 
10% $15.4 * 1.10 = $16.94 
15% $15.4 * 1.15 = $17.71 
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The purpose of these calculated and recorded thresholds is meant for the next 
section where the threshold alerts are matched backwards to the potentially illegal 
comments. 
 
5.8.3 Alert Matching 
In the FDB-DS, there will be a database table that records the flagged potentially 
illegal comments by performing the comments flagging process described in the next 
chapter. To recap on how it reaches this stage, the comments will be flagged initially 
through the process of keyword matching using the P&D IE keyword template. Then 
the flagged comments will be appended with the exact or nearest price value at the 
time each comment was posted. This price then acts as a “base price” for the forward 
analyser to count it against all the prices of ±2 days of a ticker symbol, in order to 
determine and label them with price hike thresholds. 
After all the steps (Section 5.7.1, Section 5.7.2 and Section 5.7.3) in the forward 
analyser component and moving average calculations (as stated in Section 5.8.1.1, 
Section 5.8.1.2 and Section 5.8.1.3) are performed, the backward analyser will then 
investigate backwards by matching the price thresholds to the flagged comments 
based on the same or nearest date shared between flagged comments and the prices. 
 
5.9 Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
The GUI for FDBM is simple as it is mainly used for managing button click events 
which execute backend functions, retrieving and displaying data from the FDB-DS. 
Section 5.9.1 describes and illustrates the GUI for the data crawler and Section 5.9.2 
demonstrates the GUI for the forward and backward analysers. 
 
5.9.1 Data Crawler GUI 
The data crawler component is designed to be fully automated when crawling for 
data. The other executable functions are also meant to operate in the background. 
However, the crawler GUI is designed for just in case there is a need to manually 
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initiate a download process for specific data, for example, fetching director deals 
data. 
In the data crawler GUI, the buttons like “Fetch RNS” and “Fetch Financial Diary” 
contain executable functions. Though these data are not collected and not used in 
the current research due to challenges like time and resources, it can be useful for 
future research (which is why these functions are not removed at the time of writing 
this). 
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 illustrate the data crawler GUI in two parts. Each button and 
each data display table have been labelled as follows: 
1. Fetch Tickers 
To download ticker symbols manually. 
2. Load Tickers 
To load the downloaded ticker symbols from the FDB-DS. 
3. Fetch Broker Ratings 
To download broker rating data manually. 
4. Load Broker Ratings 
To load the downloaded broker rating data from the FDB-DS. 
5. Fetch Recent Trades 
To download recent share trades data manually. 
6. Load Recent Trades 
To load the downloaded recent share trades data from the FDB-DS. 
7. Fetch Director Deals 
To download director deals data manually. 
8. Load Director Deals 
To load the downloaded director deals data from the FDB-DS. 
9. Fetch Financial Diary 
To download financial diary data manually. 
10. Load Financial Diary 
To load the downloaded financial diary data from the FDB-DS. 
11. Fetch RNS 
to download RNS (regulatory news) manually. 
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12. Load RNS 
To load the downloaded RNS from the FDB-DS. 
13. Ticker Symbols Data Display 
The loaded ticker symbols will be displayed in this area. 
14. Recent Trades Data Display 
The loaded recent trades data will be displayed in this area. 
15. Financial Diary Data Display 
The loaded financial diary data will be displayed in this area. 
16. Broker Ratings Data Display 
The loaded broker rating data will be displayed in this area. 
17. Director Deals Data Display 
The loaded director deals data will be displayed in this area. 
18. Regulatory News Data Display 
The loaded RNS will be displayed in this area. 
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Figure 5.3 Data Crawler GUI – Part 1 
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19. Fetch Fundamentals 
To download fundamentals data manually. 
20. Load Fundamentals 
To load the downloaded fundamentals data from the FDB-DS. 
21. Fetch Share News 
To download share news data manually. 
22. Load Share News 
To load the downloaded share news data from the FDB-DS. 
23. Fetch Share Prices 
To download share prices data manually. 
24. Load Share Prices 
To load the downloaded share prices data from the FDB-DS. 
25. Fetch Comments 
To download comments data manually. 
26. Load Comments 
To load the downloaded comments data from the FDB-DS. 
27. Fundamentals Data Display 
The loaded fundamentals will be displayed in this area. 
28. Share News Data Display 
The loaded share news data will be displayed in this area. 
29. Share Prices Data Display 
The loaded share prices data will be displayed in this area. 
30. Comments Data Display 
The loaded comments data will be displayed in this area. 
31. Ticker Symbols Data Display 
The loaded ticker symbols data will be displayed in this area. 
32. Load Tickers 
To load the downloaded ticker symbols from the FDB-DS. 
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Figure 5.4 Data Crawler GUI – Part 2 
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5.9.2 Forward Analyser GUI 
The forward analyser is also comprised of many background functions which hide 
behind one-click buttons. As such, the frontend GUI is designed to focus more on 
retrieving data and displaying the data from the FDB-DS. Figure 5.5 shows the GUI of 
the forward analyser. 
 
Figure 5.5 Forward Analyser GUI 
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The functions, which mostly work in sequence, on the forward analyser GUI are 
described below: 
1. Keyword Set Dropdown Menu 
This allows the user to choose which financial crime IE keyword template to 
use, provided they have been predefined. 
2. Flagged Comment (Data View) 
After a keyword template has been selected and the Search button has been 
hit, the comments flagging (as described in Section 5.7.1), price matching (as 
described in Section 5.7.2) and the price hike thresholds labelling (as 
described in Section 5.7.3) will start and the results of flagged comments will 
appear in this as the data view. 
3. Flagged Comment (Text View) 
The results appearing in the Data View will also appear here as text format. 
4. Select Stock Index 
This dropdown list will be populated according to the flagged comments. For 
example, if any of the comments belonging to the LLOY ticker symbol are 
flagged, LLOY will appear in this dropdown list for the user to select. Selecting 
LLOY will update both the Flagged Comments (Data View) and Flagged 
Comment (Text View) to show only the flagged comments which belong to 
LLOY. 
5. Select Date 
The dropdown list here allows the user to choose the date of the flagged 
comments belonging to LLOY. 
6. Total Comments Count 
This field will change dynamically according to the count of flagged comments 
appearing in the Flagged Comment (Data View). 
7. Prices (±2 Days Intervals) 
Once the user has selected the date from the Select Date dropdown list 
corresponding to the selected Stock, ±2 days’ worth of prices based on the 
date will appear. 
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8. Thresholds 
By clicking on any of these buttons the Flagged Comments (Data View) and 
Flagged Comments (Text View) will be filtered. This means if the user wants 
to have a look at all the comments that are being labelled with a price hike 
threshold of 5% (Y), the user will click the “5%” button. The same action goes 
for 10% and 15%. Finally, if the user wants to show all the flagged comments 
regardless of the price hike thresholds again, the “Show All” button should be 
clicked. 
9. Update Data View 
This button will allow the user to click in order to update the Flagged 
Comments (Data View) after adding notes to one column that are editable in 
the data view. 
10. Import Into Database 
The updated Flagged Comments (Data View) can be imported into the 
database by clicking on this button. 
11. Load Flagged Comments 
This allows the user to reload the Flagged Comments (Data View) alongside 
Flagged Comments (Text View). This can be used when there is no forward 
analysis being done. It merely loads the flagged comments from the 
`flaggedcomment` table from the Financial Discussion Boards Dataset (FDB-
DS). 
12. Random 
By clicking on this button, the flagged comments from `flaggedcomment` will 
be randomly chosen, and by default the limit is set to 1,000 rows of data. This 
might be handy if the user just wants to randomly pick some flagged 
comments for manual analysis by manually reading them. 
13. Export Text View 
This function allows the user to export the Flagged Comments (Text View) 
into a text file. This can be useful if the user wants to print the flagged 
comments based on the criteria set using certain functions introduced above. 
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5.9.3 Backward Analyser GUI 
The backward analyser allows the user to execute moving average calculations (as 
described in Section 5.8.1), alert labelling (as described in Section 5.8.2) as well as 
alert matching (as described in Section 5.8.3) backwards to the flagged comments. 
Similar to the forward analyser GUI, the functions are in the background. Hence, the 
backward analyser GUI provides the user with options to retrieve and view data. 
Figure 5.6 represents the GUI of the backward analyser. 
 
Figure 5.6 Backward Analyser GUI 
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The functions on the backward analyser GUI are described below: 
1. Calculate (for SMA) 
By clicking this button, all the functions of the backward analyser, i.e. moving 
average calculation, alert labelling and alert matching will be executed for 
SMA. 
2. Calculate (for WMA) 
By clicking this button, all the functions of the backward analyser, i.e. moving 
average calculation, alert labelling and alert matching will be executed for 
WMA. 
3. Calculate (for EMA) 
By clicking this button, all the functions of the backward analyser, i.e. moving 
average calculation, alert labelling and alert matching will be executed for 
EMA. 
4. Options 
This section allows the user to filter the data in the Data View. For example, 
the user can choose a comment author’s FDB username from the Author 
dropdown list and view all the flagged comments posted by this particular 
author. 
5. Filter 
This section allows the user to combine the threshold and moving average 
alerts. Once executed, the flagged comments will be listed in the Data View 
according to the selected filters. For example, if the user chooses the “R” 
threshold and SMA Alert of “15%”, in the Data View, the user will be shown a 
list of flagged comments that match both filter criteria. 
6. Data View 
An area for displaying the filtered flagged comments data as a result of the 
Options and Filter functions. 
7. Total Records 
The field here will change dynamically depending on how many rows of data 
appear in the Data View. 
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8. Reset 
The reset button allows the user to reset all the dropdown lists and the Data 
View. 
 
5.10 Chapter Summary 
Section 5.2 described and presented the novel architecture of the FDBM prototype 
system which implemented the methodologies described in Section 4.3. Section 5.3 
to Section 5.8 expanded on the architecture components in relation to the 
methodologies. Lastly, Section 5.9 displayed the GUI for the data crawler component, 
forward analyser component and the backward analyser component. 
The key contributions of the FDBM prototype system introduced in this chapter are 
listed as follow: 
• FDBM is capable of automatically crawling data in different formats and 
different time intervals from the selected FDBs. 
• FDBM can pre-process and transform the unstructured FDB data collected 
from FDBs into structured data for importing into the FDB-DS for the use of 
forward analysis and backward analysis. 
• FDBM is capable of matching the predefined P&D IE keyword template 
against the comments in order to detect the potentially illegal FDB comments. 
• In order to categorise the potentially illegal FDB comments into different 
price hike levels at a later stage, it is essential to know the price at the time 
of each comment being posted. However, during the collection of FDB 
comments, there were no prices attached to each comment. Hence, FDBM is 
built to be capable of searching for the price figure at the time a comment is 
posted and appending it to each comment. 
• FDBM is capable of performing the novel backward analysis by executing the 
calculation of all the prices within ±2 days against the “base price” of each 
flagged comment in order to categorise and label the comments according to 
the degree of price hike on three levels of thresholds (i.e. 5%, 10% and 15%). 
78 
 
• As part of the novel backward analysis, FDBM can also calculate and apply the 
moving averages against all the per minute share prices for all the ticker 
symbols, append threshold alerts and finally match backward to further 
classify the potentially illegal FDB comments in an attempt to resolve false 
positives. 
 
The next chapter will present four experiments (two experiments under forward 
analysis and two experiments under backward analysis). The purpose of these 
experiments is to test and validate the novel forward analysis and backward analysis 
methodologies introduced in Chapter 4 and the architecture proposed in this chapter, 
which is in relation to the research question outlined in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 6.  Forward and Backward Analysis of Potentially 
Illegal Comments 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, the architecture for a Financial Discussion Boards Miner (FDBM) 
prototype system has been described and FDBM’s crawler component has been used 
to extract comments from London South East (LSE-FDB) and Interactive Investors (III) 
Financial Discussion Boards (FDBs) and per minute share prices from ADVFN. The 
chapter also described how data were collected using FDBM. The data were collected 
over a 12-week period using a data crawler component, pre-processed through a 
data transformer component and stored in the database, namely the FDB dataset 
(FDB-DS). 
In order to answer the research question outlined in Chapter 1, a series of 
experiments were conducted using both novel forward and backward analysis 
methodologies. This chapter looks at both forward analysis and back analysis of the 
data stored in the FDB-DS. The aim of the forward analysis is to flag and filter the 
potentially illegal Pump and Dump (P&D) comments using the predefined P&D 
Information Extraction (IE) keyword template and the share prices. And, the aim of 
the backward analysis is to detect abnormal stock price movements and perform 
backward analysis by matching abnormal stock prices with the flagged comments to 
further classify flagged comments with the intention of reducing false positives for 
flagged comments. 
This chapter consists of four experiments. The first two experiments are under 
forward analysis (Sections 6.2 and 6.3) and the next two experiments are under 
backward analysis (Sections 6.4 and 6.5). For forward analysis, the first experiment 
takes only the comments into account when flagging potentially illegal comments 
using the P&D IE keyword template. The second experiment takes share prices into 
account. The share prices at the time or around the time of these flagged comments 
(results produced in the first experiment) were posted are appended. This allows the 
calculation of price hike thresholds and allows these thresholds to be labelled for the 
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flagged comments. Doing this can achieve the classification of flagged comments into 
different risk levels, such as high risk, medium risk and low risk. It then allows the 
relevant authorities or forum moderators to first focus on the highest risk flagged 
comments. 
For backward analysis, the third experiment in this chapter applies Moving Average 
(MA) techniques to the share prices, to determine whether there are price 
abnormalities. Lastly, the fourth experiment attempts to apply these price 
abnormalities backwards to the flagged comments produced in the forward analysis 
experiments, in order to further classify the flagged comments in an attempt to 
reduce false positives for flagged comments. Abnormal price movement happened 
when the price of stock varied from the market average. 
 
6.2 Experiment 1: Forward Analysis of FDB Comments 
The aim of this experiment is to test whether the P&D IE keyword template can be 
used to flag potentially illegal P&D comments on share price based FDBs. 
This experiment will test the following hypothesis: 
H0a: Pump and Dump activity from FDBs cannot be filtered using only 
information (i.e. keywords/phrases) extracted from collected FDB 
comments. 
H1a: Pump and Dump activity from FDBs can be filtered using only information 
(i.e. keywords/phrases) extracted from collected FDB comments. 
 
6.2.1 Methodology 
The following describes the steps in the methodology implemented by FDBM to test 
the hypothesis: 
1. Retrieve the predefined P&D IE keyword template from the local storage of 
the FDBM prototype system. 
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2. Iterate through each of the keywords, phrases and sentences in the IE 
keyword template (Section 5.6) against each of the comments stored in the 
dataset (FDB-DS). 
3. Flag the comments that matched any of the keywords, phrases or sentences. 
4. Import these flagged comments into a new database table, named 
`flaggedcomment`, in the FDB-DS, for subsequent experiments. 
5. List the results in two views, i.e. data view and text view (for export into a text 
file if required by users of FDBM prototype system). 
 
6.2.2 Results and Discussions 
Out of the 507,970 comments, 49,858 comments are flagged as potentially illegal 
P&D activities on the FDBs. As shown in Figure 6.1 below, the flagged comments took 
up 9.82% of the total comments. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Percentage of Flagged and Non-Flagged Comments 
 
49858
9.82%
458112
90.18%
Percentage of Flagged and Non-Flagged Comments
Flagged Non Flagged
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As shown in Figure 6.2 below, of these 49,858 flagged comments, 46,302 (93%) of 
the comments belong to the FTSE AIM All-Share index and 3,556 (7%) of the 
comments belong to the FTSE-100. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Percentage of Flagged Comment by Index 
 
The following are a few examples of the flagged comments: 
 
Table 6.1 Examples of Flagged Comments 
FC1 Ticker ID: 530     Ticker Symbol: ODX 
Author: Hufc1908 
Date/Time: 2014-09-22 04:52:56 
Comment: I know Doc & he is very level headed guy UJO & MXO both good 
small AIM tiddlers nice to see Adam doing a bit of ramping :) Here is Docs 
tweet from last night & please don’t say anyone here holds SLE?? The 
chairman is a disgrace just like someone else i could mention called Jim who 
pulled the same trick as COE of Sefton ResI've been reporting what a shister 
this man is for yonks #SLE #FANNING @TomWinnifrith @BrokermanDaniel 
@ABMckinley pic.twitter.com/d8kJJN5S8B 
FC2 Ticker ID: 178     Ticker Symbol: COMS 
Author: englishflowers 
Date/Time: 2014-09-22 07:49:00 
3556, 7%
46302, 93%
Percentage of Flagged Comments by Index
FTSE-100 FTSE AIM All-Share
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Comment: Auction has just finished now 4.83p Seems that there will be 
some good buying now at this price. GLA. 
FC3 Ticker ID: 616     Ticker Symbol: QXT 
Author: canapa123 
Date/Time: 2014-09-22 09:06:29 
Comment: Looks like some manipulation going on this morning with a good 
dash of trolling. I hope the FCA are watching. Hold on to your shares & you 
will be well rewarded imo. 
FC4 Ticker ID: 616     Ticker Symbol: QXT 
Author: PJM1 
Date/Time: 2014-12-19 09:43:06 
Comment: listen.............fill yer boots it will be 37 again soon trust me 
 
Some flagged comments are not potentially illegal themselves. However, these 
comments can be a great indication of P&D activities going on for a specific ticker 
symbol in a specific timeframe. In a real-world scenario, instead of moderating 
comment by comment, the FDBM prototype system can potentially help relevant 
authorities and human moderators to detect which listed company is being abused 
for conducting such financial crime. For example, FC1 in Table 6.1 shows that the 
comment author “Hufc1908” for the Ticker ID of 530 (Company name: Omega 
Diagnostics Group; Symbol: ODX) claimed that “…nice to see Adam doing a bit of 
ramping…”. FC3 shows the comment author “canapa123” commented “Looks like 
some manipulation going on this morning with a good dash of trolling. I hope the FCA 
are watching...” for the Ticker ID of 616 (Company name: Quixant; Symbol: QXT). This 
does not necessarily indicate the comment itself is an illegal comment, but it can 
raise an alert about potentially illegal activities going on. On another hand, FC2 and 
FC4 show direct potentially illegal P&D comments. In FC2, the comment author 
“englishflowers” was potentially trying to create a good impression for the particular 
stock Ticker ID 178 (Company name: Coms; Symbol: COMS) by saying “Seems that 
there will be some good buying now at this price”. Genuine sentiment or not, such a 
comment is an indication of claims without solid proof. In FC4, the comment author 
“PJM1” was trying to convince other investors to “trust me” that the share price of 
Ticker ID 616 will be “37” again. “37” in this case means 37 pence sterling (i.e. GBX 
being a symbol for the penny used in the London Stock Exchange (LSE)). Therefore, 
the results of this experiment support hypothesis H1a. 
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Potentially illegal P&D activity on FDBs can be filtered using only information (i.e. 
keywords, phrases and sentences) extracted from collected FDB comments. However, 
in the real world, the number of flagged comments that must be reviewed is 
significantly high. On average, for just half of the listed companies on the LSE, a 
relevant authority or a forum moderator needs to read through 593 flagged 
comments each day, which still requires massive effort and is time consuming. Hence, 
Experiment 2 in the next section is performed, this time with the involvement of 
share prices instead of just comments. 
 
6.3 Experiment 2: Forward Analysis of FDB Comments and Prices 
The aim of this experiment is to examine whether the share prices can be taken into 
account in order to filter the flagged comments according to the price movements 
and the indices they belong to. 
This experiment tests the following hypothesis: 
H0b: Pump and Dump activity from FDBs cannot be filtered using the IE 
keyword template and their correlation with price movements and the 
index they belong to.  
H1b: Pump and Dump activity from FDBs can be filtered using the IE keyword 
template and their correlation with price movements and the index they 
belong to. 
 
According to an event study conducted by Bouraoui (2015), when a P&D event 
happens, the share price on the event day hikes and gradually decreases over the 
next two days. As discussed in Chapter 2, Leung and Ton (2015) who conducted an 
event study on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), have also discovered that the 
average abnormal returns for the stock prices have already increased significantly 
two days before the P&D event day. Sabherwal et al. (2011) also found the same 
pattern in their P&D research related to the NASDAQ stock exchange in the US, where 
there was a two-day pump followed by a two-day dump in the stock prices. Thus, it 
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was decided that all the ±2 days (a total of 5 days) of the per minute share prices 
should be taken into account when calculating the price hike thresholds for 
appending to the flagged comments in Experiment 2. 
The outcome of price hike threshold calculations is categorised into the following five 
categories: 
• R – R (red) represents the flagged comments that have exceeded the price 
hike threshold of 15% and above. 
• A – A (amber) represents the flagged comments that have exceeded the price 
hike threshold of 10% but are below 15%, 10% to 14.99%. 
• Y – Y (yellow) represents the flagged comments that have exceeded the price 
hike threshold of 5% but are below 10%, i.e. 5% to 9.99%. 
• C – C represents the flagged comments that do not exceed the price hike 
threshold of 5%, i.e. 0% to 4.99%. 
• Null – Null represents the flagged comments that were not able to be 
calculated for the price hike thresholds due to missing “base price”. The main 
reason for this is that, when collecting per minute share prices from ADVFN, 
the prices were already missing. 
 
6.3.1 Methodology 
The following describes the steps taken to test the hypothesis: 
1. Retrieve the flagged comments result from `flaggedcomment` database table 
in the FDB-DS. 
2. Based on the same or nearest date and time, match and record the share 
prices to each flagged comment.  
3. Once all the flagged comments and prices are matched, take all the ±2 days’ 
worth of per minute prices, calculate each price figure against the “base price” 
(i.e. the price of each flagged comment). 
4. Determine whether there are any price figures (from the ±2 days) that 
triggered the thresholds of 5% (Y) increment, 10% (A) increment and 15% (R) 
increment. 
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5. Depending on the threshold trigger, label each flagged comment with “Y”, “A” 
or “R”. Label the flagged comments as “C” when the prices do not exceed 5%. 
 
6.3.2 Results and Discussions 
As illustrated in Figure 6.3 and Table 6.2, of all the 49,858 flagged comments, 37,895 
(76.01%) flagged comments did not trigger Y, A and R thresholds, i.e. as explained, 
threshold “C” represents flagged comments that do not even hit threshold “Y”. There 
are 5,197 (10.42%) flagged comments labelled as Y (±2 days’ prices exceeded 5% 
threshold), 2,555 (5.12%) flagged comments labelled as A (±2 days’ prices exceeded 
10% threshold) and 3,613 (7.25%) flagged comments labelled as R (±2 days’ prices 
exceeded 15% threshold). Null represents the flagged comments that failed to be 
appended with prices, mainly due to missing share price data in ADVFN. Thus no price 
hike threshold can be counted. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Total Number and Percentage for Each Threshold 
 
 
 
37895, 76.01%
5197, 10.42%
2555, 5.12%
3613, 7.25% 598, 1.20%
Total
C (<5%) Y (5%) A (10%) R (15%) Null
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Table 6.2 Total Number and Percentage for Each Threshold 
Threshold Total Percentage 
C (<5%) 37,895 76.01% 
Y (5%) 5,197 10.42% 
A (10%) 2,555 5.12% 
R (15%) 3,613 7.25% 
Null 598 1.20% 
Grand Total 49,858 100% 
 
 
After looking at the overall results, here comes the interesting part in relation to the 
indices on the LSE (LSE, 2017). As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, the reasons for 
choosing the FTSE-100 and FTSE AIM All-Share are to observe which index is more 
prone to abuse by P&D fraudsters. It appears that, as revealed in Table 6.3, only 25 
(0.7%) flagged comments in relation to the FTSE-100 are labelled as “R” (15% price 
hike) and only two (0.06%) of the flagged comments are being labelled as “A” (10% 
price hike). Even the flagged comments labelled as “Y” has only 55 (1.55%) of them 
and the remaining of the 3,337 (93.84%) flagged comments are categorised as “C”, 
which represents non-risky flagged comments. 
 
Table 6.3 Number and Percentage of Flagged Comments Based on Indices 
 FTSE-100 FTSE AIM All-Share 
C (<5%) 3,337 93.84% 34,558 74.64% 
Y (5%) 55 1.55% 5,142 11.10% 
A (10%) 2 0.06% 2,553 5.51% 
R (15%) 25 0.70% 3,588 7.75% 
Null 137 3.85% 461 1.00% 
Total 3,556 100.00% 46,302 100.00% 
Grand Total 49,858 flagged comments 
 
 
On the other hand, the flagged comments belonging to the FTSE AIM All-Share index 
have been labelled with almost 20% fewer items in the non-risky threshold “C” than 
those for the FTSE-100. This means more FTSE AIM All-Share flagged comments are 
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worth investigating by relevant authorities, under the thresholds of “Y”, “A” and “R” 
with a total of 34,558 (74.64%), 5,142 (11.1%) and 3,588 (7.75%) respectively. Overall, 
461 of the flagged comments are labelled with Null, which accounts for only 1%. 
The results produced in this experiment appear to support hypothesis H1b. By 
applying the price hike thresholds, it is possible to filter potentially illegal FDB 
comments for a more in-depth analysis. 
 
6.4 Statistical Test and Summary of Forward Analysis Experiments  
The results of both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 appear to support the hypotheses 
H1a and H1b respectively. It was found that, in Experiment 1, comments can be flagged 
by using just the P&D IE keyword template. However, due to the enormous amount 
of flagged comments, share prices needed to be taken into account in order to filter 
the flagged comments in relation to the price movements. The data produced 
through the experiments were validated through statistical tests. 
The chi-square test was used for conducting a statistical test for the outcome of the 
forward analysis experiments. A chi-square test tests the relationship between two 
categorical variables (such as potentially illegal comments and non-potentially illegal 
comments) and ordinal data (such as 5%, 10% and 15%). The results of the chi-square 
test are shown in the following Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 Chi-Square Test 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 915.862a 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 1355.096 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
731.663 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
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It shows that the p-value of the statistic test is significant i.e. chi-square=915.862, df 
=3, p-value<0.01. The P-value is observed in the experiments to determine whether 
there is a strong evidence against the null hypothesis. In these experiments, a small 
p-value (i.e. p-value<0.01) represents strong evidence for rejecting the null 
hypothesis and accepting the alternate hypothesis. This means that the number of 
flagged comments is affected by the prices and indices. 
 
Table 6.5 Correlations 
 Index Threshold 
Index Pearson Correlation 1 .121** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 49858 49858 
Threshold Pearson Correlation .121** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 49858 49858 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
The value of the Pearson correlation coefficient as shown in Table 6.5 is 0.121, which 
is positive and statistically significant. This also proves that the indices and the 
flagged comments are positively related. Table 6.3 in the previous section shows that 
in the FTSE-100, a total of 97.69% (i.e. 93.84% from “C” and 3.85% from “Null”) 
messages correspond to less than the 5% threshold. But, in the FTSE AIM All-Share 
there are about 20% fewer; it contains only 75.64% (i.e. 94.64% from “C” and 1% 
from “Null”) messages that correspond to less than the 5% threshold. This means 
that potentially relevant authorities can even concentrate their investigations on the 
FTSE AIM All-Share index alone. 
The purpose of the backward analysis experiments in the next sections is to 
determine whether the moving average techniques could assist the relevant 
authorities better in terms of confirming whether a flagged comment is indeed an 
indication of P&D crime on FDBs. 
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6.5 Experiment 3: Backward Analysis of Prices  
The aim of this experiment is to detect abnormalities in the stock price movements 
using moving average techniques without relating them to the flagged comments. 
This experiment tests the following hypothesis: 
H0c: It is not possible to detect abnormal stock price movements by using 
moving average techniques.  
H1c: It is possible to detect abnormal stock price movements by using moving 
average techniques. 
 
As discussed in Section 5.8.1, moving average is one of the statistical methods that is 
often widely used by financial analysts to perform financial related studies 
(Dzikevičius and Šaranda, 2010). The most common moving average used is the 
Simple Moving Average (SMA), followed by the Exponential Moving Average (EMA) 
as it is similar to the SMA but with “weights” so that the more recent prices are taken 
into account with a higher importance. Weighted Moving Average (WMA) also uses 
the concept of “weights”. The decrement of weights in WMA is consistent, whereas 
the decrement of weights in EMA is exponential, meaning that they do not decrease 
in a consistent manner but faster. SMA, WMA and EMA are all widely used depending 
on the types of analysis being performed. Some researchers even use a moving 
average for predicting the rate of traffic congestion and road accidents (Raiyn and 
Toledo, 2014). 
It appears that there have been no attempts in previous research known to the 
author to use the moving average as part of a financial surveillance tool to detect 
abnormal stock price movements in relation to the detection of potentially illegal 
FDB comments. This experiment attempts to prove the hypothesis H1c by applying 
the SMA, WMA and EMA, as well as the price hike thresholds (i.e. 5%, 10% and 15%) 
to the prices in order to identify meaningful discoveries such as whether there are 
abnormalities in the price movements without the intervention of flagged comments. 
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A total of 28,980,465 per minute share prices that belong to all the 941 ticker symbols 
from the FDB-DS were utilised in this price-only experiment. Each ticker has 
approximately an average of 30,000 per minute share prices associated with it. These 
share prices were originally extracted in Section 5.3.2. 
 
6.5.1 Methodology 
The following describes the steps taken to produce results for analysis: 
1. Firstly, decide time periods used for this experiment, i.e. 1 day, 3 days and 5 
days. This means there will be nine calculations, i.e. “SMA 1 Day”, “SMA 3 
Day”, “SMA 5 Day”, “WMA 1 Day”, “WMA 3 Day”, “WMA 5 Day”, “EMA 1 Day”, 
“EMA 3 Day” and “EMA 5 Day”. 
2. Programmatically calculate all the nine calculations of the SMA, WMA and 
EMA using their formulas as below: 
 
Eq. 1.     𝑆𝑀𝐴 =
𝑝1+ 𝑝2+⋯+𝑝𝑛
𝑛
 
where, p = price; n = time period. 
  
Eq. 2.   𝑊𝑀𝐴 =
(𝑃∗𝑛 + 𝑃(1)∗𝑛−1+⋯𝑃(𝑛−1)∗1)
( 𝑛∗
(𝑛+1)
2
 )
 
where, p = price; n = time period. 
  
Eq. 3.  𝐸𝑀𝐴[𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦]  =  (𝑃[𝑡𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑦] 𝑥 𝐾)  +  (𝐸𝑀𝐴[𝑦𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑦] 𝑥 (1 – 𝐾)) 
where, p = price; K = 2 / (n + 1); n = time period. 
 
3. Record all the nine calculation outcomes in the database table in the FDB-DS. 
4. Next, calculate 5%, 10% and 15% increment on top of the nine calculations, 
which act as the thresholds. As discussed in Section 5.8.1.1, for example, if a 
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particular “SMA 1 Day” price is $15.4, the following is an example of the 
threshold calculations: 
 
Table 6.6 Moving Average Threshold Price Calculation Example 
Threshold Moving Average Threshold Price 
5% $15.4 * 1.05 = $16.17 
10% $15.4 * 1.10 = $16.94 
15% $15.4 * 1.15 = $17.71 
 
5. Save the outcomes of the threshold calculations for all the nine moving 
average calculations in the FDB-DS. 
6. Once all the nine moving average calculations and the threshold calculations 
are successfully performed, check each original price against its threshold 
figures. If any of the original prices exceeds any of the moving average 
thresholds, label it with “5%”, “10%” or “15%” thresholds. 
• “5%” means when an original price is 5% above the moving average 
value. 
• “10%” means when an original price is 10% above the moving average 
value. 
• “15%” means when an original price is 15% above the moving average 
value. 
7. Calculate the total number of flagged prices that trigger the thresholds of 
“5%”, “10%” and “15%” for all the nine calculations by using the following 
sample of MySQL query: 
SELECT sma_alert, COUNT(*) 
FROM price_sma_1day 
WHERE sma_alert IS NOT NULL 
GROUP BY sma_alert * 1 ASC; 
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6.5.2 Results and Discussions 
The results of all the nine calculations will be discussed in the following Section 
6.5.2.1 for SMA, Section 6.5.2.2 for WMA and Section 6.5.2.3 for EMA. 
 
6.5.2.1 Results (SMA) 
Table 6.7 and Figure 6.4 represent the SMA results for the total number of flagged 
prices that triggered the “5%”, “10%” and “15%” moving average thresholds, for the 
time periods of 1 day, 3 days and 5 days respectively. 
As shown in the results, “5%” threshold has the highest count of flagged prices across 
the three time periods, i.e. 1 Day, 3 Days and 5 Days. The result shows that the more 
time period involved in the moving average calculations, the more flagged prices in 
each threshold. 
 
Table 6.7 Total Number of Flagged Prices that Exceeded Thresholds (SMA) 
 1 Day 3 Days 5 Days 
5% 449,121 855,214 1,081,339 
10% 107,608 237,403 335,837 
15% 104,500 242,169 348,978 
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Figure 6.4 Total Number of Flagged Prices (SMA) 
 
6.5.2.2 Result (WMA) 
Table 6.8 and Figure 6.5 demonstrate the WMA results for the total number of 
flagged prices that triggered the thresholds of “5%”, “10%” and “15%”, for the 
periods of 1 day, 3 days and 5 days respectively. 
The results appear to be similar to SMA; the “5%” threshold has the highest count of 
flagged prices across all the three time periods, i.e. 1 Day, 3 Days and 5 Days. The 
result shows that the more time periods involved in the moving average calculations, 
the more flagged prices in each threshold. 
 
Table 6.8 Total Number of Flagged Prices that Exceeded Thresholds (WMA) 
 1 Day 3 Days 5 Days 
5% 227,578 609,372 812,138 
10% 65,456 148,211 225,480 
15% 74,163 151,284 210,320 
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Figure 6.5 Total Number of Flagged Prices (WMA) 
 
6.5.2.3 Result (EMA) 
Table 6.9 and Figure 6.6 show the EMA results for the total number of flagged prices 
that triggered the thresholds for “5%”, “10%” and “15%”, for the time periods of 1 
day, 3 days and 5 days respectively. 
The results also appear similar to those for SMA and WMA; the “5%” threshold has 
the highest count of flagged prices across all three time periods, i.e. 1 Day, 3 Days 
and 5 Days. The result shows that the more days involved in the moving average 
calculations, the more flagged prices in each threshold. 
 
Table 6.9 Total Number of Flagged Prices that Exceeded Thresholds (EMA) 
 1 Day 3 Days 5 Days 
5% 922,068 1,186,603 1,238,609 
10% 396,272 431,148 513,299 
15% 502,274 668,947 835,642 
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Figure 6.6 Total Number of Flagged Prices (EMA) 
 
Moving average techniques can be used to flag the abnormalities in the price 
movements, which supports hypothesis H1c. Based on observations, as compared to 
SMA and EMA, the prices flagged based on the WMA threshold calculations contain 
the least amount of flagged prices across all time periods of 1 Day, 3 Day and 5 Day. 
As mentioned earlier, the more time periods are involved, the more prices are 
flagged. EMA appears to have the most flagged prices of all. The flagged prices for 
SMA appears to be between WMA and EMA, which could potentially mean it is the 
better moving average to use as it is not leaning towards either too many or too few 
flagged prices. However, by flagging prices alone without looking at the flagged 
comment it does not tell a lot about whether the price hikes have any relation to the 
potential illegal comments. This leads to the establishment of Experiment 4 to 
backward label the moving average threshold to the flagged comments, which will 
be described in the next section. 
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6.6 Experiment 4: Backward Analysis of Prices and FDB Comments  
The aim of this experiment is to apply the moving average thresholds calculated in 
Experiment 3 backwards to the flagged comments. This allows the further 
classification of the flagged comments in an attempt to reduce false positives for 
flagged comments. 
This experiment tests the following hypothesis: 
H0d: Backward analysis cannot be performed by matching abnormal stock 
prices with the flagged comments to further classify flagged comments 
for reducing false positives. 
H1d: Backward analysis can be performed by matching abnormal stock prices 
with the flagged comments to further classify flagged comments for 
reducing false positives. 
 
6.6.1 Methodology 
The following describes the steps taken to perform the experiment: 
1. Using the results from Experiment 3 (price-only experiment), the flagged 
prices that triggered the thresholds of “5%”, “10%” and “15%” for all nine 
calculations (i.e. “SMA 1 Day”, “SMA 3 Day”, “SMA 5 Day”, “WMA 1 Day”, 
“WMA 3 Day”, “WMA 5 Day”, “EMA 1 Day”, “EMA 3 Day” and “EMA 5 Day”) 
will be matched to the flagged comments by the dates of both price and 
comment. 
2. For all nine calculations, label each flagged comment with the moving average 
thresholds of “5%”, “10%” or “15%” if it shares the same or nearest date and 
time as the flagged prices. Flagged comments that do not qualify for any 
moving average threshold labels will stay intact. Each label is explained as 
follows: 
• No moving average threshold labelling is needed if a flagged comment 
does not match any moving average thresholds. 
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• For all nine calculations, the label “5%” is applied to the flagged 
comment if the price that shares the same or nearest date and time is 
found to have exceeded the “5%” threshold. 
• For all nine calculations, the label “10%” is applied to the flagged 
comment if the price that shares the same or nearest date and time is 
found to have exceeded the “10%” threshold. 
• For all nine calculations, the label “15%” is applied to the flagged 
comment if the price that shares the same or nearest date and time is 
found to have exceeded the “15%” threshold. 
3. Calculate the total number of flagged comments with all levels of price hike 
thresholds (“C”, “Y”, “A” and “R”) that matches the moving average 
thresholds (“5%”, “10%” and “15%”) for all nine calculations (i.e. “SMA 1 Day”, 
“SMA 3 Day”, “SMA 5 Day”, “WMA 1 Day”, “WMA 3 Day”, “WMA 5 Day”, 
“EMA 1 Day”, “EMA 3 Day” and “EMA 5 Day”). 
 
6.6.2 Results and Discussions 
In this section, SMA results will be discussed in Section 6.6.2.1, WMA results will be 
discussed in Section 6.6.2.2 and EMA results will be discussed in Section 6.6.2.3. 
 
6.6.2.1 Results (SMA) 
Table 6.10 and Figure 6.7 represent the total number of flagged comments that 
triggered both price hike thresholds (“C”, “Y”, “A” and “R”) and Simple Moving 
Average (SMA) thresholds (“5%”, “10%” and “15%”). 
Table 6.10 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Both Price Hike Thresholds and 
Simple Moving Average (SMA) Thresholds 
 5% 10% 15% 
 1D 3D 5D 1D 3D 5D 1D 3D 5D 
C 518 1039 1300 204 291 366 242 356 395 
Y 228 306 274 99 62 100 74 127 146 
A 89 259 183 40 49 64 42 65 94 
R 154 126 84 79 85 97 199 408 500 
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Figure 6.7 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Price Hike Thresholds and 
Simple Moving Average (SMA) Thresholds 
 
In the table and chart, it can be seen that there are 228 flagged comments flagged as 
“Y” (5%) price hike threshold (from the forward analysis) and also flagged as “5%” for 
the “SMA 1 Day” moving average threshold (from the backward analysis). Then, 306 
flagged comments are flagged as “Y” price hike threshold and “5%” moving average 
threshold for the “SMA 3 Day”; and, 274 flagged comments are flagged as “Y” price 
hike threshold and “5%” moving average threshold for the “SMA 5 Day”. 
As for the flagged comments that are labelled with “A” (10%) price hike threshold 
and “10%” moving average threshold, they are, in total, 40, 49 and 64 comments, for 
“SMA 1 Day”, “SMA 3 Day” and “SMA 5 Day”, respectively. Also, for the flagged 
comments that are labelled with “R” (15%) price hike threshold and “15%” moving 
average threshold, there is a total of 199, 408 and 500 comments, for the “SMA 1 
Day”, “SMA 3 Day” and “SMA 5 Day” respectively. It appears that there are more 
flagged comments under the threshold combinations of “Y” and “5%”, and “R” and 
“15%”. A user of the FDBM prototype system can prioritise these flagged comments 
before investigating other flagged comments. 
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Below is an example of the flagged comment that is being flagged with “Y” and “5%” 
for “SMA 1 Day”, posted by the comment author “TMPocket” for the ticker symbol 
“BLU” (company name: Blue Star Capital) which is under the FTSE AIM All-Share index. 
This comment author was potentially trying to pump the share price by telling the 
FDB community that this is “hot stock”.  
 
“This will be a hot stock in the next 7 trading days and beyond the IPO will be 
very good for BLU shareholders and traders alike and will dwarf the price we 
are at now some fun and games to be had here but don’t be caught out as this 
is serious multi bagger potential and a great company to be part of as a 
medium hold with trading ops. GL all.” 
 
Below are two examples of the flagged comment that is being flagged with “R” and 
“15%” for “SMA 5 Day”, posted by the comment author of “systematic92” for the 
ticker symbol “CRND” (company name: Central Rand Gold Ltd) which is also a listed 
company under the FTSE AIM All-Share index. The comment author simply convinced 
people by posting convincing words like “told you” and “this is going up”, and even 
saying “I’ll ramp when the time is right” which is a clear indication of the author 
committing a P&D crime.  
 
“Told you monkeys. It's the Americans waking up too.  This is going up again” 
“I’ll ramp when the time is right. For now I will just say 11.67 baby” 
 
6.6.2.2 Results (WMA) 
Table 6.11 summarises the total number of flagged comments that triggered both 
price hike thresholds (“C”, “Y”, “A” and “R”) and Weighted Moving Average (WMA) 
thresholds (“5%”, “10%” and “15%”). Figure 6.8 visualises the data in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Both Price Hike Thresholds and 
Weighted Moving Average (WMA) Thresholds 
 5% 10% 15% 
 1D 3D 5D 1D 3D 5D 1D 3D 5D 
C 329 644 963 184 206 253 210 311 336 
Y 174 258 288 79 83 66 70 99 115 
A 64 110 191 33 37 40 33 53 68 
R 157 126 107 58 78 99 145 315 392 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Price Hike Thresholds and 
Weighted Moving Average (WMA) Thresholds 
 
As depicted in Table 6.11 and Figure 6.8, there are 174 flagged comments being 
flagged by both “Y” (5%) price hike threshold and “5%” for the “WMA 1 Day” moving 
average threshold. There are 258 flagged comments that are being flagged as “Y” 
price hike threshold and “5%” moving average threshold for the “WMA 3 Day”; and, 
288 flagged comments that are being flagged as “Y” price hike threshold and “5%” 
moving average threshold for the “WMA 5 Day”. 
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As for the flagged comments that are labelled with “A” (10%) price hike threshold 
and “10%” moving average threshold, they are, in total, 33, 37 and 40 comments, for 
“WMA 1 Day”, “WMA 3 Day” and “WMA 5 Day”, respectively. Like the results in the 
SMA section, this threshold seems to contain a lower number of flagged comments. 
Next, for the flagged comments that are labelled with “R” (15%) price hike threshold 
and “15%” moving average threshold, there is a total of 145, 315 and 392 comments, 
for the “WMA 1 Day”, “WMA 3 Day” and “WMA 5 Day” respectively. Similarly to SMA, 
it seems that there are more flagged comments under the threshold combinations 
of “Y” and “5%”, and “R” and “15%”. 
Here is an example of the flagged comment that is being flagged with “A” and “10%” 
for “WMA 5 Day”, posted by the comment author of “Exptrader” for the ticker 
symbol “COP” (company name: Circle Oil) which is under the FTSE AIM All-Share 
index. The comment author was telling the FDB community that the stock is “about 
to pop” which is a clear intention of trying to drive the price up.  
 
“Relentless buy now. This is about to pop. News is spreading......gla” 
 
6.6.2.3 Results (EMA) 
Table 6.12 and Figure 6.9 present the total number of flagged comments that 
triggered both price hike thresholds (“C”, “Y”, “A” and “R”) and Exponential Moving 
Average (EMA) thresholds (“5%”, “10%” and “15%”). 
 
Table 6.12 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Both Price Hike Thresholds and 
Exponential Moving Average (EMA) Thresholds 
 5% 10% 15% 
 1D 3D 5D 1D 3D 5D 1D 3D 5D 
C 904 2641 2765 236 269 467 427 576 682 
Y 178 302 150 42 70 125 173 202 188 
A 85 88 40 36 32 26 109 140 166 
R 127 82 117 64 69 55 227 298 323 
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Figure 6.9 Total Number of Flagged Comments that Triggered Price Hike Thresholds and 
Exponential Moving Average (EMA) Thresholds 
 
As shown in Table 6.12, there is a total of 178 flagged comments that were being 
flagged as “Y” (5%) price hike threshold and also flagged as “5%” for the “EMA 1 Day” 
moving average threshold. Overall, 302 flagged comments are being flagged as “Y” 
price hike threshold and “5%” moving average threshold for the “EMA 3 Day” and 
150 flagged comments are being flagged as “Y” price hike threshold and “5%” moving 
average threshold for the “EMA 5 Day”. 
As for the flagged comments that are labelled with “A” (10%) price hike threshold 
and “10%” moving average threshold, they are, in total, 36, 32 and 26 comments, for 
“EMA 1 Day”, “EMA 3 Day” and “EMA 5 Day”, respectively. Also, for the flagged 
comments that are labelled with “R” (15%) price hike threshold and “15%” moving 
average threshold, there is a total of 227, 298 and 323 comments, for the “EMA 1 
Day”, “EMA 3 Day” and “EMA 5 Day” respectively. Like the results in the SMA and 
WMA sections, it appears that there are more flagged comments under the threshold 
combinations of “Y” and “5%”, and “R” and “15%”. 
Below is an example of a flagged comment that is being flagged with “R” and “15%” 
for “EMA 5 Day”; the comment was posted by the author of “DontBelieveHype” for 
the ticker symbol “BOX” (company name: Boxhill Technologies) which is also under 
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the FTSE AIM All-Share index. In this flagged comment example, the comment author 
was trying to advise people not to follow and become the victims of P&D crime for 
the ticker symbol “BOX”.  
 
“The rise is not based on anything else than speculation and probably 1000 
posts an hour in a blatant attempt to move the stock which if I am not 
misguided is also known as market manipulation? I'm purely warning people 
here so they don't lose money from false promises.” 
 
The results presented in Section 6.6.2.1, Section 6.6.2.2 and Section 6.6.2.3 show that 
it is possible to perform backward analysis by matching the abnormal stock prices 
with the flagged comments to further classify flagged comments to resolve false 
positives. Relevant authorities or FDB moderators can indeed flag and detect 
potentially illegal activities happening on FDBs. Thus, this supports hypothesis H1d in 
this experiment. 
 
6.7 Statistical Test and Summary of Backward Analysis Experiments 
The outcomes of both Experiments 3 and 4 appear to support the hypotheses. The 
data produced through the experiments are further validated through statistical tests. 
The statistical tests for the backward analysis experiments were conducted using two 
separate methods. The first method was based on the assumption that the only 
important alerts (i.e. alerts that are worth focusing on) were the price jump to 5% or 
higher. The three alerts “Y” (5% price hike), “A” (10% price hike) and “R” (15% price 
hike) are recoded in SPSS prior to the tests with a value “1” and all other thresholds, 
i.e. “C” (less than 5% price hike) and “Null” are recoded with a value “0”. Similarly, 
the “5%”, “10%” and “15%” moving average thresholds are also recoded with a value 
“1” and recoded thresholds below 5% with a value “0”. 
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The variable “threshold” was renamed “Threshold_Yes_No” for better readability 
due to the recoding in previous steps. The variable “sma_1day_alert” was also 
renamed to “SMA1_Threshold_Yes_No”. 
In this discussion, “SMA1_Threshold_Yes_No” is used for explanation. A 
crosstabulation table was constructed as shown in Table 6.13 and a chi-square test 
for independence was also conducted as shown in Table 6.14. 
The other crosstabulation, chi-square and symmetric measure results that compare 
the other moving averages thresholds against “Threshold_Yes_No” are shown in 
Appendix F. 
 
Table 6.13 Threshold_Yes_No * SMA1_Threshold_YesNo Crosstabulation – First Method 
 
SMA1_Threshold_YesNo 
Total 0 1 
Threshold_Yes_No    0 37,529 964 38,493 
   1 10,361 1,004 11,365 
Total 47,890 1,968 49,858 
 
 
The crosstabulation data in Table 6.13 show that out of the total 49,858 cases, 37,529 
cases fall into the non-important category in both “Threshold_Yes_No” and 
“SMA1_Threshold_YesNo”. But from there, there are a total of 1,004 cases which fall 
into the important category in both “Threshold_Yes_No” and 
“SMA1_Threshold_YesNo”. This means 1,004 of the flagged comments should be 
investigated for potentially illegal activities on FDBs at a higher priority. 
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Table 6.14 Chi-Square Test – First Method 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 927.245a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 925.576 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 777.525 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
927.226 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 49858     
 
A chi-square test was conducted to examine the independence of the two variables 
i.e. “threshold” and “SMA 1 Day”. The test resulted in rejecting the null hypothesis 
(chi-square = 927.245, df=1, p-value <0.01). The correlation (r=0.136) between these 
two variables is also computed in Table 6.15 below and found to be significant. 
 
Table 6.15 Symmetric Measures – First Method 
 
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx
. Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .136 .005 30.737 .000c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .136 .005 30.737 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
 
 
This means that the two variables are dependent and that the hypotheses in 
Experiments 3 and 4 appeared to be statistically supported. 
Similarly, the “Threshold_Yes_No” variable is compared with the other moving 
average and time period i.e. “SMA 3 Day”, “SMA 5 Day”, “WMA 1 Day”, “WMA 3 
Day”, “WMA 5 Day”, and “EMA 1 Day”, “EMA 3 Day” and “EMA 5 Day”. These results 
are shown in Appendix G. All the results show that the p-value of their chi-square 
tests is small (i.e. p-value<0.01) and hence, the null hypothesis of no association 
between the two variables is rejected. In another word, the hypotheses in 
Experiment 3 (H1c) and 4 (H1d) are accepted. 
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Table 6.16 Summary of Correlations – First Method 
 sma1 sma3 sma5 wma1 wma3 sma5 ema1 ema3 ema5 
Threshold  Co .136** .150** .133** .128** .143** .143** .096** .032** .004 
  Si .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .354 
  N 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 
 
All hypothesis tests rejected the null hypothesis of no association between the 
threshold variable and moving average variables. All the correlations were positive 
and found to be statistically significant even though they were not leaning towards 
the stronger side. Correlation results in Table 6.16 show that the highest correlation 
is between “threshold” and "sma3” (i.e. SMA 3 Day) alerts. Among SMA, WMA and 
EMA, EMA seems to have the lowest correlations. As with the observation of the 
outcome of Experiment 3 (price-only experiment), SMA seems to be a more suitable 
moving average technique to be used with the backward analysis. In this case, the 
relevant authorities could consider using just the SMA calculations (as part of the 
backward analysis) when running investigations. 
The second method of testing the data in the backward analysis experiments is 
described next. The results of the statistical tests in relation to the “threshold” and 
“SMA 1 Day” are discussed. This test, which slightly differs from the first method, is 
based on the assumption that all the thresholds “Y” (5% of price hike), “A” (10% of 
price hike) and “R” (15% of price hike) are important alerts and should be tested 
separately. Hence, “Y” is recoded as value “1”, “A” is recoded as value “2”, “R” is 
recoded as value “3”, “C” and “Null” are recoded as value “0”. This makes the 
“threshold” variable ordinal data, which is in order instead of it simply being 
categorical as in the first test. Similarly, the thresholds “<5%”, “5%”, “10%” and “15%” 
in moving average price calculations are also recoded as values “0”, “1”, “2” and “3” 
respectively. 
In this discussion, “SMA 1 Day” is used for the explanation. A crosstabulation table 
was constructed as shown in Table 6.17 and a chi-square test for independence was 
also conducted as shown in Table 6.18. 
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The other crosstabulation, chi-square and symmetric measure results that compare 
the other moving averages thresholds against “threshold” are shown in Appendix G. 
 
Table 6.17 Threshold_Recoded * SMA1_Threshold Crosstabulation – Second Method 
 
SMA1_Threshold 
Total < 5% 5% 10% 15% 
Threshold_Recoded C/N 37,529 518 204 242 38,493 
Y 4,796 228 99 74 5,197 
A 2,384 89 40 42 2,555 
R 3,181 154 79 199 3,613 
Total 47,890 989 422 557 49,858 
 
Table 6.18 Chi-Square Test – Second Method 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1319.065a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 932.526 9 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
 
Table 6.19 Symmetric Measures – Second Method 
 
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by Interval Pearson's R .146 .007 32.849 .000c 
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation .141 .006 31.843 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
 
Table 6.20 Summary of Correlations – Second Method 
 sma1 sma3 sma5 wma1 wma3 sma5 ema1 ema3 ema5 
Threshold  Co .146** .193** .202** .125** .171** .191** .122** .096** .084 
  Si .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
  N 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 49858 
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All hypothesis tests in the second method also rejected the null hypothesis of no 
association between the threshold variable and moving average variables. All the 
correlations were positive and found to be statistically significant even though they 
were not leaning towards the stronger side. However, the chi-square test value and 
correlation values were found to be improved when each threshold level is treated 
differently. This means that it makes sense to take into account separately the “Null” 
and “C”, “Y”, “A” and “R” as well as the “<5%”, “5%”, “10%” and “15%” on the moving 
averages side. Correlation results in Table 6.20 show that the highest correlation in 
the second method is between “threshold” and "sma5” (i.e. SMA 5 Day) alerts. 
Similar to the first method of testing, among SMA, WMA and EMA, EMA seems to 
generate the lowest correlations. Again, in this second method, SMA has once again 
hit the highest correlation value. It is, thus, synchronised with the observation in the 
outcome of Experiment 3 (price-only experiment) where SMA was shown to be a 
more suitable moving average technique to be used with the backward analysis 
because it does not lean towards too few or too many flagged prices. In this case, the 
relevant authorities could consider using just the SMA calculations (as part of the 
backward analysis) when performing investigations. 
 
6.8 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of Chapter 6 was to conduct four experiments in order to test the two 
novel methodologies, namely forward analysis and backward analysis, in relation to 
the research question. Two experiments belonged to forward analysis and another 
two experiments belonged to backward analysis. 
The aim of the forward analysis is to flag and filter potentially illegal Pump and Dump 
(P&D) comments. This analysis flags the comments against the predefined P&D 
Information Extraction (IE) keyword template and then calculates the ±2 days’ worth 
of per minute share prices against the “base price” of the flagged comments. The 
flagged comments are then labelled with price hike thresholds (i.e. “C”, “Y”, “A” and 
“R”) accordingly. This allows the flagged comments to be filtered according to their 
price movements and the indices they belong to. The hypotheses for the two 
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experiments under forward analysis have both been supported empirically and 
statistically. 
As for the backward analysis, the aim is to detect abnormalities in the price 
movements followed by performing backward analysis to match the abnormal stock 
prices with the flagged comments to further classify flagged comments with the 
intention of reducing false positives for flagged comments. This analysis flags the 
abnormalities in the price movements using moving average techniques (i.e. SMA, 
WMA, EMA) with the moving average thresholds (i.e. “5%”, “10%” and “15%”) for 
three different time periods (i.e. 1 Day, 3 Day and 5 Day) and then backward labels 
the moving average thresholds to the flagged comments, which attempts to further 
filter the flagged comments while resolving false positives. The hypotheses for the 
two backward analysis experiments have both been supported empirically and 
statistically. 
This concludes that it is possible to perform both novel forward and backward 
analysis by flagging the comments using the P&D IE keyword template with the price 
hike thresholds, then match the abnormalities in the stock prices with the flagged 
comments to further classify flagged comments to resolve false positives. 
This research also investigates the potential use of Semantical Textual Similarity (STS) 
in order to test whether it can be used to improve the comments flagging process in 
the forward analysis, by comparing the semantic meaning between the comments 
and the P&D keywords, phrases and sentences. Chapter 6 consists of three 
experiments for this purpose. 
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Chapter 7. Semantic Similarity Measures for Analysis of 
Financial Discussion Board Comments 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The use of the forward analysis and backward analysis to establish a relationship 
between price fluctuations and potential Pump and Dump (P&D) activities on 
Financial Discussion Boards (FDBs) was shown to be useful for the relevant 
authorities, in order to perform the detection of potentially illegal P&D activities on 
the share price based FDBs. It allows the detection and flagging of comments based 
on a predefined P&D IE keyword template with the involvement of share price 
movements. Price hike thresholds and moving average thresholds allow the relevant 
authorities to focus on an investigation based on the levels of price abnormalities. 
The aim of the development of the FDBM prototype system is to aid the relevant 
authorities to monitor the comment posting activities on the FDBs, hence, more 
analysis, in terms of textual format, can be explored. Since comments and the P&D 
Information Extraction (IE) keyword template are both in textual format, the degree 
of semantic similarity between the comments and the keywords, phrases and short 
sentences can be evaluated. 
Semantic similarity refers to “How close do these two sentences come to meaning 
the same thing?” (O’Shea, 2013). The aim is to let the computer understand both the 
syntactic and semantic meaning of a sentence or short text in a similar way to a 
human being. As these measures are designed to deal with short texts, they are ideal 
for use on the comments from FDBs as the language used does not have to be well 
formed into sentences for the similarity to be calculated.  
In this chapter, the Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) approach is used to test the 
similarities between the FDB comments and the predefined keywords, phrases and 
short sentences in the P&D IE keyword template. Section 7.2 gives an overview of 
the application of STS to FDB comments in this research and the experiment 
subsections follow on from this.  
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The main hypothesis to be tested in this STS chapter is as follows: 
H0: The use of Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) for template-based detection 
of the potential Pump and Dump activities cannot improve the detection 
accuracy of the FDBM prototype system. 
H1: The use of Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) for template-based detection 
of the potential pump and dump activities can improve the detection 
accuracy of the FDBM prototype system. 
 
The main hypothesis can be broken down into a few testable hypotheses which are 
tested in two experiments in Section 7.3 and Section 7.4. Lastly, Section 7.5 concludes 
this chapter. 
 
7.2 Application of STS to FDB Comments Overview 
7.2.1 Methodology for Data Generation 
 
7.2.1.1 Aim 
The aim of this data generation is to create a separate dataset which is meant for use 
in the STS experiments in this chapter. This separate dataset is created based on 
selecting a number of the comments from the Financial Discussion Boards dataset 
(FDB-DS) formed in the previous chapter. As one of the experiments in this chapter 
involves a human expert, it is impossible for the human expert to read all the 
comments. Thus, only 32 rows of comments will be selected from the FDB-DS. Overall, 
16 of them are the comments that were flagged by the forward analysis methodology 
through the FDBM prototype system, which can be picked from the 
`flaggedcomment` table in the FDB-DS. Another 16 comments are non-flagged 
comments, which can be picked from the full `comment` table in the FDB-DS. 
Furthermore, according to O’Shea et al. (2014), this is a big enough sample size to 
validate the use of the STS approach. 
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7.2.1.2 Methodology 
This section describes the methodology to create the 32-row comments dataset for 
the human expert and STS experiments: 
1. Firstly, programmatically and randomly choose 16 rows of flagged comments 
from the `flaggedcomment` table in the FDB-DS. 
2. Next, also programmatically and randomly choose 16 rows of non-flagged 
comments from the `comment` table in the FDB-DS. 
3. Merge both sets of 16 comments from Step 1 and 2 into an Excel spreadsheet. 
4. Use a random sorting function in Excel; randomly sort all the 32 comments so 
that the flagged and non-flagged comment sequence is randomised. 
5. Label all the randomised comments rows C1 to C32. 
 
7.2.1.3 Dataset 
Table 7.1 below is a result of the dataset generation with the 32 rows of comments 
randomly sorted and labelled from C1 to C32. In Table 7.1, the column “FDBM’s 
Answer” represents the outcomes of the flagged comments and non-flagged 
comments. All the 16 flagged comments detected by the FDBM prototype system in 
the previous chapter are labelled as “y”, whereas the non-flagged comments do not 
have any labels. This 32-row dataset will be used starting from Experiment 1 which 
involves a human expert labelling the comments that are deemed potentially illegal. 
 
Table 7.1 32-row Comments Dataset 
ID Comment FDBM’s 
Answer 
C1 Many of us have been around here for ages! It's been 
manipulated and diluted and now! Well it's a joke. There must 
be some sort of regulation even for aim 
y 
C2  That's champion that is. Wetherspoons…  
C3 derampers fam etc keep the price down for me for 2 more 
weeks I’ll have 10 mill then lol 
 
C4 http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/short-positions-
daily-update.xls 
y 
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C5 brad fall down a well does anyone know?  
C6 Expanding into Namibia like expanding into empty space is no 
particular coup.The county's entire population of 2.1 million 
people is less than half that of Dar es 
Salaamalone.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namibia 
 
C7 i've been away for awhile - what's been going on here (apart 
from sp drop)? 
y 
C8 i cant see them they must be through isdx  
C9 Couldn.t resist.  Another 10000 on Friday to add to my 
holdings and at 10.00p. Now come on Brad where is that RNS 
with all the lovely news of more drills happening more oil 
being pumped bank debt reduced. We know from experience 
what happens to the SP on good news. It flies and not at 
1/10th penny a time. The long term holders must still be here 
and with limited stock available it can only go one way. After 
my last 'buy' I promised Mrs. Smidsy no more. I'm now on 
silent meaIs and sleeping in the spare room. LOL It won't be 
that when we get the RNS. 
y 
C10 Strange drop this morning on little volume unless we see some 
delayed sells?  I've taken the opportunity of the dip in SP to 
top up substantially.  Hoping for news on the processing plant 
and sales. 
y 
C11 Why are people posting RT sold out to the shorters in an 
attempt to stop the short attack? Utter utter rhubarb. 
y 
C12 Between lectures Wormfool? I am wondering why you aren't 
pointing out that xcite managed to get this oil to flow where 
others (including Chevron) couldn't do so? Ah yes I remember 
you are a boiler room deramper (part-time) to pay for your 
student digs. ATB 
 
C13 True! Communication is key. Today's rise was proof of that 
(though partly also a rebound from the quick drop it had). Will 
be interested to see what tomorrow brings. 
y 
C14 For the record I am long and have held firm thru the lows...it's 
just I haven't offered shorting advice that contradicts the 
position that I hold. 
y 
C15 Possibly. I think general concensus is that we shouldn't drop 
below high 3's again - so people may think when no 7/8am RNS 
(and an intra day fairly unlikely) that they can make a few quid 
intra day. Will / should always find support at this level. Wish 
I had the guts / skill / luck .... 
y 
C16 Blimey we are getting cheesed off here. I got in at 10.5p or so 
so not too bad but still a 50% plus drop. Yet I still have faith in 
the Board. From what we glean and extrapolate from info 
released things appear to be moving in the right direction. It's 
a slow and frustrating process. Maybe for the BoD too 
assuming they look at this site. Don't forget that they are 
y 
115 
 
shareholders as well and have a lot at stake. I don't think that 
they have lost enthusiasm but there must be a lot going on in 
the background. E.g. Visitors to the site. A 1million loan can't 
be made as a last throw of the dice surely? More likely with an 
expectation of it being repaid when something big happens. Is 
this wishful thinking? Maybe. Am I tempted to top up? yes but 
I think I will wait yet...GLA 
C17 It worked!!  
C18 Trend going on lately in aim market and difficult to call 
anything. I thought small miners were finished for now and 
look what happens a lot of them go crazy you just couldn't 
make it up especially when you look at their larger counter 
parts here I just don't know anything possible but these drops 
seem rather large considering some of the companies on offer 
but cash is king and the problem here I expect watching closely 
took a punt on Blu and prem could add this to the basket! 
y 
C19 Flow rates out Monday morning? Perhaps? Time to buy now 
before we bounce to 6p on flow rates Then TI should complete 
adding more $$$$ to our increasing monthly income. Just 
topped up another 260000 units will try and add more later 
once I've had a little shuffle round on stocks good 15-20% 
coming next week I feel. Gla. 
y 
C20 At 2p. ok I'm confused…  
C21 Agreed Bel. But I think SAV has different resources. SAV doesn 
t have iron. Secondly the price way down the placing price at 
4.45p. So the drop is overdone. Massively oversold. Expect the 
bounce very soon. 
y 
C22 Thats a great article on HH. It explains it all about how 
irrational some investors are when it comes to news. I think 
the MMs know some investors would panic with no show of 
the black stuff &amp; sell. They stopped short on the well so 
they would not have a blow out if they encountered oil. The 
presence of gas indicates there is oil. They saw it in the mud 
anyhow. 
y 
C23 Ask now @ 6  
C24 double code 1  
C25 Persimmon remains confident about market Persimmon said 
that it remained encouraged by the level of customer 
confidence in the UK housing market as it reported its progress 
from July 1 to November 3 2014 today (November 4). During 
the period which the volume housebuilder said reflected an 
expected return to a more traditional seasonal pattern to 
customer activityit achieved around 696 million of forward 
sales reserved beyond 2014 a 12% increase on last year. Its 
private sale reservation rates were around 2% lower than the 
same period last year. Persimmon pointed out the tough 
comparatives from 2013 when the government introduced the 
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Help to Buy equity loan scheme and its private reservations 
surged 45% ahead of 2012. Its visitor levels equalled those of 
last year. Persimmon also said that although it had successfully 
opened 80 of the 100 new sites scheduled for the second half 
of the year opening new sites without undue delay remained 
one of the industrys biggest constraints. It is currently selling 
homes from around 375 active development sites. But 
Persimmon stated that it was still confident it would deliver 
further growth in group operating profits in the second half. 
With our new site openings land recoveries continue to 
improve and with increased production volumes we are 
capturing further build efficiencies the companys statement 
read. 
C26 I surmise your talking about the one and only ? If so well done 
gl tick tock 
 
C27 Wow we have some right characters on tonight. Looking for 
minimum revenue of 28m for the 6 months positive cash flow 
and a small loss due to 1.5m restructuring costs. Not sure how 
anyone can de-ramp until results are seen but guessing they 
have their own agenda. 
y 
C28 listen.............fill yer boots it will be 37 again soon trust me  
C29 I'm not familiar with any of the branch workings as I work in 
the Asset Finance side our head office is located just behind 
the Cardiff Central train station. I do have a requirement to 
travel to Chiswel Street some weeks but if I'm completely 
honest London is just to busy for my liking. 
 
C30 Well Anth I reckon people are doing exactly what you're 
talking about doing without the ISA buyback. There must be 
some good gains out there. I'm guessing people are crytallising 
some gains offsetting them with a BOR loss and converting to 
cash before the end of December probably will prove to have 
been a good idea. I wish I had decent gains to make. POOM. If 
you've managed to not need glasses til 72 you are doing well. 
i needed them by 47. 
 
C31 LEEK or LEAK anyone ? D21  
C32 What would you suggest trying to explain basic economics to 
the readers of the Sun / Guardian you know the sort of thing 
the difference between deficit and debt? But hey ho I'm not 
holding stock (nor do I have any short positions either) not am 
I holding on to the mindless idea that one can talk the market 
down by 20% a day (and repeat the feat) by talking 
*******s.PS are you interested in my Unicorn farming venture 
I have three breeding pairs and plans to buy 5 more. 
y 
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7.2.1.4 Graphical User Interface (GUI) for STS Experiments 
The original STASIS (Li et al., 2006) algorithm Python script has been slightly modified 
in order to accommodate all the short sentences, phrases and artificially created 
sentences based on the keywords from the P&D IE keyword template. These short 
texts are used in Experiment 2 in Section 7.4 later. The purpose of adding a simple 
GUI for STASIS, as shown in Figure 7.1, is to make the experimental process easier, in 
terms of time consumption during the similarity computation between the short 
texts and the 32-row comments dataset. Another minor modification was also made 
to write all the similarity results into a CSV file, which also makes analysis easier in 
the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 GUI for Semantic Textual Similarity Experiments 
 
7.3 Experiment 1: Human Expert Comments Labelling 
The aim of the experiment is to test whether a human expert in the field can 
determine the flagged comments and non-flagged comments correctly as per the 
answers according to the FDBM prototype system. 
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7.3.1 Hypothesis 
The testable hypothesis for Experiment 1 is listed as follows: 
H0b: A human expert cannot determine the flagged comments and non-
flagged comments correctly as per the answers according to the FDBM 
prototype system. 
H1b: A human expert can determine the flagged comments and non-flagged 
comments correctly as per the answers according to the FDBM prototype 
system. 
 
7.3.2 Methodology 
This section describes the methodology to conduct Experiment 1: 
1. Without disclosing the FDBM’s answer to the human expert, the human 
expert is asked to flag the 32 randomly sorted comments (produced in Section 
7.2.1.3) that were seen to be indicative of potential P&D and non-potential 
P&D. 
2. Once the human expert has labelled all the 32 rows of comments, compare 
the results of both FDBM’s answer and expert’s answer. 
 
7.3.3 Results and Discussions 
Table 7.2 below represents the answers from both the FDBM prototype system and 
the human expert. 
 
Table 7.2 32-row Comments Dataset – With Human Expert’s Answers 
ID FDBM's 
Answer 
Expert's 
Answer 
C1 y y 
C2    
C3  y 
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C4 y  
C5   
C6   
C7 y  
C8   
C9 y y 
C10 y y 
C11 y y 
C12  y 
C13 y  
C14 y  
C15 y y 
C16 y y 
C17   
C18 y  
C19 y y 
C20   
C21 y y 
C22 y y 
C23  y 
C24   
C25   
C26   
C27 y y 
C28  y 
C29   
C30   
C31  y 
C32 y  
 
Comparing the answers between those that are labelled by the FDBM prototype 
system and those that are labelled by the human expert, the human expert has 
labelled 10 flagged comments and 11 non-flagged comments which match with the 
results from the FDBM prototype system. This yields a 65.6% accuracy in terms of the 
matches between both results. 
There are six flagged comments (determined by FDBM) that the human expert 
labelled as non-potentially illegal. There are also five non-flagged comments 
(determined by FDBM) that the human expert labelled as potentially illegal. To 
understand the discrepancies, the results are evaluated. From Table 7.1, take the 
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comment “C4” as an example (which appears to be just a link, i.e. “http:// 
www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/short-positions-daily-update.xls”).  
FDBM labels comment “C4” as a potentially illegal comment, whereas the human 
expert did not label it as a potentially illegal comment. The entire comment in “C4” 
is merely a website link. FDBM picked it up as potentially illegal mainly due to the 
matching keyword. On the other hand, the human expert argued that the link 
pointing to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA – a financial regulatory body in the 
UK which operates independently from the UK government) does not represent a 
potentially illegal comment. It is true that the link and the content of the link do not 
show any indication of an illegal comment. However, as discussed earlier in the 
experimental results in Chapter 6, from the FDBM prototype system’s perspective, if 
a comment is labelled as a potentially illegal comment, this will direct the relevant 
authority’s attention to allow them to decide whether to inspect the FDB discussions 
surrounding a particular flagged comment on the same day, three days or even five 
days. 
 
7.4 Experiment 2: STS Approach for Comments Flagging 
The aim of this experiment is to test whether the STS approach can be associated 
with the process of comments flagging in the forward analysis, in order to allow the 
relevant authorities to prioritise the investigation based on the STS similarity scores. 
For example, if the similarity score is higher than a certain threshold when comparing 
a keyword, phrase or short sentence to a comment, then this comment is worth 
investigation by the relevant authorities.  
The P&D IE keyword template, presented in Section 5.6, contains the following 20 
short sentences: 
1. "When I post you better believe me" 
2. "Do not doubt me on this one" 
3. "Anyone who sells to make a small profit is very short sighted" 
4. "This is the chance" 
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5. "Price will go up" 
6. "Buy as quickly as possible" 
7. "Take what profit you can" 
8. "About to run, get in today" 
9. "Adding a few more don’t let the shorts win here" 
10. "Buying opportunity this AM" 
11. "Still looks good for a run" 
12. "This is the opportunity" 
13. "shall go up again after today" 
14. "Make a pretty penny" 
15. "Now is the time" 
16. "Chance to make some real dollars" 
17. "This stock might not have any trouble hitting over" 
18. "May be too late if we wait a bit longer" 
19. "Sell as quickly as possible" 
20. "Get out while you can" 
 
The P&D IE keyword template also contains a total of 97 keywords and phrases, 
which the keywords are artificially transformed into longer texts so that they can be 
tested using the STS approach. The following list demonstrates a list of the artificially 
created very short texts and the original phrases from the P&D IE keyword template:
1. "Is this Pnd" 
2. "Did he try to Manipulate" 
3. "Are you Manipulating?" 
4. "This is Misleading" 
5. "Are you deceiving" 
6. "It is a Hoax" 
7. "It is a Scam" 
8. "Are you Falsifying" 
9. "Is that a Cheat" 
10. "Are you Spreading rumours" 
11. "Artificially raising price" 
12. "He is Pumping" 
13. "Are you Ramping" 
14. "Is this a tip" 
15. "Are you elevating" 
16. "Are you boosting" 
17. "Might Get rich" 
18. "Make a killing" 
19. "Make a fortune" 
20. "Make money" 
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21. "Make big bucks" 
22. "Make a bundle" 
23. "Make a bomb" 
24. "Make a packet" 
25. "Hit it big" 
26. "You will Gain profit" 
27. "You can Become wealthy" 
28. "Strike it rich" 
29. "Dump it now" 
30. "Is he Dumping" 
31. "I am Shorting" 
32. "Do not Opt out" 
33. "Do not Abandon" 
34. "Do not Back out" 
35. "Give up the ship" 
36. "Do not Pull out" 
37. "Do not Let go" 
38. "Pump and dump" 
39. "pump dump" 
40. "you are Manipulating stock" 
41. "Chop stock" 
42. "That is a False statement" 
43. "Misleading statement" 
44. "Misleading positive statement" 
45. "Once-in-a-lifetime" 
46. "Once in a lifetime" 
47. "Pump the price" 
48. "Pump the share" 
49. "Pump this stock" 
50. "it has an Inflated price" 
51. "This is a Hot stock" 
52. "Huge volume spike" 
53. "Let us Keep ramping" 
54. "On hypes" 
55. "You should Buy now" 
56. "It has a Good future" 
57. "Invested so heavily" 
58. "It will fly" 
59. "You should Buy more" 
60. "Rock bottom price" 
61. "Buy on dips" 
62. "These are the Best tips" 
63. "It is a Good tip" 
64. "Dump the price" 
65. "Dump the share" 
66. "It will Fall hard" 
67. "Sell it now" 
68. "You should Sell quickly" 
69. "It is a Declining stock"
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The list contains 69 short texts instead of 97 short texts because some keywords are 
redundant when they are transformed into short texts. For example, the keyword 
“manipulate”, “manipulation”, “manipulating” and “manipulative” are all transformed 
into just two very short texts instead of four very short texts. 
 
7.4.1 Hypothesis 
The testable hypothesis for this experiment is listed as follows: 
H0b: The STS approach cannot be used to flag comments by comparing the 
semantic meaning between the comments and the keywords, phrases and 
short sentences in the P&D IE keyword template. 
H1b: The STS method can be used to flag comments by comparing the semantic 
meaning between the comments and the keywords, phrases and short 
sentences in the P&D IE keyword template. 
 
7.4.2 Methodology 
This section describes the methodology to conduct the experiment: 
1. Execute the GUI-enabled STASIS Python script (Section 7.2.1.4), which already 
has the 32 comments and the 89 short texts (which include short sentences, 
phrases and artificially created short text based on keywords in the P&D IE 
keyword template) preloaded. 
2. Compute the semantic similarity between all the 32 comments and all the 89 
short texts. 
3. Record all the similarity results produced through the CSV file. 
4. Set similarity thresholds of 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65 and 0.7 and empirically compare 
the STS results with the answers by a human expert (from Experiment 1) and 
FDBM. The semantic similarity threshold of 0.5 was chosen as the lowest point as 
this allows observations of moderate to higher similarity. 
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7.4.3 Results and Discussions 
In Experiment 1, Table 7.2 has shown the potential illegal comment labelling performed 
by the human expert as compared to the ones that were flagged by the FDBM prototype 
system using the P&D IE keyword template. In this experiment, the semantic similarity 
between each comment and each short text are computed. 
On the X-axis in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 below each of the 32 rows of comments (i.e. 
C1 to C32) from Table 7.1 in the previous section are represented, whereas the Y-axis 
represents the total count for the short texts with similarity scores which are higher than 
the semantic similarity thresholds. On first glance, it can be seen in Figure 7.2 and Figure 
7.3 that by using a semantic similarity threshold of 0.5, a total of 14 comments (i.e. C1, 
C5, C9, C10, C13, C14, C16, C17, C19, C22, C23, C25, C29, C32) are worth investigating 
for potentially illegal activities on FDBs. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Total Count of the Short Texts whose Similarity Scores are Higher than the Semantic 
Similarity Thresholds (Line Chart) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
C
1
C
2
C
3
C
4
C
5
C
6
C
7
C
8
C
9
C
1
0
C
1
1
C
1
2
C
1
3
C
1
4
C
1
5
C
1
6
C
1
7
C
1
8
C
1
9
C
2
0
C
2
1
C
2
2
C
2
3
C
2
4
C
2
5
C
2
6
C
2
7
C
2
8
C
2
9
C
3
0
C
3
1
C
3
2
Total Count of the Short Texts That Their 
Similarity Scores are Higher Than the 
Semantic Similarity Thresholds
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
125 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Total Count of the Short Texts whose Similarity Scores are Higher than the Semantic 
Similarity Thresholds (Stacked Bar Chart) 
 
As can also be seen from Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3, a semantic similarity threshold of 0.55 
also shows an obvious pattern similar to the threshold of 0.5. The graph pattern for 
threshold 0.6 and above is not really obvious, in terms of flagging potentially illegal FDB 
comments. 
Table 7.3 below represents the same data being visualised in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3, 
but with an additional two columns taken from Table 7.2 from Experiment 1 (i.e. the 
“FDBM’s Answer” and the “Expert’s Answer” columns). This allows the comparisons 
among the FDBM’s Answer, Expert’s Answer and the semantic similarity thresholds. 
 
Table 7.3 Total Count of the Short Texts whose Similarity Scores are Higher than the Semantic 
Similarity Thresholds 
ID FDBM's 
Answer 
Expert's 
Answer 
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 
C1 y y 61 48 30 13 5 
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C2    1 0 0 0 0 
C3  y 0 0 0 0 0 
C4 y  9 1 0 0 0 
C5   21 13 7 3 1 
C6   0 0 0 0 0 
C7 y  1 0 0 0 0 
C8   1 1 0 0 0 
C9 y y 40 10 0 0 0 
C10 y y 36 11 1 0 0 
C11 y y 21 6 1 0 0 
C12  y 0 0 0 0 0 
C13 y  63 47 21 8 3 
C14 y  40 17 1 0 0 
C15 y y 3 0 0 0 0 
C16 y y 41 8 0 0 0 
C17   35 29 25 17 10 
C18 y  0 0 0 0 0 
C19 y y 19 2 0 0 0 
C20   0 0 0 0 0 
C21 y y 0 0 0 0 0 
C22 y y 26 7 0 0 0 
C23  y 19 14 7 4 2 
C24   26 16 12 5 1 
C25   31 2 0 0 0 
C26   0 0 0 0 0 
C27 y y 5 0 0 0 0 
C28  y 3 0 0 0 0 
C29   51 28 8 1 0 
C30   12 0 0 0 0 
C31  y 1 0 0 0 0 
C32 y  68 53 32 9 0 
 
 
It can be observed that, for example, comment C1 was flagged by the FDBM prototype 
system as potentially illegal; at the same time, it has a total count of 61 short texts whose 
similarity score is higher than the threshold of 0.5. In this case, it is assumed that the 
accuracy of the STS approach is matched by the FDBM’s. Another example in Table 7.3 
above is that comment C3 is not flagged as potentially illegal by FDBM and, at the same 
time, it has zero counts of short texts that exceed the similarity threshold of 0.5. In this 
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case, it is also assumed that the accuracy of the STS approach is matched by the FDBM 
analysis. Thus, due to these assumptions, there is a total of 19 cases (regardless of 
whether they are flagged or not) out of the 32 cases (i.e. the 32 comments) in Table 7.3 
above that accurately match the STS approach and FDBM’s analysis. 
Looking deeper into the 19 cases (which contain both flagged and non-flagged 
comments), there are as many as 14 of them which are flagged comments. This means 
in Table 7.3 above there are a total of 16 flagged comments that were flagged by FDBM, 
and 14 of them are also flagged by the semantic threshold of 0.5. This yields an accuracy 
of 87.5%. 
Next, by observing the semantic similarity threshold of 0.55, it can be seen that, when 
taking comment C15 for example, there is a zero count of short texts hitting the 
threshold of 0.55 despite having three counts for the threshold 0.5. In this case, it can be 
assumed that there is not an accurate match between the STS approach and FDBM’s 
analysis for the threshold of 0.55. For the threshold of 0.55, it is observed that there is a 
total of 20 cases out of the 32 cases in Table 7.3 that are matched accurately between 
the STS approach and FDBM’s analysis. 
Looking deeper into the 20 cases (which contain both flagged and non-flagged 
comments), there are as many as 11 of them which are flagged comments. This means 
in Table 7.3 above there is a total of 16 flagged comments that were flagged by FDBM, 
and 11 of them are also flagged by the semantic threshold of 0.55. This gives an accuracy 
of 68.75%. 
A semantic similarity threshold of 0.6 and above has less than 17 cases that are matched 
accurately between the STS approach and FDBM’s analysis. The matched cases reduce 
in number when the threshold increases. It appears that the optimal threshold for the 
relevant authorities to use is 0.5 because it yields the highest accuracy of 87.5% when 
matching flagged comments with the short texts using the STS approach. 
When comparing the STS approach to the expert’s answers, for the threshold of 0.5 and 
0.55, there are only 16 cases and 15 cases of accurate matches respectively, regardless 
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of flagged or non-flagged comments. For the threshold of 0.5, out of the 16 matched 
cases, there is a total of 12 flagged comments. Since there are 16 flagged comments in 
Table 7.3 above, this yields an accuracy of 75% because 12 out of the 16 flagged 
comments are correctly matched between the expert’s answer and a similarity threshold 
of 0.5. 
As for the threshold of 0.55, out of the 15 matched cases, there is a total of 8 flagged 
comments. Since there are 16 flagged comments in Table 7.3 above, this yields an 
accuracy of only 50% because only half (i.e. 8 flagged comments) out of the 16 flagged 
comments are correctly matched between the expert’s answer and similarity threshold 
of 0.55. 
The results and discussions in this experiment appear to reject the null hypothesis and 
accept the hypothesis (H1b) as it is proven that it has the potential to aid the relevant 
authorities during the detection of potentially illegal FDB activities. 
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to conduct two experiments surrounding the Semantic 
Textual Similarity (STS) approach. The aim of these experiments was to test whether the 
STS approach can be adopted alongside the novel forward analysis and backward 
analysis. The STASIS algorithm (Li et al., 2006) has been used for experimental purposes 
because it takes function words and word orders into account in addition to its algorithm 
being more computationally efficient as compared to LSA. The results of the experiments 
were discussed and results suggest that the semantic similarity threshold of 0.5 is the 
optimal threshold for FDB comment data. This is due to the high accuracy being yielded 
from the experiments. For example, for the threshold of 0.5, out of all the 19 matched 
cases (a mixture of flagged and non-flagged comments), there is a total of 14 flagged 
comments flagged by both FDBM and the STS approach. This chapter concludes that STS 
has high future potential to be used alongside the novel forward and backward analysis 
in detecting fraudulent FDB posts. 
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Chapter 8.  Conclusion and Further Work 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising each chapter, followed by describing 
the contributions of this research work in relation to the research aim and objectives. 
Future directions of this research work will also be discussed in the following sections. 
 
8.2 Thesis Summary 
This thesis presented a financial crime analysis methodology for Financial Discussion 
Boards (FDBs) using Information Extraction (IE) techniques, Moving Average (MA) 
techniques and a Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) approach. 
Chapter 2 introduced the stock exchange in the UK, namely the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE, 2017). Then, it introduced the three share price based Financial Discussion Boards 
(FDBs) based in the UK whose share prices data are obtained from the LSE. However, the 
comments posted on these FDBs are not identical, unless some comment authors 
intentionally repeat the identical comments on all three FDBs, which is rare. While 
reviewing the three FDBs, the chapter also identified the semantically understandable 
artefacts on the FDBs. FDB artefact data like ticker symbol, comments and share prices 
were taken into account in experimental chapters. Subsequently, the stock market 
regulatory agencies in both the UK and the US were also presented. The chapter also 
highlighted the existing popular Pump and Dump (P&D) financial crime cases that have 
happened on FDBs which were mainly dealt with by the regulatory agency in the US. It 
then followed by giving reports of the existing research related to P&D financial crime 
which has happened through methods such as emails, social media and FDBs. Almost all 
the FDB research in the past has tended to focus on prediction through trading volume 
and quantified content from the Internet (Jin et al., 2016) instead of focusing on the 
share price movements and moderating the context of the content such as FDB 
comments. To the best knowledge of the thesis author, other than Delort et al. (2011) 
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who attempted to moderate the Online Discussion Sites (ODSs) using a machine learning 
approach, and the initial work presented by Knott and Owda (2012) using a knowledge 
engineering approach, there is no evidence of other work attempting to moderate FDBs 
using moderation tools. 
Chapter 3 reviewed the three types of data structures that can be collected from the 
Internet. It then introduced the two fundamental classes of Information Extraction (IE), 
namely a knowledge engineering approach and automatic learning approach. A 
knowledge engineering approach, which is also known as a rule-based approach, has 
been discussed as it is the approach used by the template-based IE prototype system, 
namely FDBs Miner (FDBM) in this thesis. Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) was also 
introduced in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 introduced a methodology (which comprised both novel forward analysis and 
backward analysis methodologies) and a novel architecture for the detection of potential 
financial crime activities on the share price based FDBs. The methodology for identifying 
the FDBs and the semantically understandable artefacts were described. This was 
followed by a description of an overall methodology (Section 4.3) for the development 
and implementation of the prototype system, which is divided into seven phases (i.e. the 
implementation of a data crawler, data transformer, dataset for storing FDB data, 
construction of a P&D IE keyword template, novel forward analyser, novel backward 
analyser and STS approach).  
A prototype system architecture overview was presented in Chapter 5. The six sections 
(Section 5.3 to Section 5.8) in the same chapter described each of the components in the 
architecture that implements the 7-phase methodology. Lastly, the Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) of the data crawler, novel forward analyser and novel backward analyser 
was presented. 
Chapter 6 conducted a series of experiments for the novel forward analysis and 
backward analysis introduced in this research – two experiments for the forward analysis 
and another two for the backward analysis. The outcomes of the experiments were also 
discussed and it appeared to be supporting all the experiments’ hypotheses. Chapter 7 
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also presented experiments using the Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) approach to test 
whether the STS approach can be adopted in the detection of potentially illegal FDB 
activities. The outcomes of the experiments were also discussed and they appeared to 
be supporting the experiments’ hypotheses. Finally, Chapter 8 concluded the thesis, 
highlighting the contributions and discussing the potential future directions of this 
research. 
 
8.3 Contributions Summary 
The key contribution of this research is the creation of a semi-automated template-based 
IE prototype system, namely Financial Discussion Boards Miner (FDBM), that can be used 
for the detection of potentially illegal P&D or other financial crimes such as Insider 
Information (II) on share price based FDBs. 
The contributions are elaborated as follows: 
1. A semi-automated stock market surveillance prototype system, namely FDBs 
Miner (FDBM), developed based on the novel methodologies devised in 
Contribution 5. 
2. A crawler component in the FDBM prototype system that is capable of crawling 
semi-structured data from FDBs. 
3. A data transformer component that can pre-process and transform the FDBs 
related semi-structured data, collected in Contribution 1, into structured data. 
4. A novel FDB dataset (FDB-DS) that contains FDB artefact data such as ticker 
symbols, FDB comments, share prices, broker ratings and director deals data that 
belonged to all the 941 companies (picked from the FTSE-100 and FTSE AIM All-
Share indices) on the London Stock Exchange (LSE, 2017). 
5. Two novel methodologies, namely forward analysis and backward analysis, that 
utilise IE and Moving Average (MA) techniques have been established for the 
detection of potentially illegal P&D activities on FDBs involving FDB comments 
and share prices. 
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6. A predefined IE keyword template constructed based on P&D financial crime. The 
template contains keywords, phrases and sentences, that are commonly used by 
fraudsters on FDBs. It can be employed in real-world scenarios by the relevant 
authorities. 
7. A system that is capable of performing anomaly detection in terms of potential 
P&D activities on FDBs and other potential financial crimes on FDBs provided if 
the IE keywords templates are devised. 
8. A system that can integrate with a Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) approach to 
compare the semantic similarity between the FDB comments and the keywords, 
phrases and short sentences in the P&D IE keyword template. This aids the 
relevant authorities to investigate potentially illegal FDB comments based on 
different semantic similarity thresholds in addition to the two novel 
methodologies described in Contribution 5. 
 
8.4 Future Directions 
The FDBM prototype system in this research does not represent the final solution or 
definitive version of the stock market surveillance system in relation to share price based 
FDBs. There are several potential future works that can be undertaken in order to 
enhance the functionality and extend the features of FDBM for surveillance of potentially 
illegal activities on FDBs. 
Possible functionality and feature related future works are listed below: 
• The creation of other potential financial crimes in relation to the share price 
based FDBs such as Insider Information (II). II is not as popular as P&D in relation 
to share price based FDBs. However, it is also possible that it might occur on FDBs. 
Hence, if a predefined IE keyword template can be devised and validated by 
experts in the field, FDBM can also be used to detect potentially illegal II FDB 
comments. 
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• The director deals and broker ratings FDB artefact data were collected in the 
process of data crawling in Section 5.3. These data may possibly be involved in 
suspicious FDB comment flagging alongside comments and share prices. 
• At the time the artefacts data were collected, FDB comments’ RSS feed (in the 
form of XML files – semi-structured data) were crawled and transformed into 
structured data. However, London South East FDB (LSE-FDB, 2017) has since 
removed the RSS feed option on the website. Hence, as part of future work, the 
data crawler component could be modified in order to crawl HTML files to obtain 
the FDB comments instead. This would also be suitable for crawling the 
comments on ADVFN (ADVFN, 2017) because it has never provided any RSS feed. 
• FDB comments from other countries such as HotCopper Australia (HotCopper, 
2017) may also be suitable for investigations through the use of the FDBM 
prototype system, as long as it is capable of crawling data in the supported format 
such as RSS feed or the HTML format as part of the future work. 
• FDB-FS may be published and made public for further research by researchers in 
the field. 
• The FDBM prototype system can be revised and improved by constructing a 
richer Graphical User Interface (GUI) for better visualisation such as visualising 
the price hike thresholds in the forward analysis, moving average thresholds in 
the backward analysis and semantic similarity thresholds in the Semantic Textual 
Similarity (STS) approach. 
• It is also possible to create a more sophisticated set of filters on the backward 
analyser GUI to allow advanced filtration of data for investigation purposes. 
 
8.5 Overall Conclusion  
In conclusion, this thesis reviewed the stock exchange in the UK, namely the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE, 2017); three share price based FDBs in the UK, namely ADVFN 
(ADVFN, 2017), London South East (LSE-FDB, 2017) and Interactive Investors (III, 2017); 
functions of the stock market regulatory agencies in both the US and UK, namely The 
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Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
respectively; and, Pump and Dump (P&D) financial crimes and existing studies in relation 
to FDBs. The three types of data structures that can be collected from the Internet and 
the challenges of collecting and processing them have also been discussed. Two 
Information Extraction (IE) approaches, namely a Knowledge Engineering approach and 
an Automatic Learning approach, have also been reviewed. 
A FDBM prototype system was presented. It implemented a methodology (which 
comprises a novel forward analysis and backward analysis) and architecture (which 
comprises seven components). The FDBM prototype system can aid the relevant 
authorities to proactively monitor and detect potentially illegal activities on the FDBs. 
With the creation of the FDBM prototype system, the problems faced by relevant 
authorities and FDB moderators of not having enough manpower or time to monitor 
share price based FDBs for potentially illegal activities could be solved; this would then 
directly benefit novice investors, who are normally the ones deceived by financial crime 
fraudsters. 
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Appendix F 
 
threshold_Yes_No * sma3_threshold_YesNo 
Crosstabulation 
 
 
sma3_threshold_YesNo 
Total 0 1 
threshold_Yes_No 0 36807 1686 38493 
1 9878 1487 11365 
Total 46685 3173 49858 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1115.521a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 1114.061 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 955.839 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1115.498 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 49858     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 723.28. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .150 .005 33.779 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.150 .005 33.779 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
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threshold_Yes_No * sma5_threshold_YesNo 
Crosstabulation 
 
 
sma5_threshold_YesN
o 
Total 0 1 
threshold_Yes_N
o 
0 36432 2061 38493 
1 9823 1542 11365 
Total 46255 3603 49858 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 882.971a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 881.746 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 771.575 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
882.953 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 49858     
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .133 .005 29.981 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.133 .005 29.981 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
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threshold_Yes_No * wma1_threshold_YesNo 
Crosstabulation 
 
 
wma1_threshold_Yes
No 
Total 0 1 
threshold_Yes_N
o 
0 37770 723 38493 
1 10552 813 11365 
Total 48322 1536 49858 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 817.788a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 816.022 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 679.730 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
817.771 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 49858     
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .128 .006 28.834 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.128 .006 28.834 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
 
 
 
 
174 
 
 
threshold_Yes_No * wma3_threshold_YesNo 
Crosstabulation 
 
 
wma3_threshold_Yes
No 
Total 0 1 
threshold_Yes_N
o 
0 37332 1161 38493 
1 10206 1159 11365 
Total 47538 2320 49858 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1020.068a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 1018.450 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 860.131 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1020.047 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 49858     
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .143 .005 32.270 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.143 .005 32.270 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
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threshold_Yes_No * sma5_threshold_YesNo 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
sma5_threshold_YesN
o 
Total 0 1 
threshold_Yes_N
o 
0 36941 1552 38493 
1 9999 1366 11365 
Total 46940 2918 49858 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1015.955a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 1014.506 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 869.726 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1015.935 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 49858     
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .143 .005 32.203 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.143 .005 32.203 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
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threshold_Yes_No * ema1_threshold_YesNo 
Crosstabulation 
 
 
ema1_threshold_Yes
No 
Total 0 1 
threshold_Yes_N
o 
0 36925 1568 38493 
1 10324 1041 11365 
Total 47249 2609 49858 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 457.733a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 456.708 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 404.356 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
457.723 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 49858     
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .096 .005 21.493 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.096 .005 21.493 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
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threshold_Yes_No * ema3_threshold_YesNo 
Crosstabulation 
 
 
ema3_threshold_Yes
No 
Total 0 1 
threshold_Yes_N
o 
0 35006 3487 38493 
1 10082 1283 11365 
Total 45088 4770 49858 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 50.445a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 50.187 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 48.715 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
50.444 1 .000 
  
N of Valid Cases 49858     
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .032 .005 7.106 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.032 .005 7.106 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
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threshold_Yes_No * ema5_threshold_YesNo 
Crosstabulation 
 
 
ema5_threshold_Yes
No 
Total 0 1 
threshold_Yes_N
o 
0 34578 3915 38493 
1 10175 1190 11365 
Total 44753 5105 49858 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .860a 1 .354   
Continuity Correctionb .827 1 .363   
Likelihood Ratio .856 1 .355   
Fisher's Exact Test    .360 .182 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.860 1 .354 
  
N of Valid Cases 49858     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1163.67. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .004 .005 .927 .354c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.004 .005 .927 .354c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
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Appendix G 
 
threshold_Recoded * sma3_threshold Crosstabulation 
 
 
sma3_threshold 
Total <5% 5-10% 10-15% 15% 
threshold_Recode
d 
<5 36807 1039 291 356 38493 
Y 4702 306 62 127 5197 
A 2182 259 49 65 2555 
R 2994 126 85 408 3613 
Total 46685 1730 487 956 49858 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2547.308a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 1562.973 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1855.383 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 24.96. 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .193 .007 43.898 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.160 .006 36.086 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on normal approximation. 
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threshold_Recoded * sma5_threshold Crosstabulation 
 
 
sma5_threshold 
Total less than 5% 5-10% 10-15% 15% 
threshold_Recode
d 
<5 36432 1300 366 395 38493 
Y 4677 274 100 146 5197 
A 2214 183 64 94 2555 
R 2932 84 97 500 3613 
Total 46255 1841 627 1135 49858 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2780.888a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 1655.006 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2038.913 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 32.13. 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .202 .007 46.106 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.146 .006 32.914 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on normal approximation. 
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threshold_Recoded * wma1_threshold Crosstabulation 
 
 
wma1_threshold 
Total less than 5% 5-10% 10-15% 15% 
threshold_Recoded <5 37770 329 184 210 38493 
Y 4874 174 79 70 5197 
A 2425 64 33 33 2555 
R 3253 157 58 145 3613 
Total 48322 724 354 458 49858 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1060.195a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 779.747 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
783.966 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 18.14. 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .125 .007 28.222 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.132 .006 29.820 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on normal approximation. 
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threshold_Recoded * wma3_threshold Crosstabulation 
 
 
wma3_threshold 
Total less than 5% 5-10% 10-15% 15% 
threshold_Recoded <5 37332 644 206 311 38493 
Y 4757 258 83 99 5197 
A 2355 110 37 53 2555 
R 3094 126 78 315 3613 
Total 47538 1138 404 778 49858 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1856.282a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 1187.552 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1459.724 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 20.70. 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .171 .007 38.778 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.150 .006 33.926 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on normal approximation. 
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threshold_Recoded * wma5_threshold Crosstabulation 
 
 
wma5_threshold 
Total less than 5% 5-10% 10-15% 15% 
threshold_Recoded <5 36941 963 253 336 38493 
Y 4728 288 66 115 5197 
A 2256 191 40 68 2555 
R 3015 107 99 392 3613 
Total 46940 1549 458 911 49858 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2367.292a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 1443.309 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1811.735 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 23.47. 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .191 .007 43.359 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.153 .006 34.506 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on normal approximation. 
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threshold_Recoded * ema1_threshold Crosstabulation 
 
 
ema1_threshold 
Total less than 5% 5-10% 10-15% 15% 
threshold_Recoded <5 36925 904 236 428 38493 
Y 4804 178 42 173 5197 
A 2325 85 36 109 2555 
R 3195 127 64 227 3613 
Total 47249 1294 378 937 49858 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 770.471a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 598.815 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
740.092 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 19.37. 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .122 .006 27.409 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.102 .005 22.824 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on normal approximation. 
 
 
 
185 
 
threshold_Recoded * ema3_threshold Crosstabulation 
 
 
ema3_threshold 
Total less than 5% 5-10% 10-15% 15% 
threshold_Recoded <5 35006 2641 269 577 38493 
Y 4623 302 70 202 5197 
A 2295 88 32 140 2555 
R 3164 82 69 298 3613 
Total 45088 3113 440 1217 49858 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1009.042a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 829.621 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
458.685 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 22.55. 
 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .096 .006 21.516 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.039 .005 8.691 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on normal approximation. 
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threshold_Recoded * ema5_threshold Crosstabulation 
 
 
ema5_threshold 
Total less than 5% 5-10% 10-15% 15% 
threshold_Recoded <5 34578 2765 467 683 38493 
Y 4734 150 125 188 5197 
A 2323 40 26 166 2555 
R 3118 117 55 323 3613 
Total 44753 3072 673 1360 49858 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1138.311a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 984.008 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
349.913 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 49858   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 34.49. 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Interval by 
Interval 
Pearson's R .084 .006 18.772 .000c 
Ordinal by 
Ordinal 
Spearman 
Correlation 
.016 .005 3.517 .000c 
N of Valid Cases 49858    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on normal approximation. 
 
 
 
